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BUILDING SOCIALISM IN THE NATIONAL CLASSROOM: EDUCATION AND 
LANGUAGE POLICY IN SOVIET UKRAINE, 1923-30 
 
In the early 1920s, the Soviet government in the republic of Ukraine embarked on 
an ambitious project to teach Ukrainian children in their native tongue.  The 
establishment of a network of Ukrainian-language primary schools was part of a republic-
wide program known as Ukrainization, which called for the promotion of the Ukrainian 
language and professional advancement of Ukrainian ethnic elites.  This study, based on 
archival evidence and contemporaneous press accounts, analyzes the Ukrainization of 
primary schools, arguably the policy’s greatest success.   It contends that educational 
planners pursued a program for social transformation by linking Ukrainian-language 
instruction with an innovative, progressive pedagogy.   Soviet authorities believed that a 
Ukrainian “new school” would allow teachers to effectively and quickly train children for 
a public role in the new socialist state. However, the number of Ukrainian-speakers in the 
Communist Party remained proportionately small.  Authorities relied on non-party 
intelligentsia for the design and implementation of Ukrainization.  As educators assumed 
a central role in the campaign, the party grew apprehensive about its capacity to control 
their initiative.  Complaints by Russian-speaking parents regarding the forced 
Ukrainization of their children also gave the party further reason for concern.    
Although teachers’ qualitative knowledge of Ukrainian continued to be poor after 
Ukrainization was formally achieved in the schools, this study concludes that the 
enthusiastic efforts of some educators and the ardent support of their patrons in the 
government unnerved the party’s leadership.  It condemned what it viewed as nationalism 
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in the schools because it did not have direct management over the classroom and feared 
the potential corruption of the very generation it hoped would “build socialism.”  It 
ultimately sanctioned the arrest and trial of teachers who had too warmly welcomed 
Ukrainization and the pedagogical experimentation it had permitted.    
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have suppressed soft signs for proper names in the text, but retained them in the footnotes 
and bibliography for accurate reference.   Additionally, I have used Ukrainian place 
names and Ukrainian abbreviations for republican branches of government, noting the 
Russian variant in parentheses at their first mention.  Lastly, I have relied on 
transliteration from the Russian for non-Ukrainian party figures.  
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1 
Introduction 
Now we issue a call for Ukrainization, for a rebirth of national culture for social 
reasons, in the name of a living historical current which takes us through the vast 
mouth of a river to the sea of a new social life.1 
 
 
In 1923, Soviet authorities began a nationalities program that promised the 
transformation of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (UkSSR) and the creation of a 
new society.  Labeled Ukrainization, the campaign was part of the larger policy of 
korenizatsiia (indigenization), an all-Union strategy for the advancement of non-Russian 
languages and promotion of non-Russians in the Communist Party, republican 
governments, and trade unions.  While there has been much scholarly attention placed on 
party level debates over Ukrainization, there has not been a detailed examination of how 
the program was realized on a local level.  Thus, this dissertation begins with a simple 
question: How was Ukrainization both experienced and interpreted by the individuals 
who were entrusted with its execution and success?   
Primary schools provide the most productive arena in which to investigate this 
question since these schools were the sites of Ukrainization’s most rapid achievements.  
According to the 1926 census, 80.0 percent of the UkSSR’s population was ethnically 
Ukrainian.2  On paper, the percentage of Ukrainian-language schools rose from 50.7 
percent at the beginning of 1923 to 87 percent by 1932.3  Ukrainian Commissariat of 
                                                 
1 P. Sapukhin, “Spravy ukrainizatsii. Oblik ukrainizatsiia vchytel’stva,” Narodnii uchytel’, 15 December 
1925, 3. 
2 George Liber, Soviet Nationality Policy, Urban Growth, and Identity Change in the Ukrainian SSR, 1928-
1934 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 188.  The 1926 census was the last official census 
until 1939.   
3 Tsentral’nyi derzhavnyi arkhiv vykonnykh orhaniv Ukrainy (TsDAVOU), f. 166, op. 4, spr. 129; 
Krawchenko, 135. 
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Education (Narodnii komisariat osvity - Narkomos) records, party communications, 
pedagogical journals, and the teachers’ newspaper not only chronicle the development of 
Ukrainization, but also how educators both understood and employed directives.  What 
emerges from these documents, however, is not simply an account of the development of 
Ukrainian-language instruction, but the reimagining of the entire school curriculum.   The 
party intended schools to be the training ground for a new generation of skilled, 
politically conscious, and economically informed Soviet citizens, and Ukrainization was 
seen as the primary means to this end.  It was through the national language that the 
Soviet ideal was to be realized.  
 But as this material illustrates, Ukrainization in the schools was by no means 
easily accomplished.  The success of the linguistic aspect of Ukrainization relied on 
educators who would not only teach children in Ukrainian, but also instruct government 
bureaucrats, party officials, and rank and file workers in the language.  Additionally, they 
had an immense amount of responsibility within the classroom itself.   Teachers had to 
use and, in many cases learn, not only a new language of instruction, but also a radical 
form of pedagogy.  Further, despite proclamations regarding the importance of education, 
the reality was that the Communist Party’s support of the new educational system and its 
trust of teachers were limited.  A group of leading educators was among the first to suffer 
because of the party’s suspicion of their management of everyday Ukrainization.  This 
fear stemmed less from an actual threat and more from the concern of republican and 
central authorities about a program that had the potential to become unmanageable.  The 
arrest and denouncement of prominent non-party Ukrainizers foreshadow the 
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abandonment of a particular form of social transformation that they had supported.  What 
ultimately becomes apparent through an investigation of Ukrainization on the local level 
is that language and the school house were inextricably linked. 
 
Assessing Ukrainization 
By choosing to focus on the daily implementation of Ukrainization, this study 
parts with previous works largely concerned with high level discussions of nationalities 
policy.  James Mace’s groundbreaking look at Ukrainian national communism centers on 
Moscow’s response to debates over the scope and intent of Ukrainization within the 
UkSSR.4  He ably describes some of the party leadership’s early identification of 
“deviations” in nationalities policy and his account of the active Ukrainization work 
undertaken by administrators in the Commissariat of Education (Narkomos) and the 
intelligentsia provided direction for this study’s focus on schooling.  However, Mace’s 
final concern is the formulation (and constraint) of an ideology of national communism, 
not the day-to-day implementation of Ukrainization.  Similarly, George Liber’s work on 
identity formation during Ukrainization describes the policy’s quantitative successes, but 
says less about the mechanics of the program.  He cites a trend towards increased 
Ukrainian self-identification in the trade unions and party and an important rise in the 
urbanization of ethnic Ukrainians: between 1920 and 1926 the proportion of ethnic 
Ukrainians in the republic’s cities rose from 32.2 to 47.2 percent.5  However, Liber stops 
                                                 
4 James E. Mace, Communism and the Dilemmas of National Liberation: National Communism in Soviet 
Ukraine, 1918-1933 (Cambridge: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 1983). 
5 The proportion of ethnic Russians and Jews in the cites dropped from 33.4 to 25.0 percent and 29.0 to 
22.7 percent respectively.  Liber, 187. 
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short of broadly demonstrating how individuals interacted in and understood this newly 
legitimized and defined Ukrainian-speaking environment.   It is only by highlighting the 
story of those whom Soviet republican authorities tasked to carry out Ukrainization that 
we approach a real understanding of the policy’s degree of acceptance and impact.     
This work’s close reading of the daily implementation of Ukrainization points to 
an important conclusion underemphasized by other scholars:  the formal, linguistic 
Ukrainization of institutions did not mean a qualitative improvement in their use of 
Ukrainian.  This phenomenon is particularly troubling regarding schooling, an area 
frequently cited for evidence of the policy’s greatest success.  Liber argues a Ukrainian 
environment had developed beyond its rural core due to the campaign of the KP(b)U - the 
Ukrainian branch of the Communist Party - for the promotion of Ukrainian culture, 
literature, and press and advancement of Ukrainian cadres.  Terry Martin, in his 
authoritative work The Affirmative Action Empire, maintains that an urban linguistic 
predominance of Ukrainian never existed in any prevailing fashion and, unlike Mace and 
Liber, Martin provides detailed statistical and anecdotal evidence to demonstrate some of 
the problems associated with Ukrainization. 6  However, he views language 
transformation in the schools as largely untroubled, a finding which this study disputes. 
Martin describes the Ukrainization of schooling as “natural” and “routine.”7  
While this was Narkomos’s goal, teachers did not make the transition easily.  They 
continued to use Russian or a mixture of the two languages that few Ukrainian speakers 
could recognize.  Most Young Pioneer youth groups continued to use Russian exclusively 
                                                 
6 Terry Martin, The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923-39 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001), 122-123. 
7 Martin, 86-87. 
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and urban children fell into Russian outside the classroom.  Martin is correct in noting 
that by 1926 Soviet republican leaders considered the formal Ukrainization of primary 
schools complete.  However, this meant only that educational authorities had succeeded 
in grouping ethnic Ukrainian schoolchildren together.  Furthermore, the process was far 
from automatic.  It met resistance from both educators and parents who opposed or 
passively resisted a shift in the language of instruction.   Narkomos considered 
Ukrainization unfinished until there had been both a significant improvement in language 
instruction and universal enrollment of school-age Ukrainian children.  At the beginning 
of the 1925 school year, only 34.8 percent of all 8 to 15 year-old children in the republic 
were enrolled.  If the account is limited to children 8 to 11 years-old, 63 percent of this 
subgroup was enrolled.  Significantly, school enrollment of 8 to 11 year-old children was 
worse in the largely ethnic Ukrainian countryside relative to the city: 59 percent 
compared to 79 percent.8  Although the proportion of children attending school increased 
throughout the 1920s, rural areas would continue to lag behind.  In 1926, ethnic 
Ukrainians constituted 87.5 percent of the rural population in the republic as a whole.9 
While it is true that teachers often exhibited apathy and hostility towards 
Ukrainization, the documentary record illustrates that this was not universally the case.  
The fact that teachers were publishing critical articles in the teachers’ newspaper 
Narodnii uchytel,10 exhorting their colleagues to build socialism in the manner advocated 
by the party, meant that some had taken up the charge.  This study highlights a number of 
the problems associated with Ukrainization, but it should not be forgotten that there was a 
                                                 
8 TsDAVOU, f. 166, op. 5, spr. 166, ark. 77. 
9 Liber, 188. 
10 This spelling is the correct transliteration of the newspaper’s title as it was originally published. 
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cohort of committed Ukrainizers, most of whom were teachers.  Without them, the policy 
would have died a much earlier death.  Furthermore, there is evidence that if teachers 
gave children time and proper instruction, they adopted the Ukrainian language with 
relatively little effort.  A confident Ukrainian-speaking generation might have developed 
throughout the republic if the prevailing climate had been different.11   
 
Redeeming “Soft-Line” Ukrainization 
Additionally, this dissertation stresses the importance of a discussion of “soft-
line” Ukrainization and contests the assumption that activities in this area had little 
meaning.  According to Martin, hard-line Ukrainization had two components: firstly, the 
party, Central Control Commission, and Council of People’s Commissars would assume 
responsibility for Ukrainization and apply it to economic and political institutions; 
secondly, it would use force to ensure compliance.12  By contrast, Martin places 
education and so-called “culture building” in a category of soft-line Ukrainization, 
characterized by Narkomos oversight and persuasion.  Since Narkomos’s activities did 
not control party administration, Martin minimizes their significance.  This division 
seems overdrawn.  Success in Ukrainization did rely on the party’s authority, but it was 
Narkomos agents and “soft-line” Ukrainizers who decided what officials in “hard-line” 
institutions needed to know.  It was their yardstick that determined whether progress had 
                                                 
11 Bohdan Krawchenko cites Iosyp Hermaize, a well-known pedagogue and literary specialist to argue that 
such a new generation, “organically tied to the Ukrainian language,” had already developed.  Soviet 
security services would later arrest Hermaize for membership in an alleged Ukrainian nationalist 
organization.  Bohdan Krawchenko, Social Change and National Consciousness in Twentieth Century 
Ukraine (Alberta: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1985), 92. 
12 Martin, 119. 
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been achieved.  Narkomos had considerably less power to enforce agreement, but 
educational officials acted against troublemakers in organs directly under their control 
and could draw attention to problems elsewhere.  Lastly, perceived problems in soft-line 
areas, such as education, occasioned direct party interest.  
In the discussion that follows, the hand of the party leadership is often absent with 
the exception of key junctures: the First All-Union Party Meeting on Education in 1920, 
the promulgation of Ukrainization in 1923, the KP(b)U’s repeated rejection of “forced” 
Ukrainization of ethnic Russians in 1926, its censure and ousting of Commissar of 
Education Oleksandr Shumskyi in 1926-27, its growing suspicion of nationalism among 
educators and sanction of a trial of the Ukrainian intelligentsia in 1930, and the Second 
All-Union Party Meeting on Education’s decision to eliminate a separate Ukrainian 
educational system.  This is not because central and republican party authorities did not 
care about the direction of educational policy, but rather because they entrusted daily 
management of its course to Narkomos and intervened most directly when they perceived 
a need for a correction.  Narkomos had considerable freedom to design educational policy 
in the interim.   
Apart from the Shumskyi affair, less is said here about central party interference 
because, for the period between 1923 and 1930, Stalin’s views regarding Ukrainization 
generally coincided with those of the principal republican leaders tasked with overseeing 
the campaign, namely Lazar Kaganovich and Mykola Skrypnyk.  Ultimately, the party 
leadership in Moscow determined the direction of nationalities policy and its instructions 
to the KP(b)U were instrumental in designing the campaign against non-party educators 
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in 1930.  However, the KP(b)U also reported internally about a supposed growth in 
nationalism and was concerned with maintaining party control over Ukrainization. 
While the KP(b)U assigned the field of education little funds, in time it came to 
fear the potential influence educators might have.  The party’s own lack of attention in 
the end became the liability it identified most.  Martin suggests that the central and 
republican party leadership instituted a campaign of repression against prominent 
members of the intelligentsia and educators because it had always viewed them as 
opportunistic collaborators and saw the beginning of the First Five-Year Plan as an 
auspicious time to get rid of them.  This conviction is certainly part of the reason for the 
intelligentsia’s repression.  Yet, fundamentally party authorities grew fearful because 
non-party educators defined and instituted Ukrainization on a daily basis.  Soft-line 
Ukrainization was not innocuous.   The party believed that the consequences of it going 
awry were considerable and acted to correct its course.  For republican leaders, like 
Skrypnyk, who were actively involved in Ukrainization’s promotion and alteration, the 
repression of the campaign’s non-party activists was a fatal act. 
Decisions made in defining the course of language policy can have profound 
social and political consequences.  Speaking on the standardization of French during the 
first French Revolution, sociologist Pierre Bourdieu argues that, “the conflict between the 
French of the revolutionary intelligentsia and the dialects of patois was a struggle for 
symbolic power in which what was at stake was the formation and re-formation of mental 
structures.”13  This intelligentsia sought not just to facilitate communication, but assert a 
                                                 
13 Pierre Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power, trans. Gino Raymond and Matthew Adamson 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991), 48. 
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“new language of authority” that incorporated a political vocabulary that peasant dialects 
could not express.  Similarly, the Ukrainian Commissariat of Education hoped to 
disseminate a standardized Ukrainian through the schools, not only to supplant Russian 
as the dominant language and enable efficient communication between regions, but alter 
peasant and urban attitudes.  Although there was disagreement within the central party 
leadership regarding the former task, most authorities aligned themselves with the latter.  
In the years following the civil war, Narkomos believed that an urban-rural union was a 
necessary prerequisite to the building of socialism.  Socialism would falter if cities could 
not effectively administer rural communities and procure the agricultural goods necessary 
to feed a workforce for industrialization.  The peasantry had to see familiarity in the city 
to accept its leadership.  Furthermore, a common linguistic (and symbolic) culture would 
enable peasant migrants to the city to work effectively upon arrival.  As Michael Smith 
puts it, for Soviet authorities, language was “a fundamental tool of political power, 
economic production, and social management.”14  It intended language to assert control 
over Russians and non-Russians alike. 
Schools played a critical part in this campaign.  To return to Bourdieu, an 
educational system is essential “in the process which leads to the construction, 
legitimation, and imposition of an official language.”15 Groups fight for control over 
education because the rewards are high.  An educational system has a monopoly on the 
creation of producers and consumers of language because it assigns “a social value to 
linguistic competence.”  If schools legitimized Ukrainian and made proficiency in 
                                                 
14 Michael G. Smith, Language and Power in the Creation of the USSR, 1917-1953 (New York: Mouton de 
Gruyter, 1998), 7. 
15 Bourdieu, 48. 
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standardized Ukrainian a requirement for educational advancement, speakers would act 
to protect and perpetuate this “linguistic capital.”    
As will be discussed below, the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences (VUAN) 
worked through the 1920s to define accepted rules for grammar and syntax, but 
Narkomos relied on teachers to inculcate standardized Ukrainian in children.  This was a 
purposeful act:  “through its grammarians, who fix and codify legitimate usage, and its 
teachers who impose and inculcate it . . . the educational system tends, in this area as 
elsewhere, to produce the need for its own services and its own products.”16  At least, this 
was what Narkomos intended.  An educational system had the capacity not just to 
transfer knowledge, but to shape the habits of language speakers and the general language 
environment.  As such, it had intrinsic power.     
Scholars have underscored the role of education as a component of korenizatsiia, 
although generally native-language instruction at the primary school level is assumed to 
have been an accomplished fact. 17  Clearly, the potential of education to influence the 
wider language environment was critical.  For example, in Turkic regions of the Soviet 
Union, authorities promoted “selected patterns of linguistic and ethnic separation already 
                                                 
16 Bourdieu, 60-61. 
17 Collections of essays on Soviet nationalities policy include Ronald Grigor Suny and Terry Martin, eds., A 
State of Nations: Empire and Nation-Making in the Age of Lenin and Stalin (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2001); Isabelle Kreindler, ed. Sociolinguistic Perspectives on Soviet National Languages (New 
York: Mouton de Gruyter, 1985); Michael Kirkwood, ed., Language Planning in the Soviet Union (New 
York: St. Martin's Press, 1990).  In addition to those already cited,  some monographs which deal with the 
subject include Ronald Grigor Suny,  The Revenge of the Past:  Nationalism, Revolution, and the Collapse 
of the Soviet Union (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993); William Fierman, Language Planning and 
National Development: The Uzbek Experience (New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 1991); Helene Carrere 
D'Encausse, The Great Challenge: Nationalities and the Bolshevik State, 1917-1930, trans. Nancy 
Festinger (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1992); Richard Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet Union: 
Communism and Nationalism, 1917-1923. Rev. ed. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997).   
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in place.”18  In doing so, they codified and raised linguistic categories, thereby fostering 
the predominance of specified identities perpetuated in cultural institutions such as the 
schools.  Similarly, the Soviets hoped a move towards latinization of Turkic languages 
would break the authority of Arabist clerics and the old intelligentsia, as well as increase 
literacy in newly defined vernaculars for Turkic speakers and Europeans alike.19  The 
effect of these measures was not immediate in the schools due to low enrollment by non-
European children.  This dissertation seeks to move beyond a discussion of language 
planning to an investigation of its implementation, to its use as an instrument of political 
and social control. 
 
 The Intersection of Education and Language 
Work on this study began with research on Ukrainization in the schools, but it 
soon became apparent that much more was taking place in the field of education than a 
shift in the language of instruction.  The revolution offered an opportunity for substantial 
reform in what and how schools taught.   With the exception of Stepan Siropolko’s 1934 
classic, no comprehensive work on the early years of Soviet Ukrainian schooling has 
been published outside of Ukraine.20  Soviet-era surveys reveal less about the true course 
of educational policy or the acts of individual educators and planners due to their focus 
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on statistical successes.21  A 1996 edited volume by Oksana Sukhomlynska presents a 
broader and more accurate picture, but is concerned foremost with methodology and uses 
limited archival evidence.22  This dissertation attempts to address the gap in our 
knowledge of what occurred at the level of the primary school classroom, by examining 
the understudied intersection between the two overriding demands the school faced:  
Ukrainization and pedagogical reform.  Narkomos conceived of the two objectives as 
fundamentally compatible strategies and any history of schooling in this period must 
consider both Narkomos’s rationale for this correlation and how the policies actually 
interplayed.   
While research on non-Russian schooling has generally focused solely on the 
language aspect of educational policy, Sheila Fitzpatrick and Larry Holmes have 
addressed the other side of the equation, structural reform and methodological 
innovation, but almost wholly in the Russian context.   Both Fitzpatrick and Holmes 
emphasize that leaders of the Russian Commissariat of Education (Narkompros) expected 
primary schools would function as a conversional mechanism.  Fitzpatrick writes that 
once teachers had adopted a progressive curriculum, “it was hoped that they would 
automatically develop a Marxist world-view and pass it on to their pupils.”23  Similarly, 
Larry Holmes argues that “Narkompros wanted nothing less than a world of 
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fundamentally-altered structures and values.”24  In Ukraine, this approach took on an 
added transformative aspect along the lines Bourdieu suggests.  Not only would 
Ukrainian schools use new pedagogy for this “reformation of mental structures,” they 
would empower a new “language of authority”-- Ukrainian.  Furthermore, an overriding 
Soviet conviction in the state’s responsibility to assume control of the raising and 
reorientation of children had greater force in Ukraine because of the territory’s 
experience with the civil war.  Much of the fighting took place on Ukrainian soil and it 
left thousands of children orphaned or homeless.  Narkomos placed these destitute 
children in homes and emphasized the superiority of their collective education in these 
institutions over the individualistic family.  The legacy of this conviction reinforced a 
commitment to “social upbringing” in the schools.  While the Young Pioneers- the 
Communist children’s organization- remained weak, the responsibility for a socialist 
education fell to the teacher.   
The principal structural difference between Russian and Ukrainian schools was at 
the secondary level, but the distinction between the two was also theoretical.  Unlike its 
Russian counterpart, the Ukrainian Narkomos did away wholly with a general secondary 
education and established a two-year professional school (profshkola).  Part of the 
rationale for this change was Ukraine’s desperate need to train workers quickly to rebuild 
and develop industry.  However, it was not the case that the Ukrainian system was simply 
predicated, as Fitzpatrick argues, on the “distant ideal of a smoothly functioning socialist 
economy, in which all resources including human ones were rationally supplied and 
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distributed according to a central plan.”25  Narkomos officials regularly insisted that the 
profshkoly were not trade schools.  Rather, they intended to give students a familiarity 
with a type of production and its place in the economy as a whole.  At the primary school 
level, Narkomos linked the seven-year labor school (trudshkola) to the profshkola 
through an emphasis on exposure to labor.  Hryhorii Hrynko, Ukrainian commissar of 
education from 1920 to 1922, insisted that Ukraine must have the freedom to design 
schools attuned to the republic’s specific needs.  This meant that in Ukraine, unlike in 
Russia, cultural training in the schools would ideally coincide with pursuit of economic 
goals and not precede them.  A Ukrainian program for a production-oriented “complex 
system” at the primary school was similar to that in Russia, but it had greater significance 
because of the direction of the whole system of education. 
In both Russia and Ukraine, educational planners pushed schools to localize study 
as much as possible.  Russian provincial educational departments even recommended that 
teachers instruct students in local dialects, the “living languages,” instead of teaching 
them formalized grammar.26  In the Ukrainian republic, authorities encouraged native 
language schooling for national minorities, but codified and promoted a standardized 
Ukrainian for ethnic Ukrainian children.  National minorities studied this standardized 
Ukrainian as a separate subject.  Furthermore, although Narkomos ordered that all study 
begin at the local level, teachers were to broaden the circle of this study outwards, as the 
students progressed, to the Ukrainian republic.  Part of the intent of this expansion was to 
link the city and village in the minds of schoolchildren, but it also served to reify a notion 
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of a Ukrainian territorial homeland, a benefactor for Ukrainians in Poland and 
Czechoslovakia, as well as the other Soviet republics.  Narkomos hoped that schools 
would function as a base for regional studies (kraeiznavsvto) for the communities in 
which they were situated and encourage study of the republic.  It placed heavy emphasis 
on a public analysis of the economic potential of the UkSSR and sought to motivate 
citizens to contribute to its further development. 
Reality, however, did not always match the ideal.  This study corroborates 
Holmes’s findings regarding the difficulties Soviet authorities had in implementing a 
bold educational plan.  Teachers lacked the experience to understand what was expected 
of them, let alone innovate in the manner that Narkomos advised.  They taught with little 
pay, instruction, or support.  As their attempts to implement instruction by the complex 
method faltered, so did the academic achievement of their students.  Parents, and even 
some educational authorities, demanded a return to instruction in the basic skills of 
reading, writing, and arithmetic.  In Ukraine, teachers confronted the added burden of 
abiding by and enforcing Ukrainization.  Some complained that the Ukrainization 
campaign, put in place ostensibly to aid teaching, was complicating their best efforts to 
institute the new pedagogy.   Narkomos’s solution was better Ukrainization:  an 
improvement in teachers’ use of Ukrainian and the complete transfer of all instruction to 
Ukrainian in designated schools.  Language and Ukrainian studies were fundamental 
components of the drive for educational innovation. 
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The Importance of the SVU Show Trial 
Narkomos was pursuing a dangerous experiment.  It advocated a methodology 
that required individual creativity on the part of teachers, asking only that they conform 
to broadly outlined standards.  They were teaching the values of socialism in Ukrainian 
and through distinctly Ukrainian subjects.  The party began to worry about what 
information teachers were actually passing to their students.  Ernest Gellner has argued 
that states institute "universal, standardized, and generic" education systems in order to 
equip society for economic development.27  These educational systems enable members 
of a community to speak with each other not only in the same language, also but on the 
basis of the same experience in the "universalized" national culture introduced in the 
schools.  The Communist Party leadership developed its own innate Gellnerian sense of 
the potential capacity of schools to teach an orientation it did not control.  In actual fact, 
the Ukrainian educational system was not universal, standardized, or generic, but the 
party was concerned that the ties between schools were strong enough to enable a 
common transmission of a mentality that diverged from Soviet aims.  The educational 
system’s mixture of flexibility in implementation but coordination in strategy is precisely 
what made Soviet leaders fear its combustibility.  The progressive educational system 
that Narkomos had created relied far too greatly on teachers’ individual initiative.  It was 
possible they would use the classroom for subversive instruction. 
In the end, the party did not trust educators.  Part of this was a result of a 
longstanding suspicion that the cooperation of non-party elements with Soviet authorities 
was temporary, as Martin argues.  However, this distrust was also a consequence of the 
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lack of the KP(b)U’s command over Ukrainization.  The course of Ukrainization could 
not be neatly set.  Michael Smith writes: “We should not underestimate the dynamism 
and treacherousness of language.  It was conducive and valent in ways which Soviet 
leaders were able to control, and in ways that they never could.”28  In pursuing 
Ukrainization, the KP(b)U conceded a dependence on national elites and simultaneously 
created “political and cultural spaces” in which Ukrainian-speakers moved without strict 
restraint.  This did not mean that teachers acted against Soviet power, just that they were 
not always passive executors of the party’s intent.   
The final ambition of this study is to demonstrate the central role that the show 
trial of the Union for Liberation of Ukraine (Spilka vyzvolennia Ukrainy, SVU) - a 
nationalist organization fabricated by the Soviet security apparatus (DPU or OGPU in 
Russian) - played in determining the future of Ukrainization.  Although the KP(b)U’s 
identification in November 1933 of “local Ukrainian nationalism” as the preeminent 
danger to Soviet power in the republic is generally seen to be the definitive marker of an 
end to Ukrainization, this study questions whether any progress could have been achieved 
in the field of education after 1930, despite statistical evidence of “complete” 
Ukrainization in schooling.  Responding to central and republican party concerns about 
growing nationalism in the Ukrainian cultural field, the DPU sent a critical signal to 
would-be, activist Ukrainizers with the SVU affair: it arrested some of the most 
prominent Ukrainizing educators, claimed that teachers throughout the republic were 
involved in counterrevolutionary nationalist activities directed by the SVU, and 
suggested that one of the organization’s chief activities was the indoctrination and 
                                                 
28 Smith, 7. 
 
18 
recruitment of the young into a parallel youth organization.  In the climate of fear that 
followed the trial, teachers had every reason to shirk the task of Ukrainization and 
evidence from 1930 demonstrates that many had already taken this course.  Schools were 
formally Ukrainized, but teachers did little to improve their quality of instruction. 
The SVU show trial coincided with moves towards the abandonment of the 
complex system and the subordination of the Ukrainian school system.   The indictment 
of leading Ukrainizers, who were simultaneously well-known educational innovators, 
permitted republican authorities to blame what they now identified as the disorder of the 
complex method on nationalist saboteurs.  The perception of a wayward educational 
system offered a rationale for the centralization of education under stricter all-Union 
control.  The same suspicion of independent teachers and scholars that had led to the 
fabrication of the SVU motivated these moves towards a regimentation of the 
methodology and structure of education.  Narkomos had looked at progressive pedagogy 
as a way of shaping the next generation, but the potential errant development of this 
group became a lurking political fear.   The commissariat had intended Ukrainization to 
enable educational progressivism.  The damage that the SVU show trial did to 
Ukrainization created an opportunity for the rejection of this task. 
 
Education in Central and Eastern Ukraine Prior to 1920 
In order to fully understand the impact of Ukrainization and radical pedagogical 
reform in the 1920s, a brief discussion of education in Ukraine in the late tsarist and 
revolutionary periods is necessary.  Few children in Russia’s Ukrainian provinces 
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received a satisfactory education in the years leading up to the revolution.  After the 
emancipation of the serfs in 1861, zemstva (local government bodies) assumed 
responsibility for the management of rural general education.  Their initiative led to the 
construction of new schools and the replacement of rote learning of religious texts with 
instruction in subject areas such as mathematics, history, and geography.29  Nevertheless, 
between two-thirds to fourth-fifths of school-age children still did not attend school in 
1914-15.30  Peasant families often could not afford school materials and fees or risk 
losing the labor of their children.  For the 1.5 million children who were enrolled in some 
form of primary school, the number of teachers was insufficient.  A single teacher 
sometimes oversaw a student body of over 100.31   Teachers in the Russian empire were 
drawn from a variety of educational institutions, but the overwhelming majority had a 
secondary or incomplete secondary education and 12.3 percent had only a primary school 
education in 1910.32  Many lacked formal certification and, as new schools were built and 
men and women were recruited to staff them, the proportion of qualified teachers 
dropped.33  In the Ukrainian provinces, less than a 25 percent of teachers were ethnic 
Ukrainians according to the 1897 census.   However, their proportion was higher on the 
left bank of the Dnipro (Dnepr) river: 40 percent.34  Where they were present, Ukrainian 
teachers played a significant role in the growing national movement. 
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There were no state-supported Ukrainian schools in the Russian Empire before 
1917.  Tsar Alexander I’s educational reform of 1804 forbade instruction in the Ukrainian 
variant of Church Slavonic and the government extended this prohibition to modern 
literary Ukrainian.35  Although Ukrainian activists established over one hundred 
Ukrainian-language Sunday schools from 1859 to 1862, provincial authorities eventually 
shut all these down.36  Furthermore, in July 1863 Minister of Interior Petr Valuev 
proposed that censors only permit the distribution of belles lettres in the “Little Russian 
dialect.”  He barred, in specific, the publication of Ukrainian instructional and religious 
texts.  An imperial commission appointed by Alexander II in 1876 to investigate rumors 
of subversive activity by Ukrainophilic intelligentsia recommended a further ban against 
the importation of Ukrainian texts from abroad (chiefly, Austrian Galicia, where a large 
Ukrainian community resided) and instructed the Ministry of Education to prohibit 
Ukrainian-language instruction in primary schools, replace Ukrainophilic teachers, and 
remove Ukrainian literature from libraries.37  Alexander II confirmed these provisions in 
what became known as the Ems decree, named after the German town where he was then 
vacationing.   
The 1905 revolution forced the government to make some limited concessions to 
its population, including a modification of its practices towards the Ukrainian language.  
The national intelligentsia took advantage of the more liberal environment that followed 
the tsar’s apparent promulgation of civil rights and established eighteen Ukrainian-
language newspapers and journals throughout Ukraine and in Moscow and St. 
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Petersburg.  However, the government placed subscribers under police surveillance and 
shut down nearly all the newspapers by 1914.38   The first official attempt to open 
Ukrainian-language primary schools was made in 1908 by thirty-seven deputies in the 
newly created parliament, the State Duma.  Their proposal was passed to a committee on 
education and promptly shelved.39   
Teachers recognized that Russian instruction negatively affected Ukrainian 
student performance.  They claimed that their students found it difficult to learn and 
retain new information taught in the classroom.  The Ukrainian-language newspaper 
Rada reported that truancy rates for ethnic Ukrainian children were twice as high 
compared to their Russian and Jewish counterparts (a phenomenon that could equally be 
attributed to rural Ukrainian families’ reliance on child agricultural labor).40  Teachers 
attending summer courses in Kyiv (Kiev) in May 1906 passed a resolution demanding the 
opening of national schools for Ukrainians and students enrolled in pedagogical courses 
throughout the Ukrainian provinces began to demand coursework in Ukrainian literature, 
history, and geography.41 
In spite of the fact that the government had conceded native language instruction 
for other national minorities, the Council of Ministers obstinately refused to permit state 
or zemstvo sponsorship of Ukrainian-language primary schooling.  The Ministry of 
Education did allow two private schools to use Ukrainian prior to the 1905 revolution and 
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three thereafter, but no more.42   Although the intelligentsia continued to back the 
publication of Ukrainian-language textbooks, these were primarily used by the reading 
circles set up by the Ukrainian cultural and educational society, Prosvita.  The 
government closely monitored the activities of even this institution.  Ministry officials 
continued to maintain that there was a single Russian nation and saw no need to set up 
schools to instruct children in a dialectal variation. 
The February 1917 revolution dramatically altered matters.  The Provisional 
Government, set up in Petrograd (St. Petersburg) after Tsar Nicholas II’s overthrow, 
issued orders for Ukrainian-language schooling to begin in the first grade.43  The Central 
Rada, the representative body which held de facto power in Ukraine, established a 
General Secretariat of Education after issuing a manifesto (the First Universal) declaring 
Ukrainian autonomy.  After the Bolsheviks seized power in Petrograd, the Central Rada 
proclaimed the establishment of an autonomous Ukrainian National Republic.  The 
General Secretariat of Education subsequently installed a highly decentralized network of 
provincial and district educational commissariats and multi-national school councils.   
Actual day-to-day administration of education fell to these local institutions.  
Due to the absence of funds and a strong administrative structure, teachers and 
public associations assumed much of the work for Ukrainian-language schooling.  The 
All-Ukrainian Teachers’ Union organized short-term courses for training teachers in 
Ukrainian-language instruction during the summer of 1917.44  Its Congress in August 
1917 resolved to begin Ukrainization of primary schools on September 1, although it is 
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difficult to confirm what percentage of schools actually began this process.  It planned to 
Ukrainize secondary schools more slowly, preferring to set up new ones initially rather 
than combat anti-Ukrainian sentiment among instructors in existing institutions. Fifty-
three Ukrainian gymnasia were established by fall 1917.45   A private organization, the 
Society of School Education, formed to begin publication of Ukrainian textbooks.  The 
government also founded a Ukrainian National University and Pedagogical Scientific 
Academy.  The Bolshevik invasion of Ukraine in December 1917 meant an end to the 
Central Rada’s plan for a new system of education.   
The government of Hetman Pavlo Skoropadskyi, installed with the help of the 
German army after it ousted the Bolsheviks from Kyiv, attempted to recentralize 
education.  It abolished nearly all local educational commissariats and school councils 
and placed educational policy under the direct control of its Ministry of Education.46  
However, the Hetmanate government continued the Central Rada’s commitment to 
Ukrainian-language schooling.  It required Ukrainian language instruction for ethnic 
Ukrainians beginning in the first year of primary school, published several million 
Ukrainian-language textbooks, and established approximately 150 new Ukrainian 
gymnasia.47  Russian secondary schools were also required to teach the Ukrainian 
language and history as separate subjects.  During the summer of 1918, it organized fifty-
nine teachers’ courses for Ukrainian instructors and five for Polish and Jewish teachers.48 
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Lastly, it established a Ukrainian Academy of Sciences under Volodymyr Vernadskyi 
and Agatangel Krymskyi. 
The Directory, which overthrew the Hetmanate, returned to the decentralized 
educational administration of the Central Rada, but continued to push for Ukrainian-
language schooling.  In January 1919 the Directory officially made Ukrainian the state 
language and its Minister of Education, Ivan Ohiienko, released preliminary rules on a 
new orthography to be used in the schools.  The Directory also established nine new 
teachers’ institutions, a network of two-semester courses, and a pedagogical mission in 
Vienna to see to the publication of textbooks.49  The Directory, however, was constantly 
on the move, retreating from the Red Army.  One Soviet source claims that the Directory 
forbade the teaching of Russian altogether and began to dismiss Russian teachers.50  The 
reality was that Petliura’s forces occupied land for too little time to ensure that basic 
educational goals were met, let alone a comprehensive program of Ukrainization, 
coercive or otherwise.    
 
The Question of Language Standardization 
When Ukrainization was begun in 1923, linguists had not yet definitively agreed 
on syntactical and orthographic norms for the language.  A modern literary Ukrainian 
existed, but pre-revolutionary publications still displayed some dialectal variation.  
Progress had been hampered in Russian Ukraine due to the nineteenth century restrictions 
on Ukrainian-language use.  The problem of linguistic standardization was complicated 
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by the existence of two literary variants, one based on the Kyiv-Poltava vernacular and 
another on a western Ukrainian form.   Furthermore, the Ukrainian speaking community 
remained divided by a political boundary, now between the UkSSR and Ukrainians 
concentrated in Poland (Galicia) and Czechoslovakia.    
The principal work on language standardization took place in the UkSSR.  In the 
pre-Ukrainization period, progress was slow.  The Ukrainian Academy of Sciences set up 
a Section on Orthography, headed in part by Volodymyr Durdukivskyi, the director of the 
Taras Shevchenko Gymnasium (later Kyiv Labor School No. 1).  In 1921, with the 
sanction of Commissar of Education Hrynko, it published a sixteen page booklet of 
orthographic norms modified slightly from rules compiled under the Hetmanate 
government.51  The Academy also established a commission under philologist Agatangel 
Krymskyi to compile a dictionary of the “living” (zhyva) Ukrainian language.  In 1924 it 
published the first volume of a Russian-Ukrainian dictionary (Rossiisko-ukrainskyi 
slovnyk) for letters A-Zh.  Ethnographic researchers recorded lexical material on stacks of 
cards that served as the basis for the dictionary’s entries.  Linguist George Shevelov 
writes that the dictionary’s “vacillations between standard and dialectal, urban, and rural 
(often folkloric), made it somewhat eclectic and the effort to represent the standard 
language often collided with a desire to introduce the richest material possible.”52  By 
casting its net as widely as possible, the commission complicated the task of promoting a 
universalized language.   
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As the Ukrainization campaign accelerated, so did work on language 
standardization.  Literature specialist Serhii Iefremov took over the chairmanship of the 
VUAN dictionary commission and published five more volumes of the Rossiisko-
ukrainskyi slovnyk.  Under the directorship of Hryhoryi Kholodnyi, the Institute of the 
Ukrainian Scientific Language had all but ceased work in the early Soviet period due to 
lack of funds, but after 1925 it gradually began to increase its activity, publishing over 
two dozen terminological dictionaries after 1925.53  Furthermore, its researchers took a 
leading role in the publication of textbooks and self-study guides.  Language planners 
regularly debated the question of how closely the literary (and, by extension, academic 
and technical) language should reflect dialectal forms.  Paul Wexler divides what he calls 
“regulators” into two camps: a purist, ethnographic group that prioritized unique 
Ukrainian features over breadth and frequency of use and a modified ethnographic group 
that allowed for the incorporation of some non-native characteristics in the interest of 
promoting a language that could be widely recognized and used.54   By the mid 1920s, the 
latter approach assumed greater importance.   Iefremov minimized the Rossiisko-
ukrainskyi slovnyk’s emphasis of local forms and it became “a representative, reliable, 
and fairly complete collection of Ukrainian words and idioms.”55   
The work that had the greatest impact on how Ukrainian was used on a daily basis 
was undertaken by a special orthographic commission, appointed by a Radnarkom (the 
Ukrainian Council of People’s Commissars) decree of July 23, 1925.   Formally, two 
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successive commissars of education headed the commission: Oleksandr Shumskyi and 
Mykola Skrypnyk.  An orthographic conference, held from May 25 to June 6, 1927 in 
Kharkiv (Kharkov) under Skrypnyk’s auspices, began the most concerted work on 
standardization.  The most contentious issue at this conference was how to render loan 
words.  The presidium of the orthographic commission later decided on a compromise 
that allowed for a distinction between words of Greek origin and those of modern 
European origin.  In reality, this decision simply reflected a variation in the central and 
eastern Ukrainian tradition of borrowing words through Russian and the western 
Ukrainian practice of borrowing through Polish.56  Skrypnyk confirmed the orthographic 
rules on September 6, 1929 and required their use in all schools and publications.  This 
compromise was to ultimately break down in the mid 1930s after Skrypnyk’s fall, but the 
conference represented an important attempt at bridging the gap between competing 
literary traditions.  Skrypnyk invited three Galician scholars to attend the 1927 
conference and their input was critical in forcing the presidium to consider an agreement 
that would satisfy the wider speaking community.   From this perspective, the 1929 
orthography should be considered a positive beginning.  It was flexible enough to 
incorporate the two leading conventions in Ukrainian orthography and yet it significantly 
reduced dialectal variations as a whole. 
Although by the end of the 1920s, Ukrainian scholars, writers, and publicists 
could still debate aspects of what was “proper” Ukrainian, the number of questions open 
for dispute was much smaller.  When educational officials or the press criticized teachers 
for failing to use Ukrainian well, they already had a clear idea of what constituted a 
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significant departure from a “standard” literary Ukrainian.  To be sure, some teachers still 
relied on dialectal forms in the classroom and had difficulty procuring guides on correct 
terminology and the evolving orthographic rules.  Nevertheless, the chief culprits of 
“language abuse” had little sense of literary Ukrainian at all, and used a Ukrainian based 
wholly on Russian cognates or interspersed with Russian words.   
National communities throughout the former Russian empire were dealing with 
many of the same questions regarding linguistic standardization.  The “normalization” of 
Ukrainian, like that for other languages, was neither inevitable nor immediate.57  It 
required the active intervention of government and scholarly authorities.  Yet, even 
before Ukrainization had begun, there was widespread agreement among the Ukrainian 
national intelligentsia and the literate population regarding the corpus of literary 
Ukrainian and language planners made significant progress during the 1920s towards a 
consensus for standardization.   They intended teachers to inculcate these language norms 
among the next generation. 
 
The Commissars of Education 
Wherever possible, this study has attempted to give voice to the local officials and 
teachers responsible for carrying out Narkomos’s dual mandate for a progressive 
curriculum and Ukrainian-language schooling.  As will be argued, educational policy in 
the 1920s was greatly decentralized.  Narkomos set targets and outlined methodological 
expectations but left much of the decision-making regarding the organization of language 
of instruction and the content of class room lessons to its local organs.  Therefore, this 
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study is not a history of the Narkomos apparatus, but rather an attempt to describe the 
consequences of its policy-making.   However, a brief description of the commissariat’s 
leading figures is offered here for the reader’s reference. 
During the 1920s, four Commissars of Education oversaw the development of the 
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic’s educational system: Hryhorii Hrynko (1920-1922), 
Volodymyr Zatonskyi (1922-1923), Oleksandr Shumskyi (1924-1927), and Mykola 
Skrypnyk (1927-1933).  All these men were ethnic Ukrainians.  Two (Hrynko and 
Shumskyi) were former members of the Borotbist party - a nationally oriented, radical 
socialist offshoot of the Ukrainian SRs that joined the Bolsheviks after a failed attempt to 
remain independent - and two (Zatonskyi and Skrypnyk) were longstanding Bolsheviks.  
With the exception of Skrypnyk’s tenure, their terms in office offer a general 
periodization of Ukrainian educational policy.  Narysy istorii ukrainskoho shkilnytstva, 
edited by Oksana Sukhomlynska, contains a valuable series of biographical sketches that 
provides much of the information for the following accounts, apart from where noted.58  
The outline of Volodymyr Zatonskyi’s life is drawn largely from the Encyclopedia of 
Ukraine, edited by Volodymyr Kubijovyč. 
Hryhorii Hrynko was born in 1890 in the Sumy region, the son of a civil servant.  
He studied at the University of Moscow, was expelled in 1913 for participating in a 
student strike, served in the army, and then found employment teaching in a gymnasium 
in Kharkiv in 1917.59  It was during the Ukrainian Revolution that he became associated 
with the Borotbists and in 1919, after the Borotbist merger with the Bolsheviks, served as 
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a member of VUTsVK (All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee) and Radnarkom.  
He became commissar of education in 1920 and established the foundations of an 
independent Ukrainian educational system which asserted the primacy of the state’s role 
in “raising” children (first through children’s buildings and then the labor school) and 
began professional training of children at age 15.  He headed the Ukrainian delegation to 
the First All-Union Party Meeting on Education, held in Moscow from December 31, 
1920 to January 4, 1921.   His defense of the professional orientation of the Ukrainian 
system won him supporters among the Komsomol and labor unions.   As early as 
September 1920 Radnarkom had ordered Ukrainian schools to teach Ukrainian as a 
separate subject and government institutions to use the language alongside Russian.  
However, Hrynko’s commissariat was much more concerned with setting up a network of 
schools for the war weary republic and ensuring the economy would have a trained labor 
force for its recovery.  In 1922, Hrynko was appointed chairman of the UkSSR State 
Planning Commission.  From 1926 to 1929 he served as deputy chairman of the USSR 
State Planning Commission and then USSR commissar for finance.  He was arrested in 
1937 and executed the following year, accused of plotting to kill Stalin.  
Volodymyr Zatonskyi was born in 1888 in the Podillia huberniia (province).  He 
was the sole commissar of education in the 1920s to complete a post-secondary degree, 
graduating from Kyiv University in 1912.  He had a brief career as an instructor in 
physics at the Kyiv Polytechnical Institute.  He joined the Bolsheviks in 1917, served as 
secretary of education in the first Soviet Ukrainian government centered in Kharkiv, and 
was instrumental in the formation of the KP(b)U.   He was also a member of the second 
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Ukrainian government, founded in Kursk to reassert control over Ukraine after the Red 
Army was ousted by German troops following the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk.  In December 
1920, he worked briefly as this government’s commissar of education.60  He was 
appointed chief of the All-Ukrainian Association of Consumer’s Cooperative 
Organizations (1921-22) and then took over from Hrynko as commissar of education in 
1922.61  Although Zatonskyi himself published two works on Soviet nationalities policy 
in Ukraine, there has been little written on his short tenure in Narkomos for this time. 62  
It was under his administration that the Soviet Ukrainian government issued the first 
decrees on Ukrainization.  Although the re-organization of schools according to the 
ethnic composition of a given area was begun in 1923, real work on Ukrainian as a 
language of instruction did not begin until Shumskyi assumed the post of commissar of 
education.  Zatonskyi took over editorial duties of the literary journal Chervonyi shliakh 
in 1926 and worked in this capacity until 1930.  He was also served as deputy chairman 
of Radnarkom from 1927 to 1933 and was elected a member of VUAN.  He reassumed 
the position of commissar of education after Mykola Skrypnyk’s dismissal in 1933.  In 
his 1934 publication Natsional'no-kul'turne budivnytstvo i borot'ba proty natsionalizmu 
he ridiculed the “whimpering” of the intelligentisa, claiming that a Soviet Ukrainian 
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culture had grown in spite of their malfeasance and Skrypnyk’s negligence.63  He was 
arrested in 1937 and later executed. 
Oleksandr Shumskyi was a contemporary of Hrynko’s, also born in 1890 into a 
peasant family in the Zhytomyr region.  He received only a two-year formal education in 
a rural school, later attending evening lectures at Shianiavskii University in Moscow.  He 
took part in anti-government demonstrations on the southwestern front during the war. 
After the February Revolution, Shumskyi became a member of the Kyiv huberniia 
Ukrainian SR Committee and served as its representative on the Central Rada.  In 1918 
he aligned himself with the Borotbists and pushed for their merger with the Bolsheviks.64  
He became a member of the Commissariat of Education’s collegium in 1919 under the 
second Soviet Ukrainian government and occupied numerous party and government posts 
in Ukraine from 1920 to 1925, including UkSSR commissar of Internal Affairs (1920) 
and head of the KP(b)U’s propaganda section, agitprop (1923-1925).65  He became 
commissar of education in 1924.  It was under his tenure that the Ukrainization campaign 
truly accelerated and progressive pedagogy reached its widest use.  He clashed with the 
Lazar Kaganovich, the KP(b)U TsK (Central Committee) secretary, who supported 
Ukrainization but differed with Shumskyi over its extent and purpose.  Shumskyi’s 
defense of “deviationist” Ukrainian intellectuals and his protest to Stalin regarding 
Kaganovich’s leadership raised the ire of the central party’s leadership in Moscow.  He 
was forced to resign his post after a party censure.  He was reassigned outside of Ukraine 
to the directorship of the Institute of the National Economy in Leningrad.  He also served 
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as deputy head of the VKP(b) (All-Union Communist Party) agitation section and head of 
the Central Committee of the Professional Union of Educational Workers.  He was 
arrested in 1933 and sentenced to an initial ten year imprisonment.  According to the 
official sources, he committed suicide in 1946 while incarcerated. 
Mykola Skrypnyk was the son of a civil servant, born in 1872 in the Katerynoslav 
(Dnipropetrovsk) region.  After completing a two-year rural school, he studied at a 
realschule (trade school) in Izium, near Kharkiv and was expelled for distributing 
socialist literature. He became a member of the Social Democratic Labor Party in 1899 
and in 1900 enrolled in the St. Petersburg Technical Institute where he continued his 
political agitation.  After 1917, he was instrumental in the formation of the first and 
second Ukrainian Soviet governments.  From 1919 to 1927 he served as commissar of 
state control, commissar of internal affairs, and commissar of justice.  In 1927 he was 
appointed commissar of education after Shumskyi’s downfall.  He is widely credited for 
being a strong defender of Ukrainization and of Ukrainian “state” interest, fighting with 
central authorities to extend the Ukrainian republic’s border and ensure cultural 
autonomy for ethnic Ukrainians in the RSFSR.66  On paper, the Ukrainization of 
schooling, post-secondary education, and publishing increased markedly under his tenure.   
However, Skrypnyk also fought against non-party participation in Ukrainization and 
critically weakened his own campaign by 1930.  He was a vocal critic of Shumskyi, 
coining the term “Shumskyism” in a 1927 article in Bilshovyk Ukrainy to denote 
Shumskyi’s alleged distancing of Ukrainian literature from the proletariat.67  This term 
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was later applied to any reported discovery of Ukrainian nationalism, incubated under the 
guise of socialism.  It was Skrypnyk’s direct action that led to a weakening of the 
Ukrainian Academy of Science’s independence prior to the 1930 trial of the SVU.  In 
1929, he pushed through the election of seven Party members to VUAN (including 
himself) and disbanded all voluntary societies associated with the Academy.68  Although 
the number schools vastly expanded from the 1929-30 academic year, this date also 
marked a critical juncture in educational policy.  In addition, Skrypnyk advocated the 
dismantling of a separate Ukrainian educational system and a turn away from progressive 
pedagogy, first towards political mobilization and then educational conservatism.  
Skrypnyk came under fire in 1933 for his work on the linguistic standardization of 
Ukrainian.  He was removed from his post as commissar, accused of separating 
Ukrainian from Russian, and tied to sabotage in linguistics.  He committed suicide on 
July 6, 1933. 
 
Chapter Summaries 
 
Having introduced the broad trends of educational and language policy in 
Ukraine, this dissertation moves to a focused examination of their application in the 
1920s.  The first chapter introduces the reader to the particular design and aims of the 
educational system in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (UkSSR) at the time of 
Ukrainization.  The Bolshevik party had come to power and emerged victorious from 
civil war with the promise of radical social change.   Educational theorists and planners in 
Ukraine took this promise seriously and set about orienting schools towards the perceived 
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needs of socialism.  After a brief discussion of the theoretical foundation of this system, 
the chapter sketches how the progressive impulse of Ukrainian educators was formally 
realized.  In Narkomos’s idealized conception, the state was to assume charge over the 
“social upbringing” of children.  This objective led Narkomos to advocate and support 
the complex system, a classroom methodology that would not only educate children in 
basic skills, but allow for the integration of labor training and lessons in industrial and 
agricultural production.  At the primary school level, differences between the Ukrainian 
and Russian system were largely ones of emphasis. However, the Ukrainians regularly 
maintained that they had the truest form of a united labor school and enjoyed support for 
their position among some in Russia.  Furthermore, the Ukrainian emphasis on 
participatory learning also enabled educational planners to promote the incorporation of 
activities based on observations of a school’s local environment.   The approach was part 
of an all-Union movement for regional studies (kraieznavstvo).  In Ukraine, educators 
regularly broadened this form of study to a wider extent, an investigation of all things 
Ukrainian.   
The second chapter outlines the initial governmental orders for Ukrainization in 
1923.  In the educational sphere, the Soviet Ukrainian government foresaw a rapid move 
towards Ukrainian-language schooling for all ethnic Ukrainians.  The Ukrainization of 
schooling was a fundamental component of the party’s overall strategy of strengthening 
the tie between the city and the village.  The city would always assume a preeminent 
position, but in Ukraine the party could not afford to ignore peasant concerns.  In the 
schools, urban children needed to understand the language of the peasantry if they were 
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to eventually assume administration over the economy.  Rural children had to cease 
viewing the city as alien in order for the government to work efficiently with the next 
generation in the countryside and attract a labor force to industrial centers.  Generally, 
Narkomos maintained that the best way for schools to raise a literate, skilled, and 
politically conscious population was through native language education.  The 1923-24 
Ukrainization plan for the schools was, however, too ambitious.  Narkomos issued 
directives, but it offered little practical guidance or support to local educational 
authorities whose responsibility it was to ensure the transfer to Ukrainian-language 
instruction.  Progress was particularly slow in the eastern and southern parts of the 
republic due to the shortage of Ukrainian-speaking teachers, a fact that Narkomos 
recognized, but did little directly to remedy.  Educational officials and the party linked 
incomplete Ukrainization to unsatisfactory academic achievement and viewed an 
improvement in language instruction as an essential prerequisite to use of the complex 
methodology.  Similarly, authorities saw resistance to Ukrainian instruction as a mark of 
a conservative pedagogy and an anti-Soviet attitude. 
The third chapter describes some of the demands and problems the Ukrainizers 
faced in attempting to oversee a transfer to Ukrainian-language teaching.  Teachers were 
paid poorly and lacked literature and basic supplies.  The number of teachers able to read 
and write in literary Ukrainian, let alone lead instruction in class, was small.  Training 
was expensive and the government’s priorities lay in economic development and not in 
educational improvement.  Teachers remained unwilling to study Ukrainian themselves, 
even when faced with an examination and threat of dismissal.  Party and government 
 
37 
officials also set a poor example by resisting training. Local sections of Narkomos 
therefore pursued a selective approach, pushing Ukrainization most aggressively at first 
in largely Ukrainian-speaking rural areas.  They did, however, advocate the transfer of 
national minorities in urban areas to native language schools.   This tactic was part of a 
general policy of trying to break Russian-language dominance in the cities.  National 
minority children would also learn Ukrainian in the schools so that Ukrainian would form 
the basis of a republican identity.  Outside the republic, Narkomos assumed responsibility 
for ethnic Ukrainians and pushed Russian authorities to assure native language 
instruction for them.  However, the reality was that educational authorities had 
insufficient means to both implement and monitor the progress of its mandate at home.  
Its inspectors were poorly qualified and the number of competent teachers that could 
champion native language schooling too few.  Narkomos pressed the party for greater 
support. 
The fourth chapter focuses on the actual implementation of the complex system 
and kraieznavstvo and details the problems that arose due to a lack of direction and 
resources.  The move to a progressive pedagogy, like the transfer to Ukrainian-language 
instruction, was frustrated by an inadequately funded school system.  School attendance 
was low, and a shortage of well-maintained schools limited the feasibility of any plan to 
increase enrollment.  Educational authorities could push the complex system in only the 
best schools.   Even inspectors had a poor understanding of the new methodology.  
Narkomos instituted a new campaign for teacher re-qualification in 1925 which 
privileged incorporation of a production-oriented kraieznavstvo.  However, teachers were 
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to extrapolate on the basis of a general provincial model for instruction.  Such latitude 
was frightening both to teachers, who were baffled by the complex system and wanted 
much more guidance, and some educational planners, who worried that confused teachers 
would do more damage than good in the classroom.  In fact, Narkomos received regular 
reports that schools were not providing basic knowledge because teachers had little idea 
how to institute the complex system.  Student knowledge of grammar was particularly 
poor and parents were beginning to complain.  Although incorporation of Ukrainian was 
an essential part of the new methodology, few teachers were up to the dual task of both 
switching the language and method of their instruction.  Good teachers, with even the 
most basic professional qualifications, were hard enough to come by.  At a select 
experimental school in Mykolaiv (Nikolaev), teachers posited the blame for problems 
associated with the complex method squarely on Ukrainization among Russified 
Ukrainian and ethnic Russian children.  Narkomos, however, did not relent.  It advocated 
more Ukrainization for ethnic Ukrainians, largely regardless of their preference for 
language of instruction.   
The fifth chapter examines the consequence of internal party debates over the 
scope of Ukrainization in education.  It was increasingly clear that, in spite of the 
Ukrainization of schools on paper, the quality of instruction was inadequate.  The 
announcement of a new examination of teachers’ Ukrainian knowledge caused a fresh 
wave of panic.  The end result was that many local educational sections postponed the 
test and others granted exemptions to those who demonstrated some degree of language 
training.  Continued pressure on teachers was required because of the results of an earlier 
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party decision on Ukrainization.  In response to a complaint made by Oleksandr 
Shumskyi that the party’s Ukrainization campaign was having little effect on the 
proletariat, Stalin intervened.  Stalin argued strongly against forcible Ukrainization of the 
proletariat, while at the same time maintaining that the party needed to take a more active 
role in the promotion of Ukrainian culture.   A vigorous campaign was needed and it had 
to involve the proletariat to have any significance.  Yet, its participation could not be 
coerced.  The solution that Narkomos decided upon was the gradual Ukrainization of the 
children of the proletariat (and, for that matter, of any Russified Ukrainians).  Not only 
did the commissariat have to exercise greater oversight over teachers, it would now take 
the campaign to city centers. Narkomos intended this push to simultaneously counter 
established prejudices against Ukrainian as a peasant language and to break pedagogical 
conservatism in tradition-bound urban schools.  The sweeping nature of this shift meant 
that children of ethnic Russians sometimes found themselves attending schools that had 
been quickly Ukrainized.69  This led to charges of discrimination against Russians.  The 
KP(b)U leadership acted quickly to protect the educational rights of Russians, now 
recognized as a national minority.  The question of what to do about Russified Ukrainians 
was left open to interpretation. 
The sixth chapter details Narkomos’s continued preference for the Ukrainization 
of proletarian children, largely regardless of initial parental preference.  Narkomos 
officials in fact argued Ukrainization remained incomplete because Ukrainian children 
were still not attending school in numbers proportionate to their standing in the 
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population.  Furthermore, in the cities Ukrainian parents were beginning to form a 
majority of the proletariat.  New schools needed to be built and high quality Ukrainian 
instruction ensured if the state was going to fulfill its obligation to the proletariat.   
Narkomos, however, still relied greatly on the effort of individual teachers and the party 
was beginning to grow increasingly worried about the influence of “nationalists” on 
them.  Shumskyi blamed the growth of nationalism on insufficient party support for 
educators and argued for greater inclusion of sympathetic intelligentsia.  However, 
KP(b)U TsK reports continued to emphasize the growth of Ukrainian nationalists, 
maintaining that they had taken advantage of the policy of Ukrainization and were trying 
to co-opt it by recruiting teachers to their cause.  There was no nationalist movement, 
however.  There were few qualified Communist Ukrainizers in the schools or elsewhere 
and the party leadership was fundamentally uncomfortable with its reliance on non-party 
intelligentsia.  Ukrainization’s aim was a linguistic unification of the laboring populations 
of the republic and yet the proletariat could not yet lead the charge.  The potential 
distortion, real or imagined, of a campaign the party did not control was alarming. 
The seventh chapter makes a case for the central importance of the SVU show 
trial to the course of Ukrainization in the schools and explores the motivation and 
consequences behind the subordination of the Ukrainian educational system to all-Union 
norms.  In the charged political environment introduced by Stalin’s “revolution from 
above,” local party reports and the press began to point to the danger of nationalism in 
specific schools and to an increase in rural anti-Soviet activity led or permitted by 
teachers.  These accounts set the stage for a show trial of the Ukrainian intelligentsia.  
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The Soviet state police rounded up a total of forty-five defendants.  A significant 
proportion of these defendants were educators and investigations around the republic 
implicated numerous other teachers in nationalist conspiracies.  The SVU trial performed 
a critical symbolic role.  It confirmed the party’s formal commitment to Ukrainization, 
yet communicated to teachers that the risks for “incorrect” Ukrainian cultural 
development were high.  The incentives for high profile, activist Ukrainization were few.  
Fundamentally, Soviet authorities feared non-party control over the campaign and, in 
particular, its effect on youth orientation.   
Press articles on the SVU affair coincided with reports of violence against 
teachers and provided educators with a model for normative behavior.  Although 
Narkomos continued to push hard for Ukrainization of schools in industrial areas, an 
increase in the number of “fully Ukrainized schools” did not mean real improvements in 
teacher instruction.  Teacher illiteracy in the Ukrainian language and studies remained 
high and Narkomos had no new solutions to propose.  Teachers’ priorities lay not in 
Ukrainization, but in a demonstration of their commitment to the public campaigns of the 
Five-Year Plan.  The SVU show trial corresponded with a rejection of the progressive 
pedagogy that educational planners intended Ukrainization to support and a move 
towards the subordination of Ukrainian education to all-Union norms.  Prominent 
Ukrainizer pedagogues (and now imprisoned members of the SVU) were blamed for the 
“chaos” of the discredited complex system.  Their condemnation provided a rationale for 
the eventual return to traditional, subject-oriented methodology and strict all-Union party 
control over educational affairs through a centralized educational system.  
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1: The Ukrainian Variant of a Soviet Educational System 
 
Theoretical Foundations 
Russia’s October Revolution set off a period of tremendous violence and disorder, 
but it also created opportunity for significant intellectual, scientific, and artistic 
experimentation.  Former subjects of the tsar who had not necessarily embraced the 
particular Bolshevik brand of socialism, found themselves applauding revolution for 
revolution’s sake.  A progressive stratum of the former empire’s educated elite welcomed 
the chance to do away with hated practices of the old.  The pedagogical world was no 
exception.  Revolution gave way to a tremendous amount of discussion throughout the 
former empire, regarding the task of building a radical “new school.”  Educators debated 
numerous options, but their overwhelming concern was a disassociation from the 
classical education of the tsarist gymnasia and promotion of pedagogical innovation.   
In Soviet Ukraine, the campaign for a transformation of pedagogy led to the 
development of a highly progressive and distinctive educational system that lasted until 
the late 1920s.  The founders of this system argued that the republic required schools 
attuned to its economic and social particularities, in their view a result of the devastation 
of the civil war and centuries of tsarist oppression and economic exploitation.  Ukrainian 
educational planners recognized the critical importance of linguistic Ukrainization to the 
creation of the “new school” and progressive pedagogy created opportunities for 
Ukrainian national exploration and expression.  However, these were means to an end.  
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For the Ukrainian Soviet government, the intent of “new school” was the creation of a 
new Soviet generation and the transformation of society.   
In the early years of the Soviet state, educational theorists and the Ukrainian 
Commissariat of Education (Narkomos) did not rely exclusively upon Marxist theory for 
inspiration, but rather turned to the wealth of pedagogical theory developed in the West.  
Hryhorii Hrynko (Commissar of Education from 1920 to 1922) publicly argued in an 
article entitled “Our Path to the West” that “spontaneous-revolutionary pedagogical 
activity” unleashed in Ukraine could be grounded with ties with the West.70  Narkomos 
representatives traveled to Germany, Austria, and Czechoslovakia to secure material and 
solicit ideas for creating new schools in Ukraine.  From 1922 to 1927 a permanent 
representative of Narkomos resided in Berlin in order to facilitate ties with German 
educators, collect publications on the subject of educational reform, and see to the 
publication of Ukrainian textbooks abroad.  Foreign educational theorists regularly 
contributed publications to the Ukrainian educational journal Shliakh osvity (literally, 
Path of Enlightenment), a periodical that became well-known abroad for its promotion of 
educational change.  According to one count by education historian O. V. Sukhomlynska, 
Shliakh osvity published 458 articles regarding problems in foreign pedagogy and 
education and maintained ties with 113 organizations and individuals abroad.71 
Drawing upon this contact with the West and research published in pre-
revolutionary Russia, Ukrainian educational theorists sought to develop an educational 
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system tailored to a child’s aptitude for learning.  Several prominent Ukrainian pre-
revolutionary pedagogues such as Iakiv Chepiha helped formulate pedagogy for the new 
educational system. One theory which gained particular favor among educational 
progressives was reflexology, elaborated by pre-revolutionary Russian researchers such 
as Ivan Pavlov and Vladimir Bekhterev.  According to Bekhterev, “the essence of 
reflexology is that all the behavior of a person begins with elementary organized 
reactions and ends with deep acts of creation, which come together in reflexes.”72  
Ukrainian educational theorists believed that an instructive methodology which 
accounted for these reflexes and directed them towards a prescribed educational goal 
would achieve the most effective results in the classroom.    
Ukrainian progressives coupled reflexology with an interest in the ideas of 
American educational theorist John Dewey, who emphasized the necessity of connecting 
instruction with real life and allowing children to solve problems through independent 
application.  Furthermore, his arguments for the merger of math and humanities and 
against the textbook as the central instructional device proved attractive to Ukrainian 
educators searching for ways to offer effective education with scant resources.  Yet 
another approach that appealed to Ukrainian educational planners reluctant to mimic their 
Tsarist predecessors and impose an obligatory and universal curriculum was the so-called 
Dalton Plan.  Designed by American Ellen Parkhurst for a Massachusetts high school, it 
allowed for individualized instruction based on a child’s knowledge.  Parkhurst’s students 
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entered into contracts with teachers and then joined small laboratory groups.  Teachers 
and students decided the course of instruction collectively. 73 
 
The Ukrainian Variant 
In a broad assessment of the Ukrainian educational system, written on the 
occasion of the tenth anniversary of the October Revolution, Narkomos Deputy 
Commissar Ian Riappo maintained that Ukraine had developed an educational “path” 
distinct from the Russian Federation which better satisfied the republic’s needs.74  In 
designing its educational system, Riappo wrote, Ukraine benefited from the fact that civil 
war prevented establishment of a network of schools in Ukraine until 1920.  Russia 
already had two years of experience by this time and planners made liberal use of 
Russian debates over the intent and form of education.75   
Initially, Ukraine did not concern itself with implementation of progressive 
pedagogy in the schoolhouse.   Narkomos’s preeminent worry was the civil war’s legacy 
of millions of homeless children. Their numbers grew even higher as the result of a 1921-
22 famine in the Volga basin which stretched into southern Ukraine and brought 
countless refugees to the republic. 76  Narkomos’s first duty then was to organize, protect, 
and provide for these children.  Unlike its Russian counterpart, Riappo argued, Narkomos 
was forced to fully realize the child rearing aspect of its directive.  The principal 
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institution for this task was the children’s building, described by Riappo as a “lighthouse” 
(maiak) for Ukraine’s neglected children.77  In 1923, at their high point, 1,928 children’s 
buildings in Ukraine cared for 114,000 homeless and neglected children.   
As the economy in Ukraine stabilized to some degree and starvation no longer 
posed an immediate danger, the number of children’s buildings steadily declined.  
However, the ideology of “social upbringing” that motivated the formation of children’s 
buildings did not diminish.  Hrynko had argued for children’s buildings to take charge of 
all children, claiming that a school’s pedagogical and organizational influence on a child 
left in the care of the “individualistic” family will be lost “in a night.”78  Although this 
idea was abandoned as both impractical and fiscally impossible, the state’s desire to 
ensure instruction by the “social collective” persisted and influenced Narkomos’s 
preference for a progressive pedagogy that emphasized the centrality of the school, 
shared projects, and civic activity.   Narkomos labeled this approach “social upbringing” 
(sotsialne vykhovannia - Sotsvykh) 
With the gradual decline of the children’s building, Narkomos turned to the 
schools as the basis of the Ukrainian educational system.  Hrynko’s commissariat 
outlined the structure of a separate Ukrainian variant at the First All-Ukrainian Meeting 
on Education in March 1920.79  Whereas the Russian Commissariat of Education retained 
a four-year primary school followed by a five-year general secondary school, the 
Ukrainian Narkomos opted for a seven-year extended primary school followed by a two-
year professional secondary school.  The professional schools offered vocational training 
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in a specified field of employment as early as age 15. The Ukrainian Commissariat saw 
them as not only as models for proletarian schooling, but also as the answer to Ukraine’s 
desperate need for qualified workers.80  Hrynko was a strong advocate for this type of 
applied instruction and a critic of the duplicative general education function of the 
Russian secondary school.  Although he insisted it was not Ukraine’s initial intent to 
pursue a separate path, he added he would not permit “any slave-like copying” of the 
Russian educational system.81  Hrynko believed that not only was technical-vocational 
orientation better suited to the needs of Ukraine, but also that this orientation should form 
the basis for a united educational policy for the Soviet Union.   
The differences between the Russian and Ukrainian systems were most striking at 
the secondary level.  Historians such as Sheila Fitzpatrick and Larry Holmes have 
referenced these distinctions, particularly in regards to the discussions held at the First 
Party Meeting on Education in 1920-21.82 Riappo and Hrynko’s promotion of 
professional schools at this meeting elicited support from Komsomol, Vesenkha 
(Supreme Economic Council), and labor union representatives and the meeting passed a 
resolution criticizing Russian moves away from vocational training.  In instructions to the 
VKP(b) Central Committee and in a February 1921 Pravda article Lenin also proposed 
early vocational training, as a “temporary and practical expedient.”83  The Komsomol 
continued to press the case and the Russian Commissariat did permit several types of 
professional schools, the most widespread being the factory apprentice school (known by 
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its Russian acronym, FZU), to operate parallel to its general secondary schools.  
However, the Komsomol maintained its pre-exisiting suspicion of junior trade schools as 
“circles of hell” for the poor, which stifled their cultural liberation and restricted their 
advancement.84  While it allowed for the FZU, it insisted on its inclusion of a general 
educational curriculum even in this institution.   
The Ukrainian preference for early professional training at the secondary level 
inevitably influenced the character of its extended primary school, the chief concern here.  
The continuing battle for the expansion of vocational training in Russia detailed by 
Fitzpatrick, and to a lesser extent, Holmes, was absent in Ukraine because it had already 
committed itself to this path.  Emboldened by the party meeting’s decision, the Ukrainian 
Commissariat insisted on an educational system oriented towards vocational training.85  
The curriculum of Ukraine’s primary schools reflected their mandate to prepare and 
matriculate students into professional secondary schools.  Although both the Russian and 
Ukrainian educational systems embraced the principle of a “united labor school,” the 
Ukrainians insisted that their institutions truly embraced labor oriented methodology and 
successfully integrated a general educational foundation with technical preparation.  
Graduates of the Ukrainian seven-year primary school, Riappo maintains, were far more 
ready to undergo this training than the many Russian youths who sought admission to a 
FZU or other alternative professional school with only four years of completed primary 
schooling.86  The reality, of course, was that probably an equivalent proportion of 
Ukrainians left school before completion of their seven-year degree, but on paper the 
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Ukrainian system did offer the opportunity for uninterrupted study leading to professional 
schooling.  The Russian route towards this end was indirect and one that enjoyed little 
institutional support by the Russian Commissariat of Education. 
 
The Complex Method 
The principal medium for a labor approach at the primary school level was not a 
uniquely Ukrainian solution.  Labeled the complex method, it was a system of instruction 
derived by Russian and Ukrainian Soviet educators alike from the progressive pedagogy 
embodied in Dewey’s writings and the Dalton plan.  Ukraine’s annual teaching guide, the 
Poradnyk sotsialnoho vykhovannia (Handbook for Social Upbringing), had embraced 
child-centered instruction early on, arguing that education should be tailored to the 
natural development of children and to children’s surroundings.  An explicit shift to 
complex instruction was a natural consequence of this approach and Ukrainian 
educational planners looked first to the 1922-23 program of the Russian State Academic 
Council for a model on how to proceed.87  The program mandated instruction around a 
set theme or complex placed under one of three broad headings: Nature, Society, and 
Labor.  All traditional disciplines (such as mathematics, science, history, and language) 
would be subordinated to this complex.  The children’s talents and interest played a 
significant part in the selection of this complex, which often called for the study of 
children’s immediate surroundings through the performance of various practical tasks.88   
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Primary school teachers in Ukraine were far from enamored with the complex 
method.  When implemented in Russia, educational planners had attributed near 
“mystical” powers to the method and offered few details on how it should be employed.89  
The Ukrainian Narkomos was little better in supplying instructions.  Narkomos set the 
structure of complexes in the annual poradnyk (guide), published them in the pedagogical 
press, and purportedly distributed to all schools (in fact, local educational sections were 
lucky to receive it).  The guide was simply that, a guide: short on details, but filled with 
tables of possible complexes and the type of material that teachers should cover.  It 
provided grand abstract models, but stopped short of offering a comprehensive and 
universal program.   Narkomos believed that the actual content of work in the schools 
must have a local character and relied on local institutions to work out specifics.90  
Teachers remained confused.  Having never encountered, let alone been trained in this 
method of instruction, teachers were understandably skeptical about the method’s 
benefits and at a loss on how to innovate.   
A 1923 report by the Kharkiv provincial educational section stated that schools in 
the city of Kharkiv were transferring to instruction by the complex system, but in the 
countryside old methods of teaching persisted.  It argued that rural teachers lacked 
instructions and basic educational material to carry out this task.91  After a 1924-25 push 
by Narkomos, one school director at a okruha (region) meeting of the heads of district 
labor schools in Kyiv noted that although schools were moving to complex instruction, 
teachers often worked strictly according to the guides with entirely abstract material and 
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were unable to integrate them with material that students could readily understand.  These 
were the better teachers.  Others abandoned the method altogether: “Often instruction by 
the complexes has turned into idle chatter and has entirely ignored technical skills and 
mastery of material on their reproduction.”92 Even when local educational sections took it 
upon themselves to provide additional material on the complex method, perhaps in an 
attempt to outdo the central planners, the guides remained theoretical and only served to 
baffle teachers more.93 
Those who did not accede to complex instruction were in practice forced to 
employ it: a 1925 internal order from the Narkomos collegium, stressed that its Sotsvykh 
program, which formally endorsed the complex method, should be mandatory and any 
other approach was impermissible.94  However, it also called for “attentive checks” on 
the work carried out as part of this program.  Narkomos was anxious to demonstrate that 
instruction by the complex method could supply required skills.  In particular, it ordered 
that local educational sections monitor not just the general development of children, but 
also their skill level in reading, writing, and arithmetic (libcha).   As will be discussed in 
more detail below, teachers who remained unable or unwilling to implement complex 
instruction sometimes abandoned a methodology altogether, fearing being accused of 
defending the old school.95  The result was a lack of any sort of discipline in the 
classroom and a high incidence of academic failure. 
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To be sure, the challenge for teachers was immense.  Their own material situation 
was often desperate.  Dependent upon local authorities for their salaries, rural teachers 
went unpaid for months and subsisted on a minimum ration.96  Some fled to urban posts 
or quit the profession entirely. Schools closed down due to lack of financing or limped 
along as best they could without fuel, light, or paper.  Teachers, inspectors, and local 
educational sections alike decried the lack of Ukrainian language textbooks, noting that 
even when new ones finally became available, they remained either too expensive or 
impossible to acquire.   
Narkomos leaders also had lingering questions about teachers’ political 
commitment to the new Soviet school.  They continued to rely largely on teachers who 
had received their education before the revolution due to a shortage of Soviet trained 
staff.  Oleksandr Shumskyi (Commissar of Education from 1924 to 1927), conceded that 
rural teachers had fallen in with the agrarian Ukrainian Socialist Revolutionary Party 
(SRs) during the civil war because of their “weak tie to the city” and peasant origins.  He 
argued that after Soviet power came to the countryside: “The public teacher honestly and 
openly returned to the working masses, the truant is catching up and with his efforts 
Soviet power will be victorious on this third front.” 97   Teachers, he insisted, were not the 
same as the intelligentsia because they had “returned” to the working population.  Just in 
case, he recommend continued Komsomol oversight.  
Narkomos was determined to implement instruction by the complex method 
regardless.  It conceded that textbooks were in short supply and not until 1924 was 
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literature available in the Ukrainian language that corresponded to Ukrainian conditions 
and to the requirements of the new Soviet school.98  Until then, pre-revolutionary 
textbooks were simply translated from Russian.   From the perspective of Narkomos and 
progressive educators, however, textbooks remained an auxiliary device, to be used to 
stimulate class activity and, in the particular circumstances of linguistic Ukrainization, to 
provide Ukrainian language vocabulary for class discussion.  Salvation, however, was to 
be found in the new methodology, not in the book alone.  One presenter at the 1925 Kyiv 
okruha conference of school directors noted that teachers remained entirely too reliant on 
textbooks when attempting to teach by the complex method and were failing to 
incorporate “concrete material” into their lesson plans or engage in true interactive 
activity with their students.99  Another delegate claimed that teachers had taken 
educational authorities concern with the quality of instruction to mean an abandonment of 
the complex method.  In fact, “the system of complexes, which the programs provide, 
gives the only means to implement the whole structure of Soviet schools.  It is impossible 
to do away with them, it is rather necessary to manage the transfer to them by the 
schools.”100  Narkomos and progressive educators were concerned with perfecting 
complex instruction, not rejecting it.  They stuck stubbornly to this course until the late 
1920s. 
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An Introduction to Kraieznavstvo in the Schools 
If the professional schools were to offer hands-on vocational training at the 
secondary level, it was the responsibility of the seven-year primary school to prepare 
students with the proper proletarian mentality.  The complex method, however 
imperfectly applied, was the means Narkomos chose to purge schools of the didactic 
teaching of the past and instruct students in value of labor and the promise of the 
revolutionary future.  In 1927, Riappo argued that because of Ukraine’s early adoption of 
the complex method “the life of the school began to adapt to the demands of the 
children’s communist society and the program to the productive tasks of a Soviet 
country.”101  Although the Russian Commissariat of Education also adopted the complex 
method, it constantly battled for its continued use and scaled back its expectations.  As 
Holmes demonstrates, it ultimately was forced to reintroduce traditional instruction by 
subjects in its 1926 and 1927 curriculums.102  Because the object of the Ukrainian 
educational system as a whole was the vocational training of its youth, the Ukrainian 
Narkomos continued to advance the preparatory value of the complex method for the 
cultivation of future laborers.    
Narkomos’s most successful application of the complex method was in the field 
of kraieznavstvo.  Strictly speaking, this term means “regional studies,” but its definition 
shifted.  In the early 1920s, kraieznavstvo denoted a general, often folkloric, study of a 
region surrounding a school and the larger Ukrainian republic. 103  In the 1920-21 
poradnyk, courses on Ukrainian studies had formed a significant part of the school’s 
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curriculum.  Through the third grade, general courses labeled kraieznavstvo 
predominated and in the fourth through seventh grades more specific courses on civics 
history (istoriia z hromadianoznavstvo) and geography covered Ukrainian studies.  
According to one calculation, out of an aggregate of 173 instruction hours per week, the 
program devoted 79 hours to subjects that were considered to be Ukrainian studies.104  
These included courses on kraieznavstvo, native language instruction, civics, geography, 
and singing.  However, the 1920-21 plan and subsequent plans did not explicitly detail 
the content and form of kraieznavstvo.  For this reason, schools interpreted kraieznavstvo 
and related subjects differently and developed variant plans.   
In the 1924-25 academic year, when Narkomos mandated a full scale transfer to 
education by the complex method, kraieznavstvo proved agreeable to this shift because of 
its early emphasis on self-discovery of a region’s features and places of interest.   The 
year 1925 saw the publication of several articles in the Soviet Ukrainian pedagogical 
journal Radianska osvita on the subject of teaching kraieznavstvo, using in particular the 
complex method.  One author, Lazaris, pointed to a lack of ideological and organizational 
leadership in kraieznavstvo prior to 1924 to explain confusion over its teaching.105  
According to Lazaris, initial efforts to tie kraieznavstvo to practical work were 
insufficient and its instruction had little to do with concerns of real life.  Now “proletarian 
students” had taken over leadership of kraieznavstvo and directed its application to 
present concerns.  A 1924 All-Union Congress on Regional Studies set the defining 
agenda for all future kraieznavstvo work.  Kraieznavstvo could no longer devote time to 
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the study of customs and tradition, but should rather concentrate on an examination of the 
“productive forces and general growth of planned economic construction.”106  Although 
the congress placed primary schools at the center of kraieznavstvo work, it called upon “a 
wide circle of workers” to involve themselves in the development of this work.  
Chapter 4 will explore in detail the challenges teachers faced in attempting to 
implement a kraieznavstvo curriculum.  I. Haliun, a contributor to Radianska osvita, 
described the ideal in an article on experimental work with children.  He and other 
progressives believed that kraieznavstvo should form the basis of instruction for all 
disciplines, rather than be set aside as a separate subject of study.  They argued for the 
“unification” of all school work to the study of real life.107  It was their concern for this 
goal that motivated them to promote the instruction by the complex method.  
Kraieznavstvo could not be studied from textbooks, Haliun wrote, but should be tied to 
“living, passionate feelings towards life and toiling people, who with the sweat and blood 
of struggle have built their labor life and culture.”  The complex method was favored 
because it organized school work towards this end, but the primary concern with 
kraieznavstvo advocates was instruction integrated with “productive” life. 
Kraieznavstvo’s new emphasis on the active engagement with the community 
promised greater localization of its application.  Teachers were encouraged to favor the 
study of the immediate surroundings of the school first and foremost.  Urban children had 
the advantage in the study of kraieznavstvo because of the great variety of “productive 
forces” in their place of residence. Haliun argued that constant change in a child’s urban 
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environment produces a “type of existence that is more developed, with a sharpened 
interest to everything that surrounds him.”108  He further insisted that schools must 
develop courses suited to this particular “psychology” of the urban child with the ultimate 
goal of producing a “future, conscious worker” for socialism.  Kraieznavstvo in the cities 
should also encompass the surrounding region’s topography, natural world, and material 
culture.  Haliun recommended that urban teachers collect “living folklore,” including 
common sayings and songs, as well as “living memories,” such as personal accounts of 
the revolution and histories of specific enterprises.   
Narkomos adjusted the complex system to meet its educational objectives in rural 
schools.   Kraieznavstvo determined the content of complexes in rural schools just as it 
did in cities.  However, rural students were to focus primarily on agricultural activity, as 
well as some folklore, local customs, and events.  Although Haliun lauded the presence 
of expressions of the “victorious new” in the villages, he conceded that it is folklore 
derived from the past should form a large basis for the study of kraieznavstvo in the rural 
school.  Material such as fairytales, fables (baika), legends, and customs had an effect on 
rural children at birth and could be used to inspire an interest in the everyday life of the 
village and its “productive forces.”109  Haliun lamented the fate of children in rural 
schools, “now completely torn from city schools” and from the city in general.  Rural 
schools must strengthen their ties to urban schools so that the student does not act like a 
“wild beast” when he encounters the city.    
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A common instructional emphasis on production would facilitate interaction 
between the urban and rural school.  Narkomos plans obligated rural students to learn 
about cities.  Thus, not only were a school’s immediate surroundings important, but also 
wider Ukraine.  Urban students studied Ukraine’s rural resources as well, but the 
emphasis of broader Ukrainian studies was on the proletarian city and industrial 
production.  The Narkomos program recommended that rural students make excursions to 
the cities and those who lived in isolated locations learn from illustrated journals.  The 
program argued that “it is necessary to inculcate in children an awareness that a person 
can do everything when he is armed with knowledge and organization and that the culture 
of the village depends on the culture of the city.”110  The most valued form of knowledge 
then was to be found in the cities.  The oft-cited cultural union (smychka) between the 
village and the city was not entirely false, but it was unequal.  Narkomos intended 
educated rural youth to either join the proletariat or contribute to the agricultural 
production necessary for its strength.  The new Ukraine was unequivocally proletarian 
and Ukrainian studies in the schools reflected this aspiration. 
Furthermore, for both urban and rural children lessons in kraieznavstvo work 
were not confined to the limits of the classroom.  Children made trips in their region (and 
sometimes beyond) to visit farms, factories, architectural sites, and other points of 
interest.  However, children were not to just passively observe the places they visited.  I. 
Kopyl, a teacher from the Poltava region, described the experience of his sixth grade 
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group in Radianska osvita.111  For this group’s kraieznavstvo work, Kopyl assigned 
students the task of examining village soviets in the district.  The students designed a 
form (anketa) in order to plan questions for their observation of the village and interviews 
with residents and members of the soviet.  They included questions not only on the 
village’s economy and production, but also on its social structure, party membership, 
civic activism, and cultural achievements (in particular literacy levels).  One group went 
even so far as to judge the number of dogs and cats, information, Kopyl stressed, that was 
not easy to acquire.  Kopyl noted that the students planned to compile the group’s more 
important findings into a directory of the raion (district), together with maps, and send it 
to the raion executive committee and other local governmental and cultural institutions.  
The students also hoped to host a workshop with schools of the neighboring raion and 
collaborate on a comparative economic study of the larger area. 
Such interactive excursions served a number of purposes, according to Kopyl.  
Firstly, they satisfied a public need.  Although Kopyl conceded that the students’ work 
may not have been entirely accurate, because of its comprehensive nature, the students 
helped inform the executive committee and “improve their parents’ and neighbors’ 
economic management.”112  Notwithstanding the students’ inexperience, the report may 
well have been less biased than other official reports of the time because the children 
posed questions with few inhibitions.  Secondly, Kopyl argues that the students’ work in 
the region had the potential to increase the school’s authority among the population, “an 
authority, by the way, that many schools do not have.” Through their engagement of local 
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officials and residents, students demonstrated the utility of schooling to a rural society, 
that when confronted with the daily challenge of survival had historically valued it less.  
Lastly, because the students were required to conduct their research independently, they 
took greater pride in the realization of the project.  This, in the end, was the chief merit of 
instruction by the complex method coupled with kraieznavstvo.  Since the students were 
investigating something already familiar to them, they accomplished their tasks with 
greater alacrity and effect. 
Narkomos did attempt to provide some institutional oversight to the kraieznavstvo 
movement.  The All-Union Congress on Kraieznavstvo was the first comprehensive 
attempt to define an agenda for the entire country.  In 1925 the Commission of 
Kraieznavstvo under the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences in Kyiv assumed 
responsibility for the coordination of work throughout the republic.  There were two 
further regional centers, the commission’s branch in Odesa (Odessa), and the 
Commission for Kraieznavstvo of Slobozhanshchyna, overseen by the Kharkiv Institute 
of Public Education.  More regional bureaus were to be set up under the okruha planning 
commissions (Okrplan).  Narkomos called upon all member of society, but particularly 
representatives of science, education, professional trade unions, and student organizations 
to attend periodical plenums on kraieznavstvo and coordinate their work. 
Some standardization of instructional content in the classroom, Narkomos 
officials concluded, was also beneficial.  Due to the nearly complete absence of 
appropriate school texts, teachers initially attempted to adapt more technical works to 
classroom needs.  Matvii Iavorskyi’s Korotka istoriia Ukraini (Short History of Ukraine) 
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and a Ukrainian translation of Miron Volfson’s Ocherki obshchestvovedeniia (Essays on 
Social Studies) were the most widely used textbooks in Ukrainian schools in the latter 
half of the twenties.113  As one of Ukraine’s leading Marxist historians, Iavorskyi played 
a significant part in the design of kraieznavstvo material.  His Korotka istoriia 
represented the first attempt to provide a party-centered and class approach to Ukrainian 
history for the general public.  Following the return to Ukraine of preemient Ukrainian 
historian Mykhailo Hrushevskyi in 1924,  both he and Iavorskyi worked on the 
promotion of kraieznavstvo.  Hrushevskyi formed a commission under the All-Ukrainian 
Academy of Sciences (VUAN) to encourage the development of regional histories.114  
Iavorskyi and Stepan Rudnytskyi, the author of several geography textbooks, directed the 
work of the VUAN Main Committee for Kraieznavstvo.  Both bodies relied on the work 
and participation of teachers at the local level for the success of their work.   
Of course, in the end, it still was the responsibility of individual teachers to adapt 
technical works for the classroom.   Publishers included illustrations in Korotka istoriia 
and Matvii Iavorskyi’s 1925 publication, Revoliutsiia na Ukraini (Revolution in 
Ukraine), to make the books more accessible to children.  Iavorskyi also incorporated 
material from Ukrainian history, essays on intervention in Ukraine, the constitution of the 
UkSSR, and Soviet nationalities policy in the Ukrainian translation of Volfson’s Ocherki 
obshchestvovedeniia so that it might be more readily used in Ukrainian schools.   
Teachers used O. O. Sukhov’s Ekonomichna heohrafiia Ukrainy (Economic Geography 
of Ukraine) due to the absence of any suitable textbooks on geography.  However, it was 
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difficult for children to understand and teachers also employed Konstantin Voblyi’s 1922 
publication, Ekonomichna heohrafiia Ukrainy (Economic Geography of Ukraine) which 
included illustrations, tables, questions, and recommended further reading for students.115  
In 1925 Sukhov published a revised version of his geography designed for use in the 
schools.  
Although local educational sections were responsible for defining specific 
methodological plans for their schools, the annual poradnyk  held that no other program 
was permissible for the design of curricular planning.  In order to ensure reproduction of 
the poradnyk’s ideal principles, organized okruha sections issued supplementary guides 
and instructed raion trudshkoly to offer models for their implementation.  Speakers at one 
meeting of  Kyiv okruha school directors the labeled the raion labor school a 
“laboratory.”116  Located in the district seat, the raion labor school was often the only full 
seven-year school in the area and was the first institution to try out the okruha’s variant 
for the poradnyk plan, collect and anticipate the concerns of other schools in the raion, 
and disseminate the plan further.  The Narkomos division responsible for administering 
primary schooling in Ukraine, the Main Administration for Social Upbringing (Holovne 
upravlinnia sotsialnoho vykhovannia - Holovsotsvykh), also set up a number of 
experimental institutions and assumed direct budgetary and administrative control over 
these institutions, unlike local trudshkoly.  For the 1925-26 academic year, there were at 
least five such schools in Kharkiv, Kyiv, Odesa, Luhansk (Lugansk), and Katerynoslav 
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(Ekaterinoslav), enrolling nearly 1500 students.117  Similarily, these central schools were 
to give local schools “models of normal work,” so that these schools might “exactly carry 
out the directives of the center.”118 They were to lead by example, testing the new 
progressive methodology and disseminating a script for innovation.   
To spread progressive methodology throughout the republic, Narkomos also 
advocated the publication and use of books that emphasized regional models of centrally 
defined themes .  The Second All-Union Conference on Kraieznavstvo (1924) 
emphasized the need for textbooks with guides to local areas and statistical information.  
In Ukraine, several such textbooks were published for regions throughout the republic.  
Local (okruzhni) methodological committees of Narkomos further argued for 
kraieznavstvo textbooks which provided a detailed plan for localized programs.119  These 
methodological committees supported the publication of several municipal and regional 
textbooks.  Student elaboration on themes articulated in the textbooks further broadened 
the type of material available for classroom use.  Independent school work like that 
described by Kopyl was published in supplementary form alongside textbooks such as 
Korotka istoriia Ukrainy and disseminated to other schools.120 Local educators and 
students also sought to fill the gaps left by a shortage in official printed guides 
themselves. A teacher-supervised student committee teacher in the Myronivka Raion 
Labor School, for example, put out its own journal entitled Promin (Ray of Light) and a 
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wall newspaper Chervonyi shkolar (Red Scholar).121  The question of general textbook 
distribution will be explored further in Chapter 4.   
Teachers also took a leading role in coordinating kraieznavstvo work beyond the 
school.  These “directors and providers of culture,” Haliun argued, had to take a leading 
role and convince workers to consider the relationship between their way of life and all 
that surrounds them, even the remnants of the failed past.122   Under the teachers’ 
leadership, educators believed that schools could become the centers for kraieznavstvo 
work.  Teachers sought to unite their own senior pupils and the “conscious young” of the 
surrounding population in such study circles.  In rural locations, these school centers 
assumed even greater importance due to the lack of other institutional support.  They 
provided the foundation for the public’s study of its environment and maintained ties to 
urban research establishments. Teachers were encouraged to establish kraieznavstvo 
museums under the schools or coordinate their activities with standalone museums in the 
raion centers.  In urban and rural locations alike the school functioned as the springboard 
for kraieznavstvo study, but this study was to involve all public institutions and the 
broader elements of society.   
Kraieznavstvo was to function as a catalyst for community activism.  Educators 
called upon parents not only to support their children in their study of region, but also 
take an active role in its study.  As Haliun writes, too many parents believed their 
“mission” was accomplished after they sent their children to school.123   Narkomos and 
educators called upon parents to participate in the development of kraieznavstvo studies 
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as part of their civic duty.  The participation of all of society in this endeavor was 
declared to be of vital interest to the young Soviet Ukrainian state:  “the resolution of a 
series of great problems regarding the economic and political rebuilding of the country is 
completely impossible without a study of the productive, historical, economic, and 
everyday particularities of everything that surrounds a modern person in his restless, 
great struggle for the establishment of a socialist foundation for the economy and civic 
life.”124  Kraieznavstvo then was part of a wide-ranging pedagogical campaign to educate 
the public in the task of “socialist construction” and solicit its participation.  Teachers, as 
“directors and providers of culture,” had to take a leading role and convince workers to 
consider the relationship between their way of life and all that surrounds them, even the 
remnants of the failed past.125   Ultimately, the aim of the teachers’ efforts was to bridge 
the peasant-worker divide, to create a “new labor intelligentsia” drawn from both 
elements that would recognize that “for them kraieznavstvo will be life with the great, 
true school and furthermore, through the school, a tie between this life and the conscious 
life.”126  Schools functioned as the foci of cultural activity at the local level and it was 
through schools that Narkomos hoped the Soviet Ukrainian public would be linked. 
 
The Kobzar 
Narkomos also allowed for the possibility of expanding kraieznavstvo to its 
broadest extent, the study of Ukraine.  Narkomos formalized Ukrainian studies, 
ukrainoznavstvo, as a separate course in national minority schools and encouraged a 
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variety of Ukrainian-related subjects, even as it moved to instruction by the complex 
method.  The shift to the complex method meant classes in separate traditional areas such 
as history, literature, and language had to give way to the complex.  However, 
educational planners had begun to promote a generalized discipline of social studies 
(suspilnoznavstvo) as a mechanism for the creation of new complexes. The 
commissariat’s promotion of social studies enabled schools to orient their curriculum 
around revolutionary themes, without having to formally emphasize any one “productive 
force” in the immediate region.  Some Ukrainian-language schools sought to use 
Narkomos’s promotion of social studies to make a link directly with ukrainoznavstvo.  
All knowledge began with a local experience, starting with a child’s village or district, 
but then connecting to an awareness of the region and the republic.  Accordingly, 
kraieznavstvo was vital prerequisite of Ukrainization and Ukrainian studies as Narkomos 
encouraged schools to privilege “Ukrainian” material.   
Narkomos and Ukrainian educators drew on numerous aspects of Ukraine’s past 
to develop social studies complexes, including the lives and works of pre-revolutionary 
and revolutionary heroes. The paradigmatic figure of Ukrainian Soviet values was the 
Ukrainian national poet and hero, Taras Shevchenko.  Raised to an exalted level by 
Ukrainian national movement, the young Soviet state co-opted and re-worked the 
mythology surrounding him.  Ukrainian literary specialist George Grabowicz places 
Shevechenko on the level of Pushkin or Mickiewicz:  “he is Bard and Prophet, the 
inspired voice of the people, and the spiritual father of the reborn nation.”127  One school 
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that responded to the Soviet authorities’ promotion of the Shevchenko myth was a former 
tsarist gymnasium in Kyiv, renamed Shevchenko Labor School No. 1.  Volodymyr 
Durdukivskyi, a well-known pedagogue, headed the school.  Under his leadership, the 
school gained a reputation as a center of pedagogical innovation and Ukrainian cultural 
advancement.    
Durdukivskyi emphasized his school’s advancement of social studies to Soviet 
authorities.  Ostensibly due to his school’s largely middle class student body, 
Durdukivskyi maintained to Narkomos that an industrial or agricultural orientation was 
impossible.128  In a 1924 article published in the Soviet pedagogical journal, Radianska 
osvita, Durdukivskyi further outlined his school’s development and use of a “Shevchenko 
complex.”  129  In designing the complex, the school did not seek to provide the 
conventional kraieznavstvo study in production, but rather sought to “light in children, 
with Shevchenko’s fiery words, disgust of all despotism, tyranny, and exploitation and to 
educate in them a class proletarian consciousness, a revolutionary fuse and capacity for 
struggle.”  Lessons on Shevchenko therefore pertained to the larger krai, Ukraine.  
Durdukivskyi believed that by encouraging children to engage the life of Shevchenko, to 
learn his poetry and write works inspired by him, these children would spread 
Shevchenko’s legacy and his message of “social truth.”   Although Durdukivskyi noted 
Shevchenko’s importance as a figure for national liberation, Shevchenko was most 
importantly an “inflexible revolutionary” and “prophet for a joyous socialist future.”130  
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Durdukivskyi claimed that instructors placed primary significance on this role in their 
development of lessons for the complex. 
Durdukivskyi also addressed another fundamental part of instruction by the 
complex method: exercises that encouraged independent study.  In his school, children 
kept journals of their thoughts on Shevchenko’s works and illustrated their favorite 
images described by the poet.   Durdukivskyi suggests that because such assignments 
were attuned to a child’s “psychology” they were more engaging.  Independent, “non-
mechanistic” study, he argues, stimulated a desire for greater learning and elaboration by 
the “young researchers.”  Progressive educators like Durdukivskyi believed instruction 
by the complex method to be a more effective means to train the young.  The complex 
method, when properly applied, would encourage school children to readily participate in 
the design and goals of their education.   
The Shevchenko complex also afforded an opportunity for civic training.  One 
second grade teacher at Kyiv Labor School No.1, who published under the initials Iu. T. 
(probably the teacher Iurii Trezvynskyi, who like Durdukivskyi was tried for being a 
member of the SVU in 1930) , describes how his students planned and agreed upon 
assignments for the complex.131  The process mimics the formulaic proceedings of a 
village or city soviet.  The teacher convened a meeting at the school; the children 
proposed several projects that were then debated.  The teacher reserved the right to 
support or reject proposals on the basis of their practicality.  The results of the debate 
were drawn up in a plan, entitled protocol No. 10 that was voted on and approved by the 
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class as a whole.  Furthermore, even at this early age, the children were encouraged to 
perform a public function.  The school arranged for the children to perform a skit on 
Shevchenko at the raion theater and participate in celebrations honoring Shevchenko’s 
birth at a workers’ theater and club.132  Even the children’s journals and drawings were 
put on display at the school museum for the whole school and the public to see.  
Information regarding Shevchenko was collected and retransmitted by these little kobzary 
(bards, a moniker usually applied Shevchenko), as Durdukivskyi calls them, to the Soviet 
public at large. 
It should be stressed that because of the less formalistic nature of the complex 
approach, the kind and character of information acquired by children was not strictly 
regulated.  Teachers, in fact, encouraged children to use all sources open to them to 
collect information on Shevchenko. The children of Kyiv Labor School No. 1 invited the 
school caretaker and the son of a contemporary of Taras Shevchenko, to tell them about 
his acquaintance with the famous poet.  His story was subsequently published in the 
school newspaper.  Furthermore, Iu. T. asked the children to compare their childhood and 
their “region of the world” to that Shevchenko’s.  They solicited material at home and 
retold their stories the next day.  Iu. T. does not describe in detail what they related, but 
emphasizes that all work was done independently.  The children were thus permitted to 
make their own judgment regarding the progress made in Ukraine since Shevchenko’s 
time.  These children, born in the midst of the civil war, adopt Shevchenko’s words for 
their poster art: “struggle, overcome.”  In the poverty of 1925 Kyiv, it is the promise of 
the revolution, repeatedly cited by Iu. T., and not its immediate accomplishment that 
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must have had the greatest resonance.  As Durdukivskyi concedes, “Shevchenko’s 
convictions are close, native to our contemporary life.”133 
The children would be taught about the history of the revolution in Ukraine in 
other complexes.  It is perhaps significant, however, that this personage from the past, 
and not a contemporary figure, was chosen as the preeminent revolutionary for Ukraine.  
Durdukivskyi argued that “every year we must unite not only the children of our school 
but of all schools in Ukraine” in the study of Shevchenko.  It was Shevchenko’s life 
which further provided material for the study of Ukraine in turn.  Children learned of 
Ukraine outside Kyiv through Shevchenko’s works and by tracing Shevchenko’s life and 
journeys on a map.  A study of Shevchenko then defined territorial Ukraine, told of the 
oppression of its people, and invoked its revolutionary spirit.  Neither Durdukivskyi nor 
Iu. T. explicitly mentions the role of the Communist Party in this struggle and lessons in 
Marxism were conspicuously absent from the complex.  They placed Shevchenko at the 
fore of contemporary revolutionary struggle and called upon the children to connect their 
own experiences to this movement.  Iu. T. concludes that at the end of the complex his 
students sang with greater awareness:  “oppressed and hungry workers of all countries 
rise up!”  Shevchenko was in the lead.  
The Ukrainian Commissariat of Education thus embraced and held up a 
progressive methodology for its promise of transformation.  Borrowing from liberal 
educational theorists such as John Dewey, it advocated the complex method to rid the 
school of traditional teaching and supply students in its extended primary school with the 
proletarian mindset needed for future vocational training.  Even when confronted with 
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resistance from teachers who were not able or not willing to teach with complexes, 
Narkomos and progressive educators insisted only on perfecting their use.  Lessons based 
on the productive capacities of the student’s immediate environment, Narkomos believed, 
would make the instruction that much more effective and had the added benefit of public 
outreach.  Children, equipped with an understanding of the value of industry and 
agriculture, could readily embrace the physical task of “building socialism.”  An 
awareness of Ukraine’s past suffering would provide some with the proper spirit.  
Some exceptional instructors, like Kopyl, were able to implement instruction by 
complex system.  Most likely, the majority of teachers did not.  Because of the 
importance Narkomos attached to the complex method for its formative value in future 
vocational training, it did not abandon the technique until the heigh of the cultural 
revolution in 1930.  Even at this time schools pursued progressive methods, such as the 
student involvement in collaborative projects, but now largely to demonstrate their 
participation in the first Five-Year Plan campaigns for collectivization and 
industrialization.  Progressive advocates of Ukrainian studies, such as Durdukivskyi and 
Hryhorii Ivanytsia, a co-editor of Radianska osvita and secretary of the Academy of 
Science’s historical-philological section, were implicated early on in the 1930 SVU 
public show trial.  The DPU even arrested the party historian Iavorskyi in 1931, 
following the SVU trial.  Progressive pedagogy, as a whole, fell widely out of disfavor.  
Ultimately, education by the complex method proved to be a dangerous proposition that 
provided too much freedom for non-party interpretations and too much opportunity for 
critics to claim academic failure. 
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2: A Mandate for Ukrainian Schooling 
 
Setting the Timeline 
If Narkomos and the circle of progressive educators who supported it were to be 
successful in their ambition to radically transform the educational system in Ukraine, and, 
as a consequence, the skills and mentality of its graduates, it would have to teach students 
in a language they understood.  For nearly three-quarters of the juvenile population of 
Ukraine, this meant instruction in Ukrainian.  Although this may have sounded like a 
simple proposition, it was not.  Throughout the pre-revolutionary period, schools had 
educated Ukrainian children in Russian.  Teachers, regardless of their ethnicity, were 
trained and accustomed to teaching in Russian.  Pre-revolutionary publications, still 
widely used in Soviet schools, and even the early Soviet primers were overwhelmingly 
written in Russian.  Ukrainian national leaders had made an attempt to set up a network 
of Ukrainian-language schools after the February Revolution, but their efforts were 
disrupted by the chaos of civil war and the fall of successive governments.   
On August 1, 1923 the VUTsVK passed a decree ordering the linguistic 
Ukrainization of all levels of government and requiring Ukrainian-language instruction in 
primary and secondary schools according to the republic’s proportion of ethnic 
Ukrainians.  This decree was the culmination of a long battle within central and 
republican party organs over nationalities policy in Ukraine.   Early party orders 
regarding the need for internal Ukrainization had done little.  A February 1920 VUTsVK 
resolution establishing the equality of Ukrainian to Russian was similarily ineffectual.  
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Thus, immediately after the promulgation of the 1923 decree, KP(b)U first party 
secretary Emanual Kviring released an editorial, confirming that the party leadership 
meant to do more than recognize a “formal equality of nations.”  Narkomos set its own 
accelerated calendar plan for the proactive Ukrainization of its own apparatus on August 
28.134  In provincial sections, staffed almost entirely by Ukrainians, the switch to use of 
the Ukrainian language could begin immediately.  Sections with a large proportion of 
Ukrainians were given three months to transfer and sections which employed a 
significant number of non-Ukrainians and serviced a high proportion of non-Ukrainians 
were allowed six months.  Narkomos also set six months as a goal for the Ukrainization 
of its central apparatus.   
Educational institutions that operated under the jurisdiction of these provincial 
sections were to follow a similar phased schedule of Ukrainization.  Teachers who did 
not know Ukrainian but wished to continue working in primary school institutions 
designated for Ukrainization, were to learn Ukrainian also over the course of the next six 
months.135  Holovsotsvykh, the Narkomos organ responsible for primary schooling, 
understood however that full institutional Ukrainization would come about slowly.  Not 
only would many teachers have to learn Ukrainian, but Ukrainian and non-Ukrainian 
speaking teachers alike would have to learn how to teach in Ukrainian and local 
educational sections needed to translate their lessons plans, acquire Ukrainian literature, 
and group Ukrainian children in ethnically homogenous schools.  In the eastern and 
southern regions of Ukraine, where non-Ukrainians constituted a significant minority, 
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Narkomos recognized complete Ukrainization would necessarily proceed more slowly.  
Plans for Ukrainization of primary schools in the Kharkiv, Odesa, Katerynoslav (later 
Dnipropetrovsk) and Donetsk hubernii allotted a two-year time period for a complete 
transfer.136  However, pedagogical courses in these regions were to be immediately 
Ukrainized in 1923 so that their graduates would be ready to teach in Ukrainian for the 
1924-25 academic years.  As will be discussed below, few teachers that Narkomos rushed 
through Ukrainian language courses were able to reliably teach in the language.  While 
Holovsotsvykh initially recognized a measured pace for Ukrainization, teachers and 
prospective teachers immediately felt the effects of the new policy.   It would take some 
time for a Ukrainian language environment to develop in the schools.  In order for this to 
be accomplished, teachers had to teach in Ukrainian or quickly learn how to do so. 
 
Rationale and Intent: Unifying a Rural Republic  
The party provided a definitive rationale for Ukrainization.  The Soviet republican 
government had to conduct its affairs in Ukrainian if it was to justly serve the interests of 
the predominantly Ukrainian-speaking population.  Furthermore, the party regularly 
claimed it sought to correct a historical wrong.  Tsarist authorities had forbidden the 
publication of Ukrainian literature and effectively stigmatized the language as a boorish 
dialect of the peasantry.  While some in the party’s central and even Ukrainian leadership 
held a similar disregard for the Ukrainian language, Lenin had succeeded early on in 
affirming a party line that recognized the equality of all languages, required republican 
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and local governments to communicate in the language of the resident population, and 
strongly condemned Russian chauvinism.   
The Ukrainian branch of the Communist Party, the KP(b)U, took its lead then 
from the all-Union party’s position.  However, in Ukraine, nationalities policy was 
inexorably linked to the Soviet strategy of smychka.  Derived from the Russian word for 
“linking,” it called for an alliance between the urban proletariat and the toiling peasantry.  
In most non-Russian areas, there was a deep divide between the largely Russian-speaking 
city and the countryside.  In Ukraine’s case, this separation was considerable. With the 
exception of an industrialized, mineral rich East, the republic was overwhelmingly rural 
and its rural population was overwhelmingly Ukrainian.    
The Ukrainian peasantry remained deeply suspicious of urban-centered authority.  
It took the Red Army three tries to establish lasting control over this population.   While a 
Ukrainian national movement was growing, it remained too weak to enlist the support 
needed to secure an independent state.  The Greens, armies made up of peasants 
frustrated by the persistent demands of invading armies and their empty promises of land 
redistribution, proved to be a greater challenge to the Bolsheviks.  Led by charismatic 
commanders such as Nestor Makhno, the Greens brokered a number of loose alliances 
with the Red Army only to break them when their interests diverged.  While peasants 
may not have universally identified themselves as “Ukrainian,” most viewed the largely 
Russian-speaking Bolsheviks as foreign.   
The young Soviet Ukrainian government drew a number of lessons from the Civil 
War.  Firstly, it recognized that the Ukrainian national movement had garnered 
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significant, if not sufficient, support.  Secondly, it concluded that that the Ukrainian 
disenchantment might only grow stronger if the population continued to view Soviet 
power as something entirely alien.  In a largely rural republic, such as Ukraine, peasant 
sentiment was critical.  A campaign to “win over” the peasantry offered a solution to the 
dilemma.  Ukrainization was a critical component of this approach.   
The Soviet government saw Ukrainization of primary schooling as an effective 
means to both cultivate a new generation of loyal citizens and gain the support of a 
suspicious peasantry.    In a 1923 document, entitled in Russian “Project: The Smychka of 
the City with the Village, According to the Social Upbringing Line,” the deputy head of 
Holovsotsvykh, Arnautov, argued that all local Narkomos sections had to reevaluate what 
children’s institutions should be Ukrainized according to the proportion of ethnic 
Ukrainians residing in a given location.137  Arnautov insisted that Narkomos had to 
develop a network of Ukrainian schools not only in the countryside but throughout the 
republic.  He stressed that the Donbas (Donbass), Kharkiv, Katerynoslav, and Odesa 
hubernii should give special attention to the question of setting up Ukrainian language 
schools and that all schools, regardless of the general language of instruction, should 
include courses in the Ukrainian language and Ukrainian studies.   
This document represents one of the earliest formulations of a Ukrainization 
policy for education following the 1923 VUTsVK decree.   Here Arnautov sees 
Ukrainization as part and parcel with a smychka (in Ukrainian, zmychka) strategy.  
Ukrainian-language schooling would function as a critical link between the city and the 
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village.  Urban schools and rural schools alike would offer instruction for ethnic 
Ukrainians in the same language, a language the majority of Ukrainian’s peasant 
population could most readily understand.   
Scholars have often looked upon smychka as an empty slogan.  While it is true 
that the Communist Party viewed peasants with distrust and cared little about their self-
articulated interests, the party needed the peasantry.  The peasantry not only fed the 
proletarian cities, but also provided the workforce for industrialization.  Until the party 
made its final decision for collectivization of the countryside, it alternated between 
coercion and persuasion in its relations with the peasantry.  The Soviet Ukrainian 
government regarded Ukrainization as a means to not only to legitimize Soviet rule 
among the rural population but as a way to facilitate a peasant’s interaction with and, 
perhaps, ultimate entry into the urban population 
 
Nuts and Bolts: Appraisal and Implementation 
Early Ukrainian Soviet officials, particularly those in Narkomos, often spoke of 
Ukrainization in reference to socialist construction.  The party proclaimed that 
Ukrainization held the promise for cultural advancement, but this goal was not an end in 
itself.  Instruction in and the promotion of the Ukrainian language would lead most 
effectively to the development of a literate and educated population in the republic.  
Ultimately, the party planned, this population would be a skilled and active participant in 
the Soviet political order and expansion of the republic’s economic base. 
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The Soviet Ukrainian government viewed the Ukrainization of educational 
institutions and of the Narkomos apparatus as absolute priorities.   A Radnarkom decree 
of July 27, 1923 to Narkomos and its local organs was in fact the first order to set definite 
requirements for Ukrainization, correlating a targeted number of Ukrainian-language 
schools with the proportion of local ethnic Ukrainian populations.  The August VUTsVK 
decree essentially affirmed this policy and, most importantly, expanded its scope, to the 
Ukrainization of all government departments.   
Ukrainization of schooling had already begun prior to these pronouncements.   As 
noted above, a succession of short-lived independent Ukrainian governments had begun 
work on the establishment of a network of Ukrainian-language schools during the civil 
war period.  These governments, however, could accomplish little while their very 
existence was threatened.   If the nationalist governments were more motivated to ensure 
the protection and preservation of the Ukrainian language through schooling, their Soviet 
successors saw Ukrainian-language schooling as a key to the republic’s cultural and 
future economic development.  In early 1923, Holovsotsvykh drafted a plan for the 
expanded use of the Ukrainian language that foreshadowed the later governmental 
Ukrainization decrees by identifying the chief obstacles to expanded instruction in 
Ukrainian.   
According to the plan, at the end of the 1922-23 school year, perhaps 60 percent 
of the republic’s primary schools had transferred to Ukrainian-language instruction.138  
The ethnic Ukrainian population, however, then stood at 72.6%.  This meant that 
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significant numbers of Ukrainian children were studying in Russian.  Holovsotsvykh 
blamed the gap on two chief causes: the absence of trained Ukrainian-language teachers 
and insufficient or non-existent Ukrainian instructional literature in some areas of study.  
It argued that some provincial educational sections had exaggerated their previous counts 
of Ukrainian language schools.  For example, the Donbas had reported that it had fifty 
such schools in May 1923 when there were only ten and the Katerynoslav huberniia had 
made a similar overestimate.139   Holovsotsvykh maintained that teachers in most villages 
knew Ukrainian, but that local inspectors needed to work with these teachers and the 
local population to encourage the transfer of school work to Ukrainian.  Its plan viewed 
the expanded use of Ukrainian as a republic-wide strategy.  Village schools in the Donbas 
and in the Katerynoslav, Kharkiv, and Odesa regions were desperate for Ukrainian-
language teachers.  The situation was even worse in the cities.  One educational inspector 
cited in the report noted that children’s buildings in the city of Katerynoslav often lacked 
a single teacher who understood Ukrainian, “the language of the children.”  While this is 
an overstatement (even exclusive Russian speakers can comprehend a little Ukrainian), 
some teachers in predominantly Russian-language environments, such as Katerynoslav, 
likely viewed the Ukrainian of peasant migrants as a coarse dialect of Russian and made 
little attempt to understand, and thereby sanction, the language of their Ukrainin students.    
Training had to begin, Holovsotsvykh argued, with teachers who already had 
some practical knowledge of Ukrainian in order to meet the immediate needs of ethnic 
Ukrainian children.  Some provincial educational sections recognized that some measure 
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of pressure would need to be brought to bear on both teachers and its own employees if 
instruction in Ukrainian was to be expanded.  The Podillia huberniia section ordered its 
employees to transfer to use of Ukrainian beginning July 6, some three weeks prior to the 
VUTsVK decree.140  They were given two months to study Ukrainian and had to 
demonstrate their knowledge in a September 1, 1923 exam.  The section allowed teachers 
under its jurisdiction six months to display their mastery of the language, but their 
challenge was greater.  They had not only to prove their ability to converse and write, but 
demonstrate they could teach a variety of subjects in Ukrainian.  The huberniia section’s 
rationale for this early emphasis on Ukrainization is informative.  Its employees needed 
to learn Ukrainian in order to communicate with both its peasant clients, but also its 
district sections, staffed primarily with civil servants of peasant origin.  Children of 
Ukrainian peasants also comprised the majority of schoolchildren in the huberniia. 141  
Local officials therefore prioritized the task of Ukrainization and, on paper, accomplished 
it quickly. 
Generally, however, the Holovsotsvykh plan set overly ambitious targets for 
Ukrainization over the course of the 1923-24 academic year.  It designated specific 
numbers of Ukrainian teachers that its provincial sections needed to train, focusing 
specifically on the eastern and southern regions of Ukraine:  500 for the Donbas, 300 for 
Katerynoslav, 300 for Odesa, and 300 for Kharkiv.142  In keeping with its comprehensive 
strategy for Ukrainization of the republic, it also called for the preparation of Ukrainian 
                                                 
140 TsDAVOU, f. 166, op. 3, spr. 872, ark. 51-53. 
141 Ibid. 
142 TsDAVOU, f. 166, op. 3, spr. 862, ark. 103. 
  
81 
language teachers for schools of non-Ukrainian instruction (Russian, Jewish, Polish, and 
German).  All teachers were to demonstrate knowledge of the Ukrainian language, 
literature, geography, and history.  Huberniia sections had to meet the basic numerical 
targets for Ukrainian-language teachers over the summer.  Similarly, Holovsotsvykh 
insisted that the need for educational literature in Ukrainian be satisfied by the beginning 
of the 1923-24 year and called upon Radnarkom to set aside specific funds for 
publication.  It maintained that each school be provided with 100 books out of this fund  
(an unrealistic, but laudatory goal) at a cost of 30 kopecks per book, a total of 331,710 
gold rubles.143   
Although the Narkomos collegium issued both the initial marching orders for 
Ukrainization and stern reprimands for the cases of failure that inevitably followed, 
responsibility for the policy’s implementation was localized.   Narkomos ordered local 
sections either to set up short-term Ukrainian language courses or require employees 
themselves to form self-study groups.144  Central organs, such as Holovsotsvykh, were 
permitted to organize classes with workers of other commissariats and optimistically 
estimated mobilizing up to 50 teachers in the huberniia of the then republican capital, 
Kharkiv, to lead study circles.145 Other provincial branches did not have this option and 
the costs for such training were considerable, 120 rubles for two and half months training 
of a single group according to a Holovsotsvykh estimate.146  Narkomos also entrusted the 
chief of the local section to form a Ukrainization commission to ensure that Narkomos 
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bodies and the educational institutions under their jurisdiction tranferred to use of 
Ukrainian.  The formal penalties for noncompliance were severe.  Employees who did 
not study and master Ukrainian in the allotted time were to be dismissed or transferred.  
As will be discussed below, sections did initiate cases of dismissal, although bureaucratic 
obstacles often stood in their way.   
The governmental decrees mandated that local educational sections tally the 
number of Ukrainian schools already operating in their areas and the number of 
Ukrainian-speaking teachers available to staff new groups.  Once again, Narkomos’s 
attention turned to the eastern and southern regions of Ukraine.  A May 1923 account had 
revealed a striking gap between the number of ethnic Ukrainian children in these regions 
and the number enrolled in Ukrainian language schools.  In the Kharkiv huberniia there 
were some 1,916,000 ethnic Ukrainian children between ages 4-15 according to the 1920 
census, but only 32,000 pupils enrolled in Ukrainian-language schools out of a total of 
127,986 pupils overall in the huberniia for the 1922-23 school year.147  Large numbers of 
Ukrainian children were not enrolling in school at all and the majority of those enrolled 
were attending Russian language schools or schools of mixed language instruction.  Even 
these figures were inflated, as later counts corrected the number of Ukrainian-language 
schools reported for 1922 and placed the number slightly lower for Kharkiv (from 360 to 
345) and substantially lower for Katerynoslav, Odesa, and Donetsk huberniia.148  Data for 
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the 1923-24 academic year varied so greatly that Holovsotsvykh ordered its provincial 
sections to compile a new report by January 15, 1924.149 
Strictly speaking, the government had legislated that children had the right to 
study in their native language.  In practice, this often meant local educational sections 
correlated students’ language of instruction with their nationality.  Of course, Ukrainian 
students continued to attend Russian language schools.  Ultimately, however, Narkomos 
expected students to be divided by nationality, with little planned regard to children’s 
preference.   The “forced” enrollment of Russified Ukrainian children in Ukrainian 
language schools became the subject of a bitter debate in 1926.  In 1923, however, data 
regarding the nationality of students informed Narkomos educational policy and targets.   
Local educational sections therefore set as their optimal goal the grouping of 
students according to national designation.  Success in meeting this goal again varied by 
region.  In the central regions an overwhelming majority of ethnically Ukrainian school 
children attended Ukrainian-language schools of instruction.   In the Kyiv huberniia, 
92.5% of all schools were Ukrainized to correspond to the proportion of ethnically 
Ukrainian children.150  The Podillia and Volyn huberniia reported similarly that almost all 
Ukrainian children in the first concentration of primary school were being taught in 
Ukrainian and that the transfer of older concentrations of children to Ukrainian-language 
instruction was proceeding apace.  By contrast, educational sections in the South and East 
pursued a piece-meal approach to Ukrainization.  Many Ukrainian children in the 
Katerynoslav and Kharkiv huberniia continued to study in schools of mixed Ukrainian-
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Russian language instruction.  In practice, teachers in these schools largely taught in 
Russian, although Narkomos’s ultimate goal was the transfer of all lessons within a single 
school to Ukrainian.  Odesa pleaded with Narkomos for patience, citing local 
“conditions.”151  Local officials claimed these areas would need at least two more years 
before all Ukrainian children would enjoy instruction in their native language. 
In reality, even this prognosis was overly optimistic.  As Narkomos officials 
throughout Ukraine continued to stress, a successful transfer to Ukrainian-language 
instruction depended on the reliable staffing of schools by teachers trained to teach in 
Ukrainian.  Narkomos’s initial decrees provided a formula for the quantitative reporting 
of successes in Ukrainization, but the commissariat did not yet offer substantial help to 
improve the quality of instruction.  Ukrainian teachers in the central regions taught 
according to their own dialectal inventory and teachers in more Russified regions 
switched regularly between Russian and a Ukrainian heavily reliant on Russian 
borrowings. 
 
Ukrainization From the Bottom Up: The Hiring of Teachers 
At this early stage, Narkomos central authorities saw their chief responsibility in 
the issuance of marching orders for Ukrainization, not the day-to-day administration of 
the policy.  In fact, at the same time Holovsotsvykh was demanding rapid transfer to 
Ukrainian language instruction, it requested information from its huberniia sections about 
measures they had taken on their own and what resources they believed were needed for 
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the policy to be a success. 152  Holovsotsvykh entrusted its huberniia sections with the 
formulation of their own plans rather than seeking to define and necessitate a universal 
arrangement.   This delegation of authority is apparent in its query to the huberniia 
sections.  Among the questions Holovsotsvykh asked was: “How many teachers are 
needed to carry out Ukrainization and teach Ukrainian and ukrainoznavstvo as a subject 
in non-Ukrainian schools?”153  Holovsotsvykh was taking stock of progress achieved, but 
it refrained from setting an explicit teacher-pupil ratio for all Ukrainian schools.   
Narkomos also recognized that Ukrainian-speaking teachers might have to move 
to more ethnically mixed huberniia to staff Ukrainian schools.   However, again it largely 
left it to local authorities to recruit and hire these teachers.  In the same Holovsotsvykh 
query, educational authorities asked the huberniia: how many Ukrainian-speaking 
teachers can be transferred to other institutions in the hubernii or beyond its borders?154  
A Narkomos report of early 1924 confirmed that Katerynoslav authorities had transferred 
teachers who volunteered for new posts, although it did not provide exact numbers.  The 
practice, however, was not uncommon. 
Occasionally, Narkomos intervened and facilitated the relocation of teachers, 
especially to the industrial East, where it viewed Ukrainization as an absolute political 
priority.  In September 1923, Pavel Stodolia, a teacher in the city of Lokhvytsa (Poltava 
huberniia) petitioned Narkomos for a transfer to Kharkiv or the Donbas, where “a worker 
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is needed in connection with Ukrainization.”155  In his letter, he emphasized his political 
credentials.  According to his account, tsarist authorities had imprisoned him in 1903 for 
“revolutionary activities” and Denikin’s army had persecuted him during the civil war.  
However, Stodolia also stressed his educational and cultural experience, including a list 
of his own publications on Ukrainian ethnography and literature and a description of his 
work in language studies and in the fight against illiteracy.  He maintained that he had 
received a fraction of his monthly salary of 20 rubles a month and could not afford bed 
linen, underwear, or even such a staple as milk.  In the Donbas, if Narkomos supported 
him financially, he could put his talents to good use as an instructor, journal editor, book 
distributor, or cultural organizer.  Apparently, Stodolia succeeded in convincing 
Narkomos that his skills were valuable enough to warrant its involvement.  
Milvernytskyi, the acting head of Holovsotsvykh, replied that his agency had arranged for 
Stodolia’s appointment as an instructor at a NKO experimental children’s building near 
Kharkiv.  Milvernytskyi stressed that the institution was supported by expenses from the 
center and the educators receive their wages on time.   
More often Narkomos told teachers to seek employment by contacting local 
authorities directly.  Stodolia’s ostensibly favorable political background and experience 
may have helped him obtain a position.  Ivan Hrovozhnskyi, a former member of a pro-
Soviet revolutionary committee in Galicia (western or Polish “occupied” Ukraine), who 
was now working as a laborer in the Podillia huberniia, made a similar request for a 
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teaching job in July 1923.156  He had less teaching experience, having only worked as a 
instructor for the huberniia agricultural cooperative office.  However, he also underscored 
his Galician origins, suggesting to Narkomos, “ask any Galician about me; everyone 
knows me and can vouch for me.”  Narkomos may not have held any overt bias against 
employing western Ukrainians as teachers at this time, but Hrovozhnskyi’s Galician 
background meant that authorities could find out less about him.  Thus, he may have been 
viewed as less politically reliable.  His professional fall might have also raised 
suspicions.  By contrast, the Holovsotsvykh main educational inspectorate sanctioned the 
request of Stepan Hohol, a teacher of “proletarian” origin, originally from Bukovyna, but 
then living in Kharkiv.157  After an initial query to Narkomos, he wrote directly to the 
Stalino okruha educational section, likely upon the advice of someone at Holovsotsvykh.   
Hohol gave Holovsotsvykh as his return address and a recommendation for him was 
attached to the bottom of his request, signed by a secretary of the main inspectorate 
section.158  Proper professional and political qualifications may have aided his plea. 
The need, of course, for Ukrainian-teachers was great in the East, especially after 
the issuance of the VUTsVK and Radnarkom decrees.  Narkomos recognized this, even if 
it was unwilling to make specific arrangements for teachers.  In September 1923, 
Holovsotsvykh had to reprimand its own Donetsk huberniia section for its failure to hire 
reliable Galician teachers, whom it listed by name, for vacancies for Ukrainian-language 
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instruction.159  Arnautov, the deputy head of Holovsotsvykh, advised Hrovozhnskyi in 
September to turn to directly to the Donetsk or Katerynoslav huberniia, noting that “in 
regards to the Ukrainization of schools in the specified hubernii, workers who know the 
Ukrainian language are needed.”160  However, he refrained from issuing an order directly 
to these sections.  When the sections erred, Narkomos might correct them, but they had 
the responsibility of making hires and filling the gaps in needed resources. 
Ethnic Ukrainians living in the RSFSR also soon learned of Ukraine’s need for 
Ukrainian-language instructors.  A preschool instructor from the Chernihiv (Chernigov) 
huberniia, Mykola Osmolovskyi who had claimed to have been arrested for anti-
government propaganda in 1906, imprisoned for three years, and then fled to Siberia in 
fear of the nationalist Black Hundred, wrote to Narkomos requesting a teaching job in his 
“homeland” for him and his wife: “in my time, I knew theoretically and practically the 
Ukrainian language and I hope to be useful in my native Ukraine in a field of my 
specialty.”161  He emphasized his academic qualifications, including his publication of a 
children’s alphabet book published by the Siberian Educational Section.  The public 
education of the Siberian executive committee issued a letter of introduction for him to 
Narkomos and announced that it did not oppose his transfer.  There is no record of any 
action taken by Narkomos, but it informed another ethnic Ukrainian residing in Siberia 
who sought to obtain teacher training in Ukraine that it had no funds to facilitate his 
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travel.162  This petitioner, a Galician named Kapko, also invoked a sense of duty to 
Ukraine, claiming it was his desire to train to work “amongst my beloved Ukrainian 
people.”   
Clearly, Ukrainians abroad knew Ukrainian-language skills were in demand, but 
the localized nature of educational policy meant that they were rarely successful in 
landing a job.  Narkomos may have wanted to employ them, but it lacked the funding and 
perhaps the daring to recruit teachers with ill-defined political baggage and uncertain 
professional abilities.  The most Narkomos did for these applicants abroad was to direct 
them to local authorities, as it did for Zanozovskyi, a Ukrainian teacher who had taught in 
the Podillia huberniia but was now working outside of Krasnodar.163   He too emphasized 
his high educational qualifications (completion of a teacher’s seminar and ten years 
experience in a Ukrainian uchylyshche) and fluency in Ukrainian, but to little avail.  His 
own case may have been hampered by his insistence on a position in the city of Kyiv, 
where Ukrainian-language teachers were more plentiful.   
Narkomos appears to have found it easier to intervene in the transfer of a teacher 
already in its employment.  Furthermore, as Ukrainization picked up pace, it judged the 
need for teachers in the East to be more acute.  In early 1924, the main educational 
inspector sent a memorandum to the central Ukrainian huberniia Sotsvykh sections 
asking for information regarding Ukrainian teachers willing to move to Donetsk.164  A 
December 1924 report by the Donetsk huberniia inspector had pointed to a gap between 
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the number of teachers needed for Ukrainization in the province (2,791 persons) and 
those who spoke Ukrainian (523).  The Donetsk inspector allowed for the possibility of 
transferring teachers from elsewhere in Ukraine, but admitted he had little idea of how 
many would be available.165  The main inspectorate undoubtedly viewed this disparity in 
Donetsk with concern.   
Although Narkomos referred individual Ukrainian-speaking teachers to Donetsk, 
the number of its referrals appears to have been small and it left its provincial sections the 
task of investigating further details regarding the teachers’ qualifications and eligibility 
for transfer.  In fact, when the Podillia huberniia section responded that some of its 
teachers were interested in a transfer and wished to know the terms of employment, 
Narkomos simply forwarded its query on to Donetsk and recommended that Donetsk 
correspond directly with Podillia.166  It is surprising that, given the desperate shortage of 
Ukrainian-language instructors, Narkomos did little to provide incentives for those 
willing to take up the arduous task of teaching, particularly in the changing industrial 
east.   
Regardless, teachers from central Ukraine were clearly interested in being 
transferred.  They hoped that reassignment to Donetsk would offer them the financial 
security that eluded most provincial teachers.  The Podillia educational section’s 
questions to Donetsk sought specific material guarantees: payment for the costs of a 
transfer, the monthly wage of a teacher by position, class loads, prices for foodstuffs, 
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lodging, and fuel.167  The Donetsk huberniia section promised reimbursement of a train 
ticket and a monthly wage of 24 rubles for teachers in rural schools and 33 for teachers in 
“city schools organized by the proletariat.”  However, educational authorities in each 
region [okruhy] were responsible for working out all other details.   The Donetsk section 
noted that officials could only offer lodging to heads of schools and then only to those 
who worked in schools “which served the organized proletariat.”  It asked interested 
teachers to travel to regional seats to receive their appointments.168  Only the most 
desperate or the most enterprising would have accepted the risk associated with such a 
move and, even then, they would have had to pay for the initial cost of a ticket.  The 
Donetsk section did not specify which regions may have been in the most need of 
Ukrainian-language teachers.  The choice for point of arrival was left entirely to the 
teacher.   
 
Identifying Opposition: Chauvinism and Pedagogical Conservatism 
In addition to training existing teachers in Ukrainian and recruiting new ones, 
some local educational authorities moved early on to rid schools of teachers opposed to 
Ukrainization.  In the case of T. Ivanov, a teacher in the Cherkassy region, officials 
sought to explicitly link resistance to teaching in Ukrainian with anti-Soviet, backward-
looking pedagogical methodology. 
Ivanov worked as a teacher in the Matusovskyi Sugar Refinery Labor School.  
Local educators began to Ukrainize this school in early 1922, well in advance of the 
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VUTsVK decree on Ukrainization.  According to a petition sent by Ivanov to Narkomos, 
the Cherkassky educational section removed him and four other teachers from their posts 
for “russification and other misdeeds.”169  Ivanov immediately protested this action and 
sent a letter of complaint to Narkomos along with the minutes of a meeting of the 
school’s students and the factory’s cultural committee (composed of the students’ 
parents) held in support of the ousted teachers.  Ivanov insisted on his right to teach in 
Russian and demanded his reinstatement.  This complaint and a second petition to 
Radnarkom apparently went unanswered.   
Holovsotsvykh ordered an inquiry into the dismissal after having received a third 
letter from Ivanov.  As a result, Vovchenko, the Cherkassy okruha educational inspector, 
organized a commission to investigate the affair in August 1923.  Vovchenko reported 
the commission found that Ivanov had refused to use Ukrainian in a school with 
Ukrainian children.170  Furthermore, the commission judged that “Ivanov’s outlook is of a 
conservative type, unworthy of being a Soviet teacher and therefore concludes that it is 
impossible to allow Ivanov to work in sotsvykh institutions.”  Furthermore, Vovchenko 
added that, on the basis of information he learned from Ivanov’s estranged wife, “Ivanov 
appears to be the type of teacher-bureaucrat of the olden days . . . self-confident and 
insolent, he ‘tolerantly’ regards Soviet power, but he cannot bear the Ukrainian 
language.”   
Clearly, Vovchenko and the commission members were concerned that Ivanov 
and his compatriots were hostile to the teaching of Ukrainian.  He noted that other 
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Russian teachers, outside of those who were dismissed, held similar views, but continued 
to work in Ukrainian schools.  However, Vovchenko did not use the accepted language of 
chauvinism to describe the antagonism of these teachers, but rather terms their attitude 
anti-Soviet.  For him, they were “foreigners [chuzdi], regardless of nationality, to Soviet 
power and education.”171  The commission allowed that Ivanov might be permitted to 
teach in a Russian-language secondary school.  But Vovchenko believed Ivanov and 
others like him could not be employed in primary schools, where Narkomos sought to 
begin the  fashioning of a new Soviet generation.  He criticized the huberniia educational 
section for lack of guidance in managing this affair.  Implicit in his firm defense of the 
okruha’s actions was a belief that instruction in Ukrainian was the most effective way for 
the Soviet state to meet its educational goals among the Ukrainian population.   
 
Ukrainization as Key to Academic Success 
Although Narkomos authorities did not intervene in Ivanov’s case, they generally 
shared the opionion that only instruction in the Ukrainian language could ensure 
academic success for ethnically Ukrainian children.  Consequently, they sought to link 
progress in Ukrainization with educational accomplishment.  In May 1924, 
Holovsotsvykh demanded that the Donetsk huberniia immediately implement measures 
to fully Ukrainize and “raise the cultural achievement” of children’s’ institutions in the 
Luhansk okruha.172  Rudova, the senior Donetsk primary school inspector, proposed “to 
separate the remaining  [children’s buildings] into individual groups, having created for 
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them more satisfactory conditions for work, and during the summer to bring the cultural 
level of the children’s buildings up to the level of schoolchildren.”173   His inclusion of 
information on the slow pace of Ukrainization suggests that this grouping of children was 
to be done according to ethnicity.  The huberniia was set to begin a campaign for full 
Ukrainization according to a plan worked out by the head of the huberniia Narkomos 
section.174  It would reorganize schools under the terms of this mandate. 
Donetsk authorities then placed hope for educational success on the rapid 
expansion of the Ukrainian language.  However, realities on the ground level frustrated 
this hope.   The Luhansk okruha inspector argued to the Donetsk huberniia sotsvykh that 
while schools were being Ukrainized, they lacked textbooks to truly conduct instruction 
in Ukrainian.175  He claimed that an early credit of 5,000 rubles for books had already 
been used up and further Ukrainization would depend on the extension of another credit.  
Even where authorities accomplished Ukrainization on paper, the language of the 
classroom changed little without substantive support from the center.  Most students, if 
they learned anything, had to acquire knowledge from Russian-language texts.  Those in 
rural schools, who had little exposure to a Russian-speaking environment, would have 
found this prospect particularly challenging.  
Some indication of educational shortcomings in Ukrainized schools is provided 
by the head of Luhansk Children’s Building No. 3 in an account to the Donetsk huberniia 
section of the visit of the VUTsVK representative Petrovskyi.  The children’s building 
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was one of 18 schools Ukrainized in the okruha.  The second grade children of this 
school were unable to correctly answer the question posed to them by Petrovskyi: who is 
Trotsky.176  Petrovskyi stressed they had to know the details of the life of Lenin and the 
revolutionary leaders of Ukraine.   The Luhansk okruha inspector warned the huberniia 
section not to generalize on the basis of this one school, but it passed on this information 
to Holovsotsvykh anyhow together with its plan for Ukrainization.   
Although the huberniia had not blamed the transfer to Ukrainian-language 
instruction on the shortcomings of this one children’s building, Holovsotsvykh responded 
by coupling the two problems of Ukrainization and academic failings together and tasked 
the huberniia with finding a solution to both concurrently.  Similarly, the Kharkiv 
huberniia inspectorate found that low levels of expenditure had led to a qualitative 
decline in sotsvykh education and teacher training in the Akhtyr okruha and demanded 
the subordinate okruha organ include a detailed proposal for the completion of 
Ukrainization in its operative plan for academic improvement.177  For education 
authorities at various levels, Ukrainian-language schooling was a necessary part of any 
proposal for progress. 
The push towards Ukrainization placed pressure on teachers to use Ukrainian 
even when they were not prepared to do so.  Narkomos viewed the improper use of 
Ukrainian as equal to the failure to use Ukrainian at all.  A report by the Kharkiv 
huberniia educational section noted that although some teachers knew Ukrainian, they 
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lacked scholarly training and could be teaching flawed grammar.178  The Russian-
language environment inevitably had an effect on the quality of instruction in Ukrainian.   
It pointed to a shortage of Ukrainian-language schools in the city of Kharkiv and 
demanded the full Ukrainization of two schools that had kept the instruction of their older 
grades in Russian. Teachers had other problems with which to contend.  In the cities of 
the Kharkiv huberniia, the constant transfer of students had led to overcrowding.  In rural 
areas, teachers lacked books, guidance, and even minimum pay. 179  Both urban and rural 
teachers then saw little incentive to shift their methods of instruction, let alone their 
language of instruction.  When they did use Ukrainian, those who did not know it well, 
did so half-heartedly.   
For true believers in Ukrainization, no other task took higher priority than the 
perfection of Ukrainian-language instruction.  P.  Sapukhin, one Ukrainization advocate 
writing in the teachers’ newspaper Narodnii uchytel, claimed that retraining teachers to 
use the Ukrainian language correctly was more important than preparation of new 
instructional systems, such as the complex method, because “language is ‘our primary 
tool’ for school work.”180  In an article entitled “Ukrainization:  ‘Ichthyosaurs’ of the 
Modern School,” Sapukhin cited the reminder RSFSR Commissar of Education 
Lunacharskii gave to the All-Union Congress of Teachers in 1925: pedagogues must not 
ignore simple literacy when developing complexes.  In Sapukhin’s estimation, such 
misplaced attention posed an even greater danger to Ukrainian than Russian.  He pointed 
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to the deleterious “cross influence” bilingual culture had on Ukrainian and claimed that 
the overwhelming majority of Ukrainian teachers were functionally illiterate in the 
language. Even so-called experts failed to understand the most elementary and popular 
rules of Ukrainian.  Teachers were “crippled at both knees” and needed real training.  
Otherwise, Sapukhin insisted, “there will be no complex, no formal training, no respect 
or faith in the school and teachers.” 
O. Polubotko, an educator writing in the pedagogical journal Radianska osvita, 
insisted that improvements in language-training would facilitate the promotion of a 
progressive pedagogy.  Narkomos had to confront those teachers who sought to place 
language in the “second tier of subjects studied.”181  Polubotko argued that language was 
both a means for deepening knowledge, but also “a tool, our weapon in the class 
struggle.”  Therefore, its study must be at the center of any school’s curriculum.   
Because so many disciplines required students to write, Polubotko insisted that language 
study was particularly well-suited to the complex system’s approach of uniting subjects 
of study and must form its foundation.  Language teachers should examine all essays 
composed in the school, so that students would understand the need to always write well, 
not just for “language class.”   As discussed in Chapter 1, the demands of the “new 
school” meant that students would study on the basis of real life experience.  The Dalton 
Plan, touted widely by progressive pedagogues of the time, recommended that teachers 
take their students on excursions so they could both make direct observations and present 
their conclusions in written form.   Teachers could link these observations to formal 
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subjects of study (such as mathematics, natural sciences, etc.), but writing would be the 
basis for all future work. 
Under the complex system, the teacher was to be a supplementary guide, with 
students performing mostly independent work.  Parents and some teachers worried that 
the promotion of this method might lead to the neglect of instruction in formal 
knowledge.  Polubotko argued, to the contrary, that complexes could and should be 
designed so that children would know all they needed to know when they left school:  
they would understand “working life.”182   However, with properly designed complexes, 
students could obtain formal skills, such as reading and writing, largely on their own.  
Self-motivated study might be a necessity for language preparation anyhow.  Due to a 
shortage of books, Polubotko recommended that children copy excerpts of Ukrainian 
literature and compile a collection of works they like. 
The orientation of complex work was varied, but the goal of all work, explicitly or 
implicitly expressed, was the development of future, responsible Soviet citizens.    
Supporters of Ukrainization like Polubotko believed native language instruction, and in 
particular native language literacy, had to form the core of the complexes.  Written work 
offered students very concrete knowledge, coupled with lessons in civic obligation. For 
example, a common complex recommended by Narkomos concerned preventative health 
care.  Polubotko proposed integrating language instruction even here, encouraging to 
students to write their own works on the subject or repeat poetry with passages such as 
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“Dirty boy- wash up quickly.  Shake out your clothes girl. Untidiness is the enemy.  Be 
afraid.  Do not bring us an epidemic [poshest].”183   
Similarily, language was a fundamental part of a school’s transfer of political 
ideology.  Complexes dedicated to the October Revolution, Lenin Days, Shevchenko 
Days,  May 1 were not to be simply opportunities for celebration, but “culminating points 
of struggle and life” expressed in written form.  Polubotko gave a number of examples of 
such work.  The complex on the October Revolution might include an essay comparing 
differences in form and ideology of works written before and after the revolution.   A 
complex for a rural school could include a reading of Arkhyp Teslenko’s Shkolia in 
which the main character, a peasant boy dies from hunger in pre-revolutionary Ukraine.  
Polubotko proposed asking students why this happened and why such “capable children 
of proletarians” will not needlessly die in today’s Ukraine.  In short, complexes offered 
teachers a chance to have children shape their own civic education:  “they obtain that 
which they still have to obtain, that which they need to know for life and not for a 
diploma certification.”184  
The KP(b)U official line saw the complex system and Ukrainian studies as 
complementary parts of its campaign to educate Ukrainian children and retool Ukrainian 
national culture.  In a February 1925 memorandum to Narkomos, Radnarkom, and the 
Komsomol, the Politburo secretary Emmanuil Kviring repeated a party directive for 
broadening the network of the republic’s primary schools.  For this to happen, however, 
Kviring emphasized that teachers needed to continue their re-qualification:  “it is 
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necessary to concentrate all efforts on the development of methodological approaches of 
school work, while remaining oriented to the new complex programs and children’s 
Communist movement.”185  New methodology meant both the promotion of a civic 
education through progressive pedagogy in the classroom and its continuation in Pioneer 
groups once the school day was over.  Kviring emphasized, that in order for teachers to 
have any chance of successfully implementing this program more native-language 
literature would need to be published and supplied to the schools for Ukrainians and non-
Russian national minorities.  He further ordered the Narkomos academic committee to 
define specific textbooks for city and rural schools.  This distinction will be examined 
later.  But for now, it is enough to say that Ukrainian textbooks would not conform to an 
all-Union norm.  They would reflect the particularities of the republic and individual 
localities.  In considering innovation in education, the larger agenda of Ukrainization 
informed the tactics pursued.  Ukrainian language literacy and study in Ukrainian area 
studies were essential parts of the new pedagogy. 
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3: Obstacles and Practical Demands  
 
Taking Stock 
If Ukrainization was necessary to the success of Narkomos’s educational agenda, 
practical problems slowed down the policy’s implementation.   A report published in the 
newspaper Visti regarding school affairs in the Katerynoslav huberniia alarmed 
Holovsotsvykh so much that it demanded an investigation by the huberniia section.186  
The report claimed that the teachers’ standard of living in the Pavlohrad (Pavlograd) 
okruha was nearly desperate.  According to one teacher, the majority of schools in the 
area were not working.  Where they remained open, students were using old textbooks, 
the buildings were in disrepair, and teachers received minimum rations and their salaries 
a half year late, if at all.187  Okruha authorities had claimed they would fully support 
teachers beginning in September 1923, but in November announced that they could only 
fund ten percent of the teachers’ salaries and encouraged them to seek direct contracts 
with the local population.  Out of desperation, some teachers were leaving the okruha.  
Officials had threatened to invoke an emergency court (troika) to try those leaving their 
posts or refusing to work.   Teachers faced the dilemma of “whether to hope or 
scatter.”188   
Although teachers did not confront such dire circumstances everywhere, most 
eked out a bare existence.  Lack of proper funding inevitably affected the quality of 
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education.189  On the rare occasions when things worked, grateful residents sometimes let 
central authorities know.  In September 1923, some 21 residents of the village of 
Tarnoruda wrote VUTsVK, thanking “the powers of the UkSSR” for appointing a new 
educational inspector, a man named Halii.190  According to them, the Halii had put 
“school affairs on a higher pedestal all over the world.”  Until his arrival, they had not 
known “the truth” of education.  Clearly, in the opinion of these villagers, this inspector 
was an exception to the norm.  As will be discussed below, most educational inspectors 
were poorly trained and unwilling or incapable of mustering the resources necessary to 
make a qualitative change in the level of schooling.   
Even those schools that had teachers who knew Ukrainian well and were 
dedicated to their profession could only Ukrainize cautiously due to the simple lack of 
literature available.  A Holovsotsvykh plan for Ukrainization cited the insufficient 
amount or complete absence of academic language in Ukrainian as one of the main 
reasons for the slow development of Ukrainian-language institutions.191  It called upon 
VUTsVK and Radnarkom to allot funds to create school libraries with a specific number 
of children’s books and demanded the publication of new children’s textbooks, fiction, 
and popular scientific works, as well as methodological literature for teachers.   It insisted 
that the state publishing house fully satisfy the need for children’s textbooks in Ukrainian 
by the beginning of the 1923-24 school year.  It estimated that giving every school its 
first one hundred books would entail the publication of 1,105,700 books at a cost of 
                                                 
189 Holmes underscores underfunding was a problem in Russia also.  The budgetary contraints of NEP 
forced both commissariats to reintroduce school fees in the early 1920s.  See Holmes, 28. 
190 TsDAVOU, f. 166, op. 3, spr. 862, ark. 175.  
191 TsDAVOU, f. 166, op. 3, spr. 862, ark. 103-104. 
  
103 
331,710 gold rubles.  Provincial plans for the eastern and southern hubernii also 
committed Narkomos to completely furnishing schools with Ukrainian-language 
textbooks and literature, but allowed that parents might have to contribute to the cost of 
supplying books.  If this was the case, then they determined that Vseuzdat and Seloknyh 
must organize collective purchases.192   
As early as May, Holovsotsykh had drawn up a list of Ukrainian-language books 
to be distributed for the 1923-24 school year.193  Although at first glance the list seems 
ambitious, the number of copies it prescribed for textbooks and teachers’ aids was clearly 
insufficient.  The greatest number of copies Holovsotsvykh planned for any new textbook 
was 30,000.  Given that at the end of the 1922-23 year there were some 779,500 children 
enrolled in Ukrainian-language schools alone, these target numbers for textbooks fell 
well short of a full supply.194  Furthermore, the state publishing house needed to reprint 
many of the books Holovsotsvykh had designated as essential and national minority 
schools would require copies of Ukrainian-language books as well.    
Teachers made do with what they had, reading and translating from Russian 
language texts, and relying on in-class oral assignments.  The children of the Pohozhe-
Krenytska labor school in the Poltava huberniia chose to appeal to the Soviet public in a 
letter they wished to be published:  “We have an unshakable hope that the editors of the 
children’s journal Chervoni kvity will stand with the head of our school and aid us with 
valuable advice and give the children of this village the possibility of obtaining a magical 
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and valuable book.”195  The children pleaded to all “sympathetic institutions and human 
persons” to provide them with the literature they desperately needed.  The school’s 
director likely aided in the drafting of this letter, given its reference to him.  Nevertheless, 
the motivation of children’s appeal seems genuine.   It was impossible to truly transfer to 
Ukrainian-language instruction without the massive publication and distribution of new 
material. 
In a 1924 assessment entitled “The Year of Ukrainization in School Affairs,” the 
deputy Narkomos commissar, Riappo, underscored the importance of a transfer to 
Ukrainian-language instruction to the party as a whole.  He wrote that “the complete task 
[of Ukrainization] of the leading organs of education is such that all this process is 
directed towards the building of a worker-peasant state and the future Communist 
society.”196  However, he confirmed many of the problems raised in earlier 
correspondence to Holovsotsvykh and conceded that this immense task was only in the 
planning stages:  “it is not easy to overturn the inertia of centuries.”197   He believed the 
greatest problem is that the republic’s schools were “extremely weakly equipped with 
Ukrainian cultural forces” and demanded renewed attention to the training of current 
teachers and the preparation of new ones.  Pedagogical technicums conducted barely 
more than half of their instruction in Ukrainian.198 Although the budget for education had 
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risen over the past two years, it was still well below pre-revolutionary levels and schools 
struggled to meet the most basic costs. 
Riappo saw the greatest problems to progress in Ukrainization in hubernii with 
significant Russian-speaking populations: Kharkiv, Odesa, Chernihiv, Katerynoslav, and 
Donetsk.  In all of Ukraine, 67% of the schools taught in Ukrainian or in mixed Ukrainian 
and Russian instruction.  However, the proportion of ethnic Ukrainian children attending 
school was approximately 75%.  Thus, some eight percent of the children were not going 
to school in their native-language.199   He claimed that there was no entirely Ukrainized 
school in Donetsk.  The number of Ukrainian teachers in the rural communities he 
believed was extremely small.  Furthermore, in Ukraine as a whole, only half of primary 
level schools had been supplied with Ukrainian textbooks.  Still, he claimed that, with the 
exception of the Donbas, Ukrainization could be largely completed within a year. 
This conclusion was overly optimistic.  A Chernihiv huberniia report from early 
1924 suggested that schools in the province still confronted significant challenges in 
implementing the program.   Rural schools lagged behind their urban counterparts.  In the 
city of Chernihiv, six out seven schools were Ukrainized, but in the Chernihiv okruha 
only 49 out of 197 schools had completed this process.200 Schools of mixed Ukrainian-
Russian instruction continued to operate in this okruha and others.  Ukrainization of these 
schools would proceed gradually, starting with the youngest groups.  The shortage of 
teachers undoubtedly contributed to this gradual approach.    Even in the central hubernii, 
where ethnic Ukrainians formed an overwhelming majority of the population, 
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Ukrainization did not always advance smoothly.   The central inspectorate pointed to 
problems in the Kyiv huberniia in December 1923:  “the question of Ukrainization in the 
city of Kyiv, which has a special significance as the center of cultural-national life, has 
not been sufficiently impressed upon the Kyiv gubsotsvos [huberniia sotsvykh 
section].”201  It blamed shortcomings on lack of initiative by the huberniia and lack of 
funds for children’s literature.  While the inspectorate may have seen these problems as 
understandable elsewhere, it placed special significance on the program’s success in 
Ukraine’s cultural and ethnic heartland. 
A 1925 article in Narodnii uchytel emphasized a greater problem for 
Ukrainization: the policy’s lack of authority in the schools.  Kh. Nevira, the author of the 
article, noted that because of the lack of Ukrainian-language books, sometimes work in 
the school was reduced to nothing.202  This standstill naturally created “ambivalence” 
towards Ukrainization, both among those teachers who relied on books to teach and 
students who were instructed to privelege published texts .  Even worse, according to 
Nevira, children’s activities in the classroom were conducted largely in Russian.  In 
schools just beginning to Ukrainize, like Kharkiv Labor School No. 32, almost all work 
of the Young Pioneers, the Communist organization for young children, was done in 
Russian.  Nevira attributed this failure to use Ukrainian on poor leadership by the 
Komsomol:  “Very often registered Komsomol do not know the Ukrainian language and 
Leninist children following after them are ousting the Ukrainian language from their 
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rounds and practical work.”203   Nevira noted that sadly children go from the home, 
where often parents do not speak “pure Ukrainian,” to nominally Ukrainian schools 
where work is done in Russian.    
The situation was little better in fully Ukrainized schools.  Nevira reported that 
the schools’ extracurricular use of Ukrainian was limited: “teachers and children (for 
example during the weeding of the garden, digging of a vegetable plot, game of soccer 
etc.) employ Ukrainian, but once the Young Leninist exercises, parade practice, meetings, 
and assemblies begin everything switches to Russian.”204  Schools also published 
children’s newspapers almost exclusively in Russian, even in more ethnically Ukrainian 
rural areas.  This privileged use of Russian set a dangerous precedent.  Children would 
continue to internalize a hierarchy of languages, accepting Ukrainian as a language for 
cultural expression, but unsuitable for political leadership.   Furthermore, the constant use 
of Russian outside the classroom affected events in the classroom: “The Young Leninist 
collective is a model and other students operate according to its example.  Here it 
especially necessary to prioritize this concern so not to negate the time consuming and far 
from easy work of the pedagogical collective.”205  In other words, Komsomol’s refusal to 
use Ukrainian was having a negative effect on Ukrainization in the classroom.  Here 
Nevira suggests that Narkomos’s demand for teachers to quickly switch to Ukrainian was 
unrealistic unless the party and its own subsidiary organizations did so.   
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For true believers in Ukrainization, however, the policy was about much more 
than changing one’s language use.  Kaliuzhnyi, another contributor to Narodnii uchytel, 
argued that Ukrainization was fundamentally about an adjustment of the way of life 
[buttia]: “it is not just about the formal use of the Ukrainian language or an external re-
painting for a Ukrainian appearance.”206    Ukrainization was a comprehensive study of 
all things that “provide an understanding of ‘Ukraine’,” the history, regional cultural 
growth and traditions, and social economic life of a population.  Kaliuzhnyi and others 
who embraced the promise of Ukrainization believed that only this sort of study would 
provide state leaders with the skills necessary for economic and cultural management and 
enable union between the proletarian city and the village.   
Kaliuzhnyi conceded that the formal Ukrainization of schools had occurred 
relatively quickly, with some problems in Donetsk and elsewhere.  However, teachers 
would continue to take on great responsibility in Ukrainization, because the schools 
would supply “workers for the lower state apparatus.”  Thus, while a transfer of the 
language of instruction had begun, teachers still needed to teach students all things 
Ukrainian.  Ukrainization was not simply de-russification.  Teachers had to deepen their 
knowledge of the Ukrainian language, aid in orthographic and terminological 
standardization, and promote broad Ukrainian studies.  This was a bold agenda for most 
rank and file teachers.   
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Teachers’ Inadequate Ukrainian Skills Explained 
As the example of the Kharkiv schools suggests, all was not right even in fully 
Ukrainized schools.  Teachers illiterate or semi-literate in Ukrainian were doing more 
harm than good.  The pedagogical press is replete with examples.  One Narodnii uchytel 
contributor from Pavlohrad in the Katerynoslav huberniia wrote that there were still cases 
in 1925 of teachers who did not know Ukrainian teaching in Ukrainian schools.  
Children, he said, were speaking with a hard “G,” a phoneme foreign to Ukrainian but 
commonly used in Russian.207  “Why?” he asked in a poem he composed on the subject 
and then provided the answer:  “Those from the instructional personnel, they cannot 
‘break the tongue.’”  Such persons, he insisted, had no place teaching in a Ukrainian 
school:  “When you do not know, do not direct speech.  Do not attempt to cripple 
children too!” 
Advocates of Ukrainization were in effect making the argument that teachers had 
a solemn responsibility to ensure the policy was properly implemented.  M. Makerevych, 
another writer in Narodnii uchytel, elaborated on this theme.   Also invoking the image of 
lasting physical harm, he insisted that the poor use or disregard of Ukrainian could impair 
the development of ethnic Ukrainian youth:  “children must not be crippled [ne 
pokalicheni] by a foreign language.  This is critical to the pedagogue.”208  Competent 
Ukrainian-speaking teachers were rare in Ukrainian schools, he insisted.   The majority 
were Russians, Russified Ukrainians, or “changelings” [perevertnia] who used three 
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Russian words for every two Ukrainian words in a sentence.  For example, according 
Makerevych’s assessment, of some 500 teachers working for schools along the Donetsk 
railroad line, only 126 knew Ukrainian and only half them could teach in it properly.   
Although teachers could enroll in three-month courses for government employees, this 
was not enough time to learn much.  Since the state was too poor to offer longer courses, 
Makerevych insisted that all teachers had to take responsibility for their own training.  Of 
greatest importance was their participation in re-qualification seminars in the Ukrainian 
language:  “Each person will understand this, when he accepts that language knowledge 
in the hands of the pedagogue is a powerful tool of influence on the children’s 
collective.”  The teachers’ own sense of professional and civic duty would motivate 
them.   
Republican Soviet organs saw the cost of Ukrainization as high.  In an assessment 
of the funds necessary for the Ukrainization of its employees, Holovsotsvykh placed the 
cost of training one group of fifteen to twenty people for two and half months at 120 
rubles.  It recommended coordination with other commissariats in the capital of Kharkiv 
and mobilization of fifty teachers to economize.209  Still, teachers would earn no more 
than one ruble per hour of instruction.  On paper, local authorities gave pecedence to the 
Ukrainization of governmental institutions over schools.  The Podillia huberniia allowed 
teachers six months to receive Ukrainian-language training and local education officials 
only two.210  Officials needed to learn Ukrainians so they could speak with “peasants in 
daily conversation and written correspondence.”  The level of knowledge the government 
                                                 
209 TsDAVOU, f. 166, op. 3, spr. 862, ark. 106. 
210 TsDAVOU, f. 166, op. 3, spr. 872, ark. 53 
  
111 
expected of teachers was, however, considerably greater.  They had to not only use 
Ukrainian properly, but teach children how to as well.   The best among them would train 
bureaucrats of today in Ukrainian.  Their common task was to prepare those of tomorrow. 
Many teachers, in fact, worried about a formal appraisal of their abilities in 
Ukrainian.  An announcement of an upcoming perevirka (examination) in the Ukrainian 
language appearing in Narodnii uchytel reportedly created widespread panic.  According 
to P. Sapukhin, one of the newspaper’s correspondents, teachers burdened with the 
already arduous task of switching their lesson plans to Ukrainian resented having their 
knowledge questioned.  The faculty from one school composed a song describing their 
frustration:  “A cloud is approaching again, a perevirka awaits us.”211   Teachers could no 
longer simply claim to speak Ukrainian and teach in the classroom according to their own 
innate understanding of the language.  State authorities would now hold them more 
accountable.  Sapukhin writes that this led to a crisis of self-confidence among teachers.  
What he labels “Ukrainian arrogance” had led many teachers to assume that they would 
improve naturally, as if by “impulse.”   On the contrary, Sapukhin insists, teachers had to 
work hard to perfect their language ability.   
While the announcement of the 1926 perevirka signaled a call for a broader use of 
Ukrainian, it also warned those proficient in the language against reliance on historical, 
romantic notions.  Sapukhin singled out teachers who lived according to what he labels 
Kobzar “purity[chystochka].”  By this he meant those teachers who saw the language of 
the national poet Taras Shevchenko as the most correct form and were too enamored with 
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“primitive” Ukrainian studies.   Sapukhin argued that a reworking of Ukrainian was 
needed in order to respond to current needs.  Ukrainian was a tool for class struggle and 
communism:  “Through the national word of Ukrainian workers and peasants we must 
tell them of the idea of the international unity and brotherhood of laborers, to raise them 
from the form of a national primitiveness to the international heights of contemporary 
culture.”212  The schools, and through them the party, would teach lessons about the tasks 
of socialism to the children of these workers and peasants in Ukrainian.  But, returning to 
an essentialized language was impossible and politically dangerous.  A Ukrainian rooted 
in the past risked marginalization and obsolescence. 
The perevirka would also test a teachers’ knowledge of Ukrainian studies, what 
Sapukhin labeled “the geographic, economic, and historical elements of our country 
[nashoho kraiu], to promote the Marxist-dialectical approach to helpful, practical work, 
directed at the building of socialism in our country.”  Failure to learn Ukrainian 
debilitated the teacher, but language study alone was not enough.  Furthermore, 
Ukrainian speakers had to reject a fixation with Ukrainian lore and study the history of 
the revolutionary struggle in Ukraine and the republic’s potential for economic growth.  
Sapukhin argued that a perevirka of Ukrainian studies was absolutely necessary:  
“without this accounting, we cannot march ahead.”  If teachers were not held accountable 
for this sort of knowledge, they could not instruct their students and not participate in 
development of a Ukrainian socialist culture. 
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Careful Path Forward:  Limiting Priorities, Building Support 
In spite of these concerns regarding teachers’ low level of Ukrainian knowledge 
and the slow pace of Ukrainization in some areas due to the lack of teachers who knew 
Ukrainian at all, insufficient local funding, or shortages in textbooks and other 
educational aids, Narkomos remained committed to Ukrainization and the policy did 
enjoy some early, if qualified success.  The party had implemented Ukrainization in part 
because it believed that native-language instruction would educate a new generation 
quickly and effectively .  Furthermore, the Soviet government was building in part on a 
network of Ukrainian language schools established by Ukraine’s short-lived independent 
governments and championed by a portion of the population.  Ukrainian-language 
schooling was already a reality.  The Soviet government broadened and transformed its 
scope. 
An early request by Ukrainian parents and teachers in the Kyiv huberniia to open 
a new Ukrainian school soon after the Soviet ousting of Ukrainian national forces in 1919 
gives some indication of how popular pressure prompted authorities to act where it was 
easiest to do so.  In August, at an assembly of local officials, teachers, union leaders, and 
workers’ club members, a representative of the huberniia’s Podil district party committee 
introduced a measure to create a Ukrainian gymnasium.213  He was supported in his 
proposal by Shmyhovskyi, an official from the teachers’ municipal union.  Shmyhovskyi 
claimed that there were three Ukrainian schools for early grades in the Podil district, but 
none for the older grades.  Those wishing to continue their studies had to do so in Russian 
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schools.   Most families did not have the means to relocate from this lower portion of the 
city or send their children to the central quarter of Old Kyiv where Ukrainian schools 
were concentrated.   Furthermore, Ukrainian families with children were regularly 
moving into Podil from the countryside surrounding the city.  Thus, the demand for 
Ukrainian-language schooling would only increase.  Lastly, Shmyhovskyi added, a 
religious school in the district was set for dissolution and the students had nowhere to 
continue their education.  If a boarding house was established under the new school, there 
would be a ready supply of students. 
Here, as it would elsewhere, Narkomos insisted upon changing the orientation of 
the school.  Although parents and teachers in the Podil had called for a gymnasium, the 
representative of the huberniia educational section, Nahurnyi, required the school to be 
organized as a labor school for the upper grades.  He submitted a plan for the opening of 
this school, suggesting in time that there might be more than one:  “The Podil, which was 
a greenhouse [rozsadnykom] of culture not only in Ukraine, but in Russia 
[Moskivshchyna], should have its own secondary Ukrainian school and not just one.”214  
Because of the socio-economic composition of the Podil, he claimed students attending 
school in the district would largely come from the laboring population, including 
unpropertied peasants living in villages across the Dnipro river and near the city.   His 
plan mandated that the school occupy the building of the dissolved religious school, 
enroll both boys and girls, and maintain a dormitory for village children who had 
completed the the first four years of schooling and showed promise.   
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Here then Narkomos acted not only to satisfy the demands of ethnic Ukrainians, 
but also to extend its educational mission to as wide a population as possible.  This 
Ukrainian-language school would cater to previously underserved children and replace 
religious instruction with the progressive pedagogy of the new Soviet school in a 
language they could understand.   The school’s formation was the direct result of a 
popular petition and its task was made easier because it did not have to assume the 
location and student body of an existing Russian-language school. 
As has been discussed above, when VUTsVK ordered Narkomos to undertake a 
more concerted plan of Ukrainization in 1923, local sections had to outline a program for 
rapid achievement.   They were, however, selective regarding where they actually 
promoted Ukrainization most aggressively.  The Odesa huberniia educational section 
compiled a two-tiered program for Ukrainization, dividing schools between those it 
expected to fully Ukrainize and those which would began Ukrainization only with the 
first two grades.215  In the end, it planned for 53% of primary schools to be ultimately 
Ukrainized, a proportion correspondent to the size of the ethnically Ukrainian population 
in the huberniia.  By the end of the 1923-24 school year, the section reported that it 
expected the plan to be accelerated.  This meant that school heads or okruha officials had 
to pursue full Ukrainization in some schools originally designated for a partial approach 
(gradually increasing the number of Ukrainian-language groups).  There was clear 
enthusiasm among some in the huberniia section for the program.  It did not rely on 
Narkomos for a curricular plan, but audaciously worked out its own program for 
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instruction in the Ukrainian language with explanatory notes.  It also published 10,000 
copies of an alphabet book entitled Chervona zirka (Red Star) for use in Ukrainian-
language schools. 
Nevertheless, the section chose to push Ukrainization the hardest where it would 
reap initial rewards.  It reported that in its Kherson okruha there were several districts 
where 80-85% of the schools could transfer their instruction “painlessly” [bezbolezno] to 
Ukrainian.216  It recognized it would have a tougher campaign in the other districts and 
granted that weekly okruha courses in Ukrainian for teachers and Soviet employees were 
a necessity.  In the Odesa okruha, officials pursued a plan of full Ukrainization in schools 
where ethnic Ukrainian children formed a majority and teachers had sufficient 
knowledge.   Elsewhere, only the first two grades would be Ukrainized and instruction in 
the remaining groups would be in the language “which is most possible given current 
conditions.”  Likewise, although Ukrainian studies was a mandatory subject in all schools 
beginning in the fourth grade, national minority schools could choose to study either 
Russian or Ukrainian as a second language.  It was among both Russians and the national 
minority populations that local authorities had to tread carefully, although their 
determined, but gradual, approach in ethnically mixed areas foretold a campaign for the 
separation and Ukrainization of Russified Ukrainians.   
In the Katerynoslav huberniia, Ukrainization also proceeded according to a 
targeted approach.  During the 1922-23 school year, 55.2% of schools were Ukrainized.  
This figure increased to 69.3% of schools and, in contrast to the Odesa huberniia, 
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Katerynoslav authorities introduced the Ukrainian language as a mandatory subject for all 
non-Ukrainian children as early as the third grade and did not offer Russian as an 
alternative subject of study for national minority students.217   They did, however, 
prioritize the appointment of the Ukrainian-language to rural areas, where the ethnically 
Ukrainian population was concentrated.   This meant the postponement of comprehensive 
Ukrainization in the predominantly Russian-speaking cities.  Similarly, the huberniia 
cited a lack of funds for its slow Ukrainian-language work among party employees.  The 
same rationale undoubtedly applied to urban schools.  Money for teacher training and 
literature acquisition would be spent first in those areas where the need was most 
immediate.  In these locales then Ukrainization was successful.  However, this selective 
approach lent the policy as a whole little authority.  Ukrainization of the party was 
delayed and the Russian-speaking Ukrainian parents saw little prestige or incentive in 
switching the language of instruction for their children. 
Sometimes, however, Soviet government employees demonstrated greater 
acceptance of Ukrainization than teachers themselves.  Donets, a teacher in the small city 
Kremenchuh (Poltava huberniia), wrote a brief account in Narodnii uchytel of how city 
residents viewed Ukrainization.  At the post office, a worker did not yet recognize the 
Ukrainian word for stamp when Donets asked for one, but vented his frustration in 
capable Ukrainian when the stamp stuck to his finger.218  One employee of the municipal 
budget office translated the Ukrainian word “sùmma” (cost) into Russian as “bag,” by 
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mistakenly picking the definition of the word “sumà” out his dictionary.219  Her error led 
everyone in the section to laugh, but Donets downplays the slip-up, writing that errors are 
understandable for anyone intent on learning a language.  By contrast, at a meeting of  
Robos (the Ukrainian branch of the Union of Educational Workers), members 
complained when one teacher made a proposal in Ukrainian and demanded he switch to 
Russian so they could understand it.  According to Donets, they whispered to one 
another, “who are these barbarians who wear out all our nerves.”   Educators, the very 
people who were largely responsible for using Ukrainian everyday and teaching it to 
others, displayed the greatest hostility to the policy in Kremenchuh.  It could not always 
be assumed, therefore, that a selective emphasis on Ukrainization in provincial schools 
would yield favorable results.   
If local authorities sought to limit the scope of Ukrainization in their specific 
hubernii, Narkomos broadened its reach generally.   An underlying justification for 
Ukrainization was that it legitimized the UkSSR as a protector and advocate for laboring 
Ukrainians within the Soviet Union and beyond.  Thus, Narkomos sought to include 
Ukrainians from abroad in its work.  Western Ukrainian scholars in the Academy of 
Sciences laid much of the groundwork integral to the policy of Ukrainization:  the 
development of Ukrainian studies disciplines, research into new terminology, and 
sponsorship of new literature.  Furthermore, they were closely involved in the 
standardization of Ukrainian-language orthography to come in 1928.   
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A remarkable aspect of this policy of inclusion was the schooling of ethnic 
Ukrainian children from Czechoslovakia and Poland in the UkSSR.  In December 1924, 
Kaliuzhnyi, an officer at the Soviet embassy in Czechoslovakia, requested that Narkomos 
support the education of a child of Bondar, a prominent Communist senator from 
Carpathian Rus, in Czechoslovakia.220  Kaliuzhnyi claimed that this child could not gain 
admittance to schools in Czechoslovakia due to his father’s political background and that, 
“as for language, it would be easier to teach the boy in Ukraine and, from a political 
standpoint, [such an education] would give him the best impressions.”  Kaliuzhnyi argued 
that Narkomos should give the boy one of the fifty stipends it had reserved for children of 
workers and poor peasants in western Ukraine and even offered to take him with him 
when he returned to the UkSSR.    
In matters of such political sensitivity, the party itself asserted its leadership role.  
Kviring set the parameters of what could be done for this child in a resolution forwarded 
to Commissar of Education Shumskyi.  He resolved that the child be admitted to a 
profshkola or technikum, but not a party school.221  The UkSSR would assume 
responsibility for the cultural enlightenment of children such as Bondar’s, but not, at least 
at this stage, offer them prestigious leadership training.  Bondar’s case was not isolated.  
Kaliuzhnyi notes that some twenty students had already gathered in Czechoslovakia to 
await transfer and boarding at educational institutions in the UkSSR.  In July 1925, 
Lozovii, the head of Profosvita, the Narkomos section of secondary professional 
education, requested permission from the KP(b)U agitprop to enroll students from the 
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western Ukrainian regions of Galicia, Bukovyna, and Prykarpattia (in Poland, Romania, 
and Czechoslovakia respectively) to schools in the UkSSR.  Lozovii requested thirty 
spaces in workers’ schools (robfaky) and 80 in higher educational institutions.222  The 
demand for spaces indicates that at least some Ukrainians abroad viewed the Soviet 
educational system positively and felt that it offered an opportunity for their 
advancement. 
There is no evidence of Narkomos seeking to enroll younger children in the 
UkSSR’s primary schools, the principal subject of this study.  However, its continuing 
efforts to provide instruction to western Ukrainian youth does demonstrate a wish to 
claim a principal role as educator for the Ukrainian nation as a whole.   Most likely, only 
the children of the most pro-Soviet and stalwart Communists were admitted to these 
schools (or even sought admittance).  Even so, the state’s guardianship of these children 
was politically important.  The Soviet Ukrainian state would take over where families of 
western Ukrainian laborers had left off and provide these children proper proletarian 
training.    
 
Expanding Objectives: De-Russification and Cultural Aid 
While Ukrainization was fundamentally about the promotion of the Ukrainian 
language, a campaign to eliminate Russian-language predominance in the republic was 
central component of the policy.  Narkomos strove to make Ukrainian the universal 
republican language, but it also recognized that the protection and promotion of national 
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minority languages could act as a counterbalance to the influence of Russian.  It hoped to 
break the historical authority assigned to Russian in urban centers and thereby offer 
Ukrainian as a secondary, “official” language for national minorities.   
Of particular concern was the assimilation of many Ukrainian Jews to Russian.   
This tendency was particularly common in the cities, where middle class Jews believed 
Russian-language schooling would ensure advancement for their children.  A Kyiv 
huberniia meeting for sotsvykh workers in March 1925 noted that in the Bilotserkva 
okruha up to 90-95% of children, “whose native language is Jewish [Yiddish]” go to 
Russian schools.223  The huberniia meeting recommended that educational authorities 
reexamine the need for all Russian-language schools and consider their transfer to “native 
language instruction” for the 1925/26 school year.  In the absence of clear evidence of a 
strictly ethnic Russian population, huberniia educators saw little reason for Russian 
schools. 
Although Narkomos authorities repeatedly stated they would respect the parents’ 
right to choose the language of instruction for their children; in fact they regularly 
worked to convince parents that children learned best in their “native” language.  
Narkomos directly correlated children’s ethnicity with their native language and frowned 
upon parents who pressed to have their children enroll in non-native schools.  In a 1925 
report on Ukrainization, dedicated in part to educational institutions for national 
minorities, Narkomos condemned the “ignorance” [nesoznatelnost] of some sections of 
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the population that refuse attend to “their” (native) schools.224  The report specifically 
emphasized the refusal of Jews to attend Yiddish-language schools, commenting that 
these schools only serve 14.6% of the Jewish population.  Assimilated non-Russians, 
especially urban Jews, were overwhelmingly enrolling their children in Russian-language 
schools, a fact that Narkomos noted with displeasure:  “often schools with instruction in 
Russian are used in these instances by petty-bourgeois groups, who ignorantly oppose the 
implementation of nationalities policies in the schools.”  Here Narkomos linked parents’ 
refusal to send their children to the appropriate school to anti-Soviet behavior, instigated 
by classes hostile to proletarian rule.   Narkomos held that the privileging of the Russian-
language by national minorities (together with Russified Ukrainians) constituted a sort of 
confused chauvinism.  The success of Soviet nationalities policy in Ukraine and 
specifically Ukrainization demanded correction of this behavior.    
Narkomos attempted to remove any rationale for children refusing to attend their 
“native” school of instruction.  It recognized that schools had failed to open due to a lack 
of national minority teachers and that the generally low level of education among some of 
those who were teaching reinforced the perception that Russian-language schools were 
superior.  It also blamed poor enrollment on book shortages or, in the case of Bulgarian, 
Moldovan, or Tatar schools, the near complete absence in the republic of suitable native 
language literature.  Although the literature for German, Jewish, and Polish schools was 
somewhat better, publication of national minority textbooks even as late as 1924 was still 
far below what was needed (only twenty-six titles in national minority languages as a 
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whole).225  Those that were published began as translations of Russian or Ukrainian texts.  
While Narkomos focused on an increase in production, officials in the teachers’ union 
demanded a campaign to retrain national minority teachers in courses designed to 
improve both their general knowledge and political training.226  Like their Ukrainian 
counterparts in the village, these teachers were the basic representatives of Soviet power 
and extensions of the party’s ideal for the building of socialism in Ukraine.  In the mind 
of Narkomos officials, it was essential that these teachers receive proper training if the 
Soviet government was to retain authority and the school to earn the community’s trust. 
By attempting to minimize the use of Russian, Narkomos sought to affirm 
Ukrainian as the primary language of communication between all nationalities in the 
republic and grant it increased authority.   Narkomos would use the Ukrainian language 
to recast a new republican identity: supra-ethnic, but universally Ukrainian-speaking.   
However, it also assumed the role of protector of ethnic Ukrainians abroad, including a 
large Ukrainian population in the RSFSR (the Russian republic).  Language remained a 
critical identifier of ethnicity.  The Ukrainian language connected ethnic Ukrainians 
abroad to the UkSSR.  Within the republic, national minorities would be linked to their 
Ukrainian counterparts through their republican identity, expressed by their children’s 
secondary study of Ukrainian.  Neither aspect of this policy sat easy with all members of 
the party.  
Narkomos support of Ukrainian-language schools in the RSFSR would increase 
throughout the late 1920s and early 1930s.  As early as 1925, the Narkomos collegium 
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passed a resolution detailing its backing of these schools.   This resolution called for 
Ukrainian schools in the RSFSR, “where a concentrated Ukrainian population lives.”227  
Narkomos stressed this mandate primarily regarded Ukrainians in villages, although it 
granted that it was possible to organize Ukrainian skills in the “majority of cultural 
centers,” such as Moscow and Leningrad.  Narkomos would help in the establishment of 
these schools by sending qualified teachers from the UkSSR, organizing courses in Kyiv 
and Kharkiv to train teachers from Russia, and supplying Ukrainian-language literature.   
It recognized that ultimately educators would have to draft Ukrainian-language textbooks 
according to the specific demands of the RSFSR educational system (it did not specify 
how, noting only that Ukrainian textbooks were heavily localized), but for the time being 
these Ukrainian schools abroad could use books published in the UkSSR.  While the 
Russian Commissariat of Education administered these schools and dictated their 
curriculum, the schools’ tie to Ukraine remained.  Narkomos insisted that it was not 
enough for teachers in the RSFSR Ukrainian schools to know Ukrainian.   They had to be 
experts in Ukrainian literature, history and geography.  This knowledge of a specifically 
“Ukrainian” republic would be transferred to the children.  Just as the UkSSR offered 
refuge to radical western Ukrainians, it assumed guardianship over Ukrainians 
throughout the broader proletarian homeland of the USSR.   
Narkomos’s defense of the rights of Ukrainian-schooling abroad paralleled its 
promotion of these schools at home.  It argued similarily that Ukrainian schools outside 
the UkSSR were justified on pedagogical grounds, to provide for the “the rational 
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ordering of work with children who speak Ukrainian.”228   However, Narkomos also 
touted these schools on purely political grounds.  In particular, it stressed that Ukrainians 
abroad might engage in “anti-Soviet agitation on national grounds” if their children were 
denied the opportunity to study in Ukrainian.   It acknowledged that local educational 
authorities might need to explain the importance of native-language instruction to some 
parents in the RSFSR, citing teacher-led protests against Ukrainian-language schooling in 
the UkSSR as cause for caution.  However, it clearly believed that sentiment among 
ethnic Ukrainians abroad was in favor of Ukrainian-language schooling and that, 
especially in rural areas, such instruction would enable teachers to best provide for their 
students’ success.   If local authorities chose to force Russian-language instruction on 
ethnic Ukrainians, they would only continue the oppression of their tsarist predecessors 
and encourage dissent and instability.  
 
Mechanisms for Oversight 
Beyond issuing orders for the transfer of schooling to the Ukrainian language, 
Narkomos required some measure of bureaucratic oversight to ensure that this policy was 
accomplished.  Radnarkom had initially entrusted the Workers-Peasant Inspectorate with 
enforcement of its 1920 decree on the equality of languages and development of a 
network of Ukrainian-language educational institutions.229  However, it also gave 
Narkomos the responsibility both to establish Ukrainian-language schools (and introduce 
Ukrainian as an obligatory subject in national minority schools), as well as to set up 
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courses in Ukrainian studies for all soviet employees, a category which included teachers 
and local civic servants.   In 1923, when Radnarkom issued formal orders for a concerted 
campaign of Ukrainization, it had already positioned Narkomos as the primary soviet 
organ in charge. 
As has already been demonstated, it was often local educational inspectors who 
monitored the progress of Ukrainization in the schools.  They also took a leading role 
outside the classroom.  For example, the Kyiv okruha executive committee ordered the 
local educational inspector to coordinate an assessment of the region’s Ukrainian-
language courses for government employees.230   However, not all inspectors knew 
Ukrainian well.  A 1924 report from the Kyiv huberniia educational section notes that a 
portion of its inspectors had to enroll in Ukrainian language courses, of the very sort that 
the okruha executive committee had ordered its inspectors to inspect.231  Although it fell 
to the educational inspector to report on the progress of Ukrainian-language schools as 
well, clearly all were not equipped to do so.   
Ultimately, Ukrainization’s success depended on teachers.  Inspectors held 
individual educators responsible for failure, but they did not design plans for transfer to 
Ukrainian-language instruction.  In Poltava, for example, the huberniia educational 
section entrusted the realization of Ukrainization to its senior inspectors, but it gave its 
methodological committee the task of working out a program of Ukrainian studies for the 
schools according to  a realistic assesssment of the number of teachers it had available. 232  
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Inspectors monitored Ukrainization’s implementation, but local educational sections had 
to provide training or recruit more teachers if they wanted to remedy the gaps even 
poorly qualified inspectors inevitably found.   Without Ukrainian-speaking teachers, this 
program meant little.   
 It was also teachers who headed the courses in Ukrainian studies for state 
employees.  So, although educational inspectors reported on the level of language 
knowledge among civil servants in the city of Kyiv, it was a representative of the okruha 
liknep (committee to liquidate illiteracy) that conducted the testing.233  Teachers were 
widely expected to perform this role in addition to their teaching duties.  In this case, it 
was work that went uncompensated.  The municipal executive committee claimed it had 
no money to pay the liknep worker.  Progress in Ukrainization, both inside and outside 
the school, depended on the dedication of individual cultural workers and educators.  
Unfortunately, as will be discussed, the skill level of even those who volunteered or 
sought employment as “Ukrainizers” varied. 
Central authorities at Narkomos set the broad guidelines for the implementation 
of Ukrainization and remained interested in the steps taken by local educational 
inspectors, sections, and teachers.  It published and disseminated questionnaires (ankety) 
on Ukrainian language usage.  In particular, it asked education authorities whether 
“obstacles” had occurred in the Ukrainization of their work.  The Odesa huberniia 
educational section noted in its account of measures taken specifically in the schools that 
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the situation in outlying regions had not been studied enough.234  It expressed concern 
that, although authorities had planned to Ukrainize 158 schools in the Mykolaiv okruha, 
as of January 1, 1924 only 61 had been Ukrainized and 79 were in the process of being 
Ukrainized.  It ordered raion cultural sections and okruha inspectors to determine what 
had been accomplished and what still needed to be done.235  In its report on the 
Ukrainization of state institutions, the Kyiv okruha inspectorate responded that  “hostile” 
employees had avoided Ukrainian language courses and threatened them with dismissal 
after “a certain time.”236  Narkomos therefore clearly had information that its ambitious 
plans were not being fulfilled.  It would, in time, look upon reports of quantitative 
successes by some sections with increasing suspicion. 
 Although Narkomos remained an important organ with oversight of 
Ukrainization and the principal agency for its implementation in the schools, the party did 
not relinquish control.  In 1925 the KP(b)U Politburo formed a Central Committee on 
Ukrainization that would take a more direct role in the Ukrainization of its rank and file 
and the government.  Before the formation of this committee, Narkomos reported its 
findings on Ukrainization to agitprop, the Central Committee’s propaganda wing.   
agitprop’s operational plan for December to March 1924 included the following dictate:  
“along with this basic task of mass party enlightenment work, before agitprop the task 
rises of accounting for achievement of resolutions of the XII Congress regarding the 
nationality question in party education of the soviet apparatus, cultural work of unions of 
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Narkompros.”237  Its task was to investigate the degree of Ukrainization at the various 
levels of education, evaluate all coursework in Ukrainian studies, and determine the 
extent of party and union involvment in Ukrainian-language study.   The plan foresaw the 
creation of a Central Scientific Methodological Committee under Narkomos to oversee 
the creation of local committees and confirm a program in Ukrainian studies.  It 
mandated the drafting of Soviet primary school textbooks adjusted to Ukrainian 
conditions and the specific development of an agricultural program for rural schools.  
Furthermore, it mandated support for the organization of Pioneer groups, among 
Ukrainians and among national minorities, where political and methodological work was 
scant. 
In January 1924, in response to instruction from Narkomos Deputy Commissar 
Riappo, the commissariat’s administrative section forwarded excerpts of an account on 
Ukrainization by the Odesa huberniia educational section to agitprop.238  The dispatch is 
evidence of the Narkomos leadership’s continuing concern about the pace of 
Ukrainization in the South, a concern it communicated to and shared in common with 
agitprop.  In another memorandum, Riappo himself replied to a direct query from 
agitprop regarding Ukrainization.  He conceded that Narkomos was still investigating the 
achievements of the policy and thus he was forced to send incomplete information, much 
of which had been compiled a year earlier.239  The text of the agitprop inquiry, 
incongruously written in Russian, asked specifically for information on the Ukrainization 
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of business affairs by government institutions, but Narkomos replied with additional 
information on the Ukrainization of all its “subsidiary” organizations, including the 
schools.  Although there are gaps in the Narkomos information (the material Riappo 
provided did not go beyond figures collected at the huberniia level), its successes were 
notable in comparison with that of other commissariats and must have been known to 
agitprop.  Riappo’s anticipated audience may have been the wider party leadership, to 
whom he sought to convey a sense of the work accomplished but also the problems that 
remained.  True Ukrainization would require greater support. 
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4: Learning the New Language of Pedagogy 
 
Restoring Order to the New School 
As discussed in Chapter 1, Narkomos saw the use of a progressive system of 
instruction as essential to the building of socialism in Soviet Ukraine.  Narkomos 
planners envisioned the development of a new generation, trained in essential labor skills, 
but above all else aware of a system of production.  Citizens would acquire this 
knowledge in the schools, achieving high literacy, and beginning their study with an 
investigation of local economic resources and activity in the immediate surrounding area.  
Narkomos believed that instruction by the complex method was the best means for 
teachers to accomplish this goal, to break down the traditional subject areas of the old 
school, and provide an interdisciplinary education organized around set themes.  In the 
absence of direct state control over the upbringing of children, a goal of Commissar of 
Education Hrynko, study of “living” material, coupled with political training in the young 
Pioneer movement, would continue to provide the state and the party a role in shaping 
children’s early world outlook.  No longer bound by disciplinary strictures, the next 
Soviet generation would see how the knowledge they had gained in schools might be 
applied, as well as the integrative nature of this knowledge.  They would, in short, be 
Soviet citizens committed to “building socialism,” but also capable of understanding the 
complexity of challenges involved in this task.   If this was the vision, the reality was that 
teachers were overwhelmed by all that was expected of them.  They confronted the dual 
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imperative of altering their language and method of instruction.  The most dedicated were 
content to teach basic skills and leave campaigns for social transformation to others. 
 Instruction by the complex method represented a fundamental break from the 
past.  Given the difficulty that educational theorists had in neatly defining the new 
methodology and the teachers’ scant training in it, it is not surprising that there was 
considerable misunderstanding among teachers about how to apply it in the classroom.  
Further, the new methodology was beset by a number of other problems including a lack 
of funding, insufficient materials, and parental complaints. Ultimately, and perhaps most 
critically, a perceived contradiction emerged between the goals of the complex system 
and the application of Ukrainian language instruction.  This chapter explores the 
“mechanics of implementation”: the tension that emerged between the ideals of this new 
pedagogical appoach, their introduction, and Ukrainization.    
The problems inherent in the practical application of the progressive pedagogy 
were apparent at the First All-Ukrainian Congress of Sotsvykh Workers held in January 
1925.  The congress underscored the importance of breaking with traditional pedagogy to 
achieve this end in a resolution it passed on the basis of a report given by Commissar 
Shumskyi.  It applauded the revolution’s destruction of an old system of education based 
on privileges and the establishment of schools centered “on the principles of national 
self-determination and labor content.”240  The congress recognized that the civil war led 
to massive devastation, destroying the economy and any hope of financing its ambitious 
plans for a complete reworking of education.  While it orphaned thousands of children 
                                                 
240 TsDAVOU, f. 166, op. 5, spr. 666, ark. 26.  
  
133 
and fractured families, this social dislocation had a positive consequence in the eyes of 
Narkomos.  It created a blank slate for the promotion of sotsialne vykhovannia (sotsvykh), 
the theory of “social upbringing.”  Defined by the congress as “the state protection and 
state embrace of all children,” the belief motivated Narkomos to create  children’s 
buildings as “universal social-pedagogical centers,” in which the state would assume the 
role of guardian.  As Chapter 1 argued, the end of the civil war and the introduction of the 
New Economic Policy (NEP) brought some normalization in educational affairs, but it 
also meant a decline in the number of children’s buildings and what the congress 
lamented as a reduction in the influence of the state and strengthening of a negative role 
of the family. 
The congress made clear, however, that Narkomos had not given up on its 
impulse for guided child rearing.  It sought to orient schools to the task of social 
upbringing.  They would not be mere places of learning, but places of citizenship 
training.   Ultimately, the congress advised that this task would be accomplished by youth 
communist organizations.  However, the number of Komsomol organizations was still 
small and the number of its subsidiary Pioneer troops even smaller.  In the city of 
Myronivka (Kyiv okruha), for example, the Pioneer detachment suffered from weak 
support from its sponsor, a local sugar refinery.  Its activities remained entirely detached 
from the school.241  Recognizing shortcomings such as this, the congress urged 
instructors to place primary emphasis on school curriculum.  It directed them to continue 
the struggle “for the complete rebuilding of a revolutionary pedagogy on a material 
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basis.”242  The essential vehicle for this new pedagogy was instruction by the complex 
method in the Ukrainian language.  The congress envisioned the tying of the complexes 
to Pioneer group activity, where they existed, but more generally, to issues of production.   
In the absence of a children’s movement, the school would take on its mission: to foster 
ties with surrounding activity, “with the proletarian and landless peasant society and its 
productive interests.”  The congress called upon teachers to innovate, experiment, and 
make use of hands-on methods associated with productive activities.   
This issue of curricular transformation was at the heart of all discussion among 
pedagogical circles in the 1920s.  Ukrainization was a means towards this end.  However, 
a number of practical problems confronted the would-be reformers.  The congress 
detailed several: overburdened teachers, an almost complete absence of funds for 
instructional training in the schools, shortages of literature, teachers’ inability to adapt to 
the new prescribed methods and low relative enrollment in rural areas.243  Funding also 
remained a problem.  Schools relied on local governments for budgetary alotments and 
although the congress reported that amount of money assigned to schools had increase 
from 19 to 32 million rubles in the 1924-25 school year, more funding was needed for 
teacher training and the purchase of books and schools supplies. 
A Holovsotsvykh report on the main tasks for the 1925-26 school year also added 
to the list of deficencies that the Sotvykh workers congress had raised.  For its 
pedagogical mission to succeed, Narkomos desired universal enrollment of children from 
eight to eleven years old.  For the time being, it concentrated on the enrollment of early 
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school age children.  At the beginning of the 1925-26 school year, Holovsotsvykh 
estimated that 457,000 eight-year and 300,000 nine-year old children in the republic were 
not attending school.  To enroll them, schools would have to open 5,000 more groups 
(classes).244  This objective required local educational sections to build new schools, hire 
teachers, and procure textbooks.  Furthermore, while Holovsotsvykh was primarily 
concerned with an expansion of the first four years of schooling, ultimately it needed to 
increase the number of full seven-year schools.   In 1925-26 there were approximately 30 
groups for every seven-year school.  To keep this proportion constant, Narkomos would 
have to increase the number of these schools too. 
The existing state of school affairs was less than ideal.  Authorities often housed 
schools in buildings not meant for instruction, in dilapidated structures or peasant homes.  
Local educational sections were responsible for submitting their own orders to the state 
publishing house for textbooks, but had little money to pay for new literature.245 General 
publication of children’s literature was still negligible and school libraries poorly stocked. 
Schools lacked even the most basic supplies: tables, benches, and desks, to say nothing of 
“extras” like maps, charts, and writing implements.  Holovsotsvykh demanded an account 
of okruha spending to ensure that its sections were providing funds for supply of these 
items as best as they could.  Within the classroom, Holovsotsvykh dictated that teachers 
instruct no more than forty students.   If it was necessary to burden teachers with large 
numbers of students (as it often was), it was better that they take on one large group 
rather than two groups that together surpassed this forty student limit.  
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Holovsotsvykh also set up auxiliary schools for children who were falling behind.  
It resolved that Narkomos must provide enough of these remedial schools to meet the 
needs of approximately three percent of the school age children.  Without them, it 
maintained, the work of “normal” children would falter.  Holovsotsvykh assumed 
budgetary responsibility for these schools, as well as schools for juvenile offenders and 
the blind and the deaf.246  Holovsotsvykh’s primary slogan was the “normalization of 
work” and, therefore, its operating rationale was to limit distractions away from the 
schools’ chief task:  the use of a new, revolutionary pedagogy. 
Were schools able to set curricular and methodological affairs in order?  
Educational inspectors’ lack of preparation for evaluating Ukrainization has already been 
discussed in Chapter 4.  Few were equipped to investigate a school’s general activities as 
well.  At a meeting of Kyiv huberniia sotsvykh workers in March 1925 one attendee, 
Slutskyi, argued that the inspectors rarely did their job, even if they had the skills to do 
so.247 He maintained that some huberniia inspectors did not tour village schools or even 
give instructions to their okruha counterparts to do so, but only attended meetings of the 
inspectorate.  Furthermore, many were new graduates of pedagogical schools or occupied 
positions as heads of schools but had no teaching experience or political training.  He 
suggested that a huberniia section employ only former teachers as inspectors and provide 
them with a readily available form of transportation.  Although Holovosotsvykh 
mandated implementation of its program, it relied upon the initiative of local inspectors 
to ensure that schools were carrying out its orders.  Due to their inexperience, even those 
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who did regularly carry out inspections may have been unable to appreciate the particular 
challenge of teaching by the new progressive methodology involved or, more 
importantly, unable to suggest remedies.   
Local authorities also balked at formulating their own applications of the 
methodology Holovsotsvykh prescribed.  Holovsotsvykh intended all teachers to undergo 
training by the complex method and work out curriculum for their schools.  Lypovytskyi, 
another delegate to the Kyiv huberniia meeting, reported that directors of the training 
programs remained dissatisfied with the program for retraining and want more detailed 
and specific plans to pass on to the teachers.248  Therefore, they waited for instruction 
from the huberniia educational section in Kyiv and the complexes that educators did 
organize became muddled:  “we see from [local teachers’] conferences that while some 
complexes are organized for the future, others will be stuck in the past.  In some raiony 
there may be a complex on the ‘February Revolution’, but they will work out something 
completely different in addition to it.”249  Lypovytskyi suggested that it was up to raion 
and school administrators to use the program to “independently revolutionize” their 
activities.  It was, however, this very sort of independence that ironically both unnerved 
teachers and school directors and yet allowed them to resist prescriptions for a 
progressive pedagogy.  Educators requested a neatly defined program, not descriptive 
directives.   They worked out complexes as they understood them, but ones largely bereft 
of the transformative spirit Holovsotsvykh envisioned.  
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Notwithstanding the anxiety expressed at these conferences, some exceptional 
schools did seek to implement a progressive pedagogy.  A report on the state of education 
in the Bilotserkva okruha found that in the Fastovska Raion Labor School teachers had 
instituted a progressive curriculum, but had taken an incremental approach similar to 
their gradual  introduction of Ukrainian-language instruction. They set up an entirely new 
program in the younger grades, but conceded only partial instruction in the laboratory 
method.250  Similarily, the teachers began full Ukrainian-language instruction only in the 
first grades.  The two aspects of the Narkomos program were supposed to work in concert 
with one another.   Although teachers at this schools demonstrated their commitment to 
both, they advocated a measured transition given the difficulty involved in achieving both 
immediately. 
Educators also pushed progressive pedagogy the most in the younger grades of 
the Skvyrska Raion Labor School.   It was reported that during a complex on Shevchenko 
and the February Revolution for the fourth grade, “the group of 64 children was so 
completely delighted with the work and so thoroughly engaged with the material that, in 
general, it was evident the leader had skillfully carried out the correct plan.”  Here too the 
link between Ukrainization and the complex system is apparent in the successful 
application of a complex on Shevchenko.  This school, like the central experimental 
schools, served as a model for other schools in the raion.  At the meeting of the raion 
pedagogical council, it reported on its work and sought to guide that of more rural 
schools.   If progressive pedagogy was going to succeed, schools in the raion centers 
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would have to embrace it first and promote its spread.  However, it is again noteworthy 
that even these model schools saw the dual implementation of this pedagogy and 
Ukrainian centered instruction as a significant challenge. 
 
Raising Teachers’ Qualifications 
Building socialism required Narkomos and its subsidiary organs to equip its 
schools appropriately.  A call for pedagogical innovation meant little if teachers were 
unprepared to accomplish it.  They needed to modify the way they taught and did so only 
reluctantly.  It was not until the summer of 1923 that systematic work on the raising of 
pedagogical qualifications began in earnest, mostly in the form of conferences and study 
circles.251  In 1924, courses on methodology and self-study were held throughout 
Ukraine.  Partly in response to teachers’ demands for publication of pedagogical 
literature and the establishment of pedagogical libraries, Narkomos began to publish the 
journal Radianska osvita and the teachers’ union released the newspaper Narodnii 
uchytel.   However, only teachers working in the major cities were able to read these 
publications with any regularity. 
1925 witnessed heightened activity in the drive for teacher preparation.   Riappo, 
the deputy Narkomos commissar, issued orders in April for all huberniia sections to 
oversee more comprehensive summer courses for sotsvykh teachers.252  Okruha sections 
assumed direct responsibility for the administration of the courses.  Additionally, 
Narkomos ordered that the courses take place in the “national language” of the teachers 
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and that okruha sections pay for the travel of national minority teachers to larger, 
consolidated classes in urban centers. 
A local educational section’s ability to meet Narkomos’s mandate depended on a 
variety of practical considerations. The Chernihiv huberniia educational section formed a 
bureau for teacher retraining, but its okruha sections did not have the money to support 
regular courses at the lower level.253  Furthermore, raion libraries in the huberniia had 
almost no pedagogical books for teachers seeking material on their own.  Individual 
initiative counted, of course.  Nizhyn (Nezhin) okruha officials found a way to organize 
several pedagogical courses, hold conferences, and support the work of teacher study 
circles.  According to the huberniia administration, some 286 study circles were active in 
the whole huberniia with 18-20 participants in each circle.  Participants were supposed to 
read recommended literature, evaluate each others’ pedagogical work, and familiarize 
themselves with local economic questions and agricultural data.   However, the Chernihiv 
report concluded that few had engaged in “planned, systematic, and deep work” and most 
took the opportunity to complain about with their own overwork and poorly supplied 
libraries.  Teachers found little time to significantly engage in these study circles and few 
resources to help them in their efforts.  
Nevertheless, huberniia sections continued to design courses that emphasized self-
study.  The Volyn huberniia organized a congress bringing together raion organizers of 
study groups and teachers undergoing retraining.  The plan for the congress’s work 
stressed that it would not hold courses specifically for retraining but would seek to 
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instruct participants in skills necessary for “self-training.”  Most of the activity of the 
congress would take place in work groups, with only three summary reports given to the 
whole congress.   Although teachers had some input on the congress’s agenda, it would 
work generally according to a huberniia strategy devised by the Zhytomyr educational 
section that gave a central role to “production regional studies” (vyrobnychne 
kraieznavstvo).  In the case of the Volyn huberniia this approach meant an orientation 
towards agriculture.  The congress planners proposed that teachers take part in excursions 
to observe agricultural work.254  They believed that schoolchildren should not just study 
production abstractly, but had to learn about it firsthand.  They intended the teachers’ 
trips to the countryside to function as lessons in how to conduct this sort of instruction.   
Narkomos officials emphasized kraieznavstvo as the foundation of new 
instruction.  It was, the Volyn huberniia congress planners believed, the “the most 
important task in education” and one which they saw at the heart of teacher training.   
However, their instruction in this critical methodology was decidely non-specific. They 
did not mean for the congress to spell out exactly how this instruction would take place, 
but rather sought to provide teachers with the fundamentals of such an approach.  The 
congress proposed that teachers employ a “shock program,” according to which they 
would adapt the general program to local needs and rapidly transform their work in the 
schools.  For example, in order to teach agriculture, they would draw from their 
experience in the congress’s excursion to oversee their students’ cultivation of garden 
plots and to lead tours in the immediate countryside.   The congress also included 
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information on integrating the communist children’s movement into school life and 
kraieznavstvo.  Tying schoolwork to Young Leninist activity would strengthen and 
broaden the new progressive pedagogy and the push towards the study of “socially 
productive labor.” 
Budnov, a speaker at the Kyiv huberniia sotsvykh conference, cited comments by 
Krupskaia (Lenin’s widow and a key figure in the field of education) at the First All-
Union Conference on Retraining that all teachers must become experts in regional studies 
(Russian - kraevedy, Ukrainian- kraieznavtsi). The Holovsotsvykh program emphasized 
the need to localize educational material, but it was up to the teachers themselves to be 
promoters of kraieznavstvo:  “the new program functions as only a skeleton which needs 
to be given living flesh of regional studies material.”255  Teachers needed to connect all 
complexes to local life.  Budnov also cautioned against the study of history and folk 
customs and lauded an investigation of labor activity.   The Holovsotsvykh program 
demanded this study of labor.  The teachers’ task was to apply this directive to their own 
locale.  Budnov recommended broadening their study to the whole raion, but not beyond.  
By limiting the study this way, they and their students would focus their observations on 
what was familiar.  Educators had to privilege direct examination above all else.  When 
the students advanced, they would ask them to draw connections to the region and the 
republic beyond.   
There was a danger that educators’ emphasis on teacher self-training and 
independent activity in the schools might have negative consequences.   Muzychenko, 
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also a speaker at the Kyiv huberniia conference, warned that educational sections had to 
ensure that teachers did not turn kraieznavsto to ethnography, geography, and the study 
of olden times.256  Another participant , Kamynskyi, argued that Narkomos must supply 
teachers with concrete and specific kraieznavstvo material so that teachers would not pick 
their own disparate materials.   He recommended that teachers undergo a full year of 
instruction in correspondence courses if Narkomos had any hope of setting up instruction 
in kraieznavsto complexes.   Muzychenko and others added that the number of 
kraieznavstvo experts outside the city of Kyiv was still small and the success of the 
program would depend on the cooperation between teachers, ties between central and 
provincial institutions and, perhaps most importantly, a revamping of pedagogical 
training.  They insisted that the rationale of all study, whether self-motivated or organized 
by Narkomos, should be “Soviet building” through kraieznavstvo, not the ethnographic 
romanticism of the past.  
 
Social Upbringing Through Kraieznavstvo 
Educators such as Budnov favored kraieznavstvo so greatly because they claimed 
it offered a means to ensure that Soviet Ukraine’s young citizens participated in the 
building of socialism.   In a remarkable statement that contrasts sharply with the accepted 
understanding of the command-and-control Stalinism to come, Budnov insisted that 
kraieznavsto was “not accidental, not a temporary passion, not a fashion, but rather a 
natural consequence of the entire internal policy of Soviet power, a policy based and built 
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on decentralization.”257  Teachers, children, and the general public would assume 
responsibility for surveying the challenges that faced their locality and using the 
information they gained to suggest solutions to Soviet authorities.  Teachers would 
instruct children in how to conduct kraieznavstvo studies by themselves and form their 
own circles to coordinate and promote kraieznavstvo.   
As has been argued above, advocates of kraieznavstvo believed that the 
construction of a socialist society and economy required that citizens be fully aware of 
the republic’s revolutionary political history and productive potential.    Ukrainian area 
studies provided the rationale for a transfer to the complex system.  Ukrainization exams 
for civil servants, trade union members, and party officials not only tested literacy in the 
Ukrainian language, but also proficiency in Ukrainian studies (knowledge of Ukrainian 
literature, history of revolutionary movements, geography, economy, etc.).  In the 
schools, Narkomos planned for children to acquire this knowledge at an early age.   It 
firmly linked language study to the study of a school’s region and to that of wider 
Ukraine.   
Social studies, as an aspect of kraieznavstvo, constituted the principal discipline 
involved in this task of training the next generation for the building of socialism.  
Progressive educators assigned language study a critical, but supporting role.  In an 
assessment of the state of Ukrainization in the Vasylkivska Raion Labor School, the 
school head, Chavdarov, argued that “language is not a goal in itself and therefore the tie 
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with social studies is primary.”258  Children were to study, as much as possible, the 
“living language.”   By this, educators meant a language close to that spoken by 
contemporary Ukrainians, purged of archaisms and artificial constructions.   
As has been argued above, teachers had to learn how to teach kraieznavstvo 
properly.  A Kyiv okruha report on teacher training argued that teachers, aware of 
Narkomos’s emphasis on the complex system, were increasingly interested in retraining.  
However, the report insisted it was not enough for huberniia sections to introduce 
teachers to models of the new approach.  Kraieznavstvo material was necessary for the 
development of complexes that “children must know about production in our Republic 
and especially in their own raion.”259  It recommended that raion educational sections, 
through their methodological bureaus, oversee the creation of small groups of teachers to 
collect kraieznavstvo material.  Known as kushchy (bushes), these small groups were to 
evaluate “territorial specifics” through direct observation, to consider how they might be 
integrated into complexes and what sort of “verbal or illustrative” work could be 
developed.  While the raion methodological bureau would compile a catalog of the 
general characteristics of the raion with the help of local intelligentsia, each school’s 
faculty would decide what details and sub-themes might be used in a given complex.260  
The establishment of the complex system, the new Soviet school in general, depended on 
the success of Ukrainian studies, localized in the first instance and then broadened to the 
republican level. 
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While the Pioneer organization offered straightforward political training outside 
the schools, Narkomos argued that the complex system, infused with local material, 
would fulfill its vision of “social upbringing” inside the school.  Forced to abandon its 
plans to assume a direct role in parenting through the establishment of children’s 
buildings, the Administration for Social Upbringing (Upravlinnia sotsialnoho 
vykhovannia- Uprsotsvykh, Narkomos’s new abbreviation for its division of primary 
schooling) held that a school curriculum based on experience, an awareness of local labor 
and production, and Ukrainian studies would provide children with the civic education 
necessary for participation in the “building of socialism.”  For example, complexes on 
Shevchenko and the February revolution offered teachers an opportunity to give children 
political lessons.  Firstly, Uprsotsvykh explicitly linked the two subjects.  In its 
interpretation, the February Revolution fulfilled the vision of Shevchenko’s early 
nineteenth century struggle against tsarism and the aristocracy.  Regarding the February 
Revolution, Uprsotsvykh recommended that teachers discuss events in Ukraine, including 
the Central Rada, the revolt against the Hetman, banditry under the Directory, Petliurism, 
and the relationship between the USSR and UkSSR.261  The Uprsotsvykh guide saw the 
objective of this joint complex as the cultivation of “disgust for social and national 
subjugation, disgust for national enmities, and a consciousness of the class essence of 
Shevchenko’s works.”  It suggested that children read Shevchenko’s works and 
biography, as well as works on serfdom, and memoirs and interviews of those who 
participated in war and the February revolution.  Of course, according to the complex 
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system methodology, work could not just be confined to the classroom.   Children were 
to take excursions to pre-revolutionary landlord estates to witness the history of serfdom 
firsthand and publish declamations and wall newspapers recounting the events of the 
revolution in Ukraine and its promise.  Above all, Uprsotsvykh emphasized the 
“emotional moment” should predominate in all class exercises.   Inspiration was primary. 
  Further instructions for the 1927-28 school year sought to make the connection 
between school work and activity even more explicit.  Another program on Shevchenko 
and the February revolution directed children to collect stories from their parents about 
their participation in the war, determine for whom they fought, and for what reason.  The 
purpose of this technique was “to emphasize that the participation of peasants and 
workers in the war was for the tsar their final subjugation and spoil.”262  Of course, the 
interviews may have well turned up disquieting material about parents who fought in the 
tsarist army only to then join Ukrainian nationalist forces or peasant bands opposed to 
Bolshevik rule.  The Uprsotsvykh program gives no advice to school administrators or 
teachers on how to handle such dangers.  Narkomos viewed such political lessons as 
absolutely necessary, but the very latitude of the complex system presented a dilemma.  
For the present, educators’ trust in the potential of progressive pedagogy displaced these 
concerns. 
A complex on the October Revolution sought to tie instruction to the goals of the 
revolution.  Its prescribed exercises, however, also carried risks.  The significance of the 
complex was obvious.  The 1927-28 Uprsotsvykh program insisted that teachers’ had to 
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use the complex to explain the political meaning of “power in the hands of the workers 
and peasants” and the role of revolutionary organizations.  It also emphasized the 
importance of the “emotional experience” to instruction, recommending that material for 
the complex be drawn from local life.263  Elsewhere it suggested that rural students 
needed to understand how the October Revolution benefited landless and middle-class 
peasants.  It proposed having children ask their parents how much land they had prior to 
the October Revolution and how much they had after.  It assumed that, “after having 
thought about this information in groups, children will very easily understand what the 
October Revolution gave the peasants and that V. I. Lenin led it.”264  Presumably, 
formerly prosperous parents would have realized the jeopardy involved in answering 
their children’s questions honestly or teachers would have intervened to limit their 
children’s contribution to class.  The boldness of the complex system is, however, 
striking.  Educational planners apparently trusted that benefits of the October Revolution 
would be apparent to most and that those who disagreed would take heed. 
Local educational inspectorates were responsible for monitoring the schools’ 
success in making use of locally drafted variants of Uprsotsvykh’s guide for complex 
instruction.  The Kyiv okruha inspectorate attempted to clarify what complex instruction 
meant in a 1926 circular it sent out to the heads of all trudshkoly under its jurisdiction.  
Fundamentally, complex instruction meant “study of living items with the assistance of 
[book] knowledge.”265  The best way to provide this sort of training, the inspectorate 
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maintained, was to have children research the environment around them, to do “less 
talking, more research.”  Its institution was absolutely necessary because, “in the 
conditions of class war” children had to be equipped with a “class-organizational reflex” 
to force a change in social relations.  The inspectorate, and its more active counterparts 
across the republic, meant for children to be the activists of the future, to continue the 
revolution by reordering society.  Advocates of the complex system viewed its embrace 
of applied know-how (uminnia) as more beneficial than strict knowledge (znavstvo).   
Equipped with this training, children would quickly move to their roles as rational 
organizers of a socialist society.  The young researchers of labor would become 
conscious laborers and managers of labor themselves. 
Ideally, the incorporation of local material would orient the school towards the 
principal fields of production in a given area: for example, wheat cultivation, lumbering, 
coal mining.  It was more difficult for schools located in residential and commercial city 
centers to claim such an orientation than those in industrial or rural areas.  The director of 
Kyiv Labor School No. 1, Durdukivskyi, maintained in 1925 that in the absence of 
appropriate “conditions,” his school embraced a generalized “social studies” direction.266  
Durdukivskyi concedes that the school had not yet set up a complex system, but insisted 
that teachers were being trained to do so and were leading students on excursions to 
nearby factories.  For the time being, students would study the other disciplines 
separately (not in complexes), but social studies, however diluted of its “active” nature, 
still dominated the school curriculum and guided its direction.  Durdukivskyi insisted that 
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the proletarianization of the school was underway and that the poradnyk was “only a 
guide, not a dogmatic tool.” 
Apart from class exercises, Narkomos expected teachers to ensure children’s 
participation in Ukrainian Soviet society.  Again the emphasis of activities supervised by 
the school was local.  The Kharkiv educational section reported that in 1926-27 school 
year the most successful area of public work was schools’ maintenance of ties with 
community enterprises.267  Urban schools also retained direct affiliation with rural 
schools, simultaneously preserving the zmychka and their own cultural leadership.    
However, beyond the celebration of political holidays, the schools did little.  The Kharkiv 
report evaluated the association of okruha schools with a number public activities, among 
them participation in Soviet elections, sowing campaign, and the struggle against 
saboteurs.   Schools had met their “goals” in all by less than 25%.268  Overall, the report 
concluded the schools’ work in public activity was sporadic and “isolated from Soviet 
society and leadership.”  It pointed to the weakness of the complex system and 
underscored a need to further localize material.   The implicit judgment was that an 
effective complex system, grounded in local study, would encourage political work and 
political work in turn would support the complex system. 
 
Reform At the Expense of Formal Knowledge? 
The procedure for establishing a complex system of instruction remained vague 
and purposefully so.  What may have appeared to be a fanciful product of Narkomos 
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ruminations, in fact had a firm grounding in Western progressive pedagogical theory.  
However, it had never been applied on the sort of mass scale that Narkomos educators 
envisioned for Ukraine and, ambiguous or not, it was a task left to local officials to work 
out the new methodology and cast it in a Soviet mold.   In the confusion that followed, 
parents and individual officials began to point to the system’s failure to meet basic 
educational goals. 
Although Narkomos was pushing through a fundamental reform of education, the 
expectations of parents remained essentially the same.  Schools had to provide 
fundamental knowledge.  According to the report of one school director, Pasika, parents 
were afraid that the overcrowded Narkomos schools were not teaching their children the 
basic skills of reading, writing, and arithmetic.   As a result, they were hiring private 
teachers and forming independent study groups.269  Pasika warned his audience at a 1925-
26 meeting of Kyiv raion labor school heads that this practice threatened Narkomos 
control and hoped that salvation would ultimately be found in the complex system.  
However, in spite of some discussion of the methodology in teacher conferences, plans 
did not yet exist for a new curricular schedule.  Pasika conceded that the complex system 
was mostly a matter of “idle chatter.”  Even worse, the “ability and knowledge of 
children in the third and fourth grades in particular do not correspond with the state 
minimum.”  According to this report, teachers were providing neither uminnia nor 
znavstvo.  
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While Pasika maintained that only the full transfer to complex system would 
increase the Soviet school’s authority among the population, his account reveals that 
teachers had very little idea how to accomplish this.  They simply knew that the old 
methodology was bad.  When they tried to implement the complex system, some simply 
worked from the generalized Uprsotsvykh guide or with entirely abstract material.  For 
example, students studied literature on tropical rain forests rather than observe the 
lumbering industry in their own raiony.270  Other teachers abandoned methodology 
altogether or worked only with those students who showed promise.  The result was a 
collapse of discipline and an increase in truancy.   
Concerns about children’s acquisition of basic skills persisted well into the late 
1920s.  A 1928 report by the Kharkiv okruha educational section continued to stress the 
poor tie between “formal knowledge” and the complexes.271  Although it found reading in 
native language classes (Ukrainian for the majority of schools in the okruha) to be 
satisfactory, it concluded that writing was much worse.  Very rarely did students, even in 
the oldest groups, write grammatically.  Furthermore, although students did study 
literature under the complex system, teachers rarely planned work or set defined themes.  
In any event, students’ knowledge of both grammar and analysis of literature did not 
conform to the minimum set by the Uprsotsvykh guide.  On a general level, the Kharkiv 
authorities estimated, village schools were carrying out only 60% of the official program 
of study. 
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In such an environment, parents naturally grew angry.  Vasylenko, another raion 
labor school director at the 1925-26 Kyiv okruha meeting, cautioned that “the school is 
not a place for idle talk.  When parents are emphasizing that children are not gaining 
knowledge, then it is necessary to listen.”272  The shortcomings presented by Pasika had 
to be addressed immediately or schools risked losing the authority they had.  Vasylenko 
similarily did not suggest abandoning the complex method, but rather argued for its 
acceleration through a re-emphasis on kraieznavstvo study and public work.  Again, the 
children’s’ best education would come through interaction with their surrounding 
environment and the wider Ukrainian republic.  
Even in the area broadly considered kraieznavtsvo there were significant 
disappointments.  In the Kharkiv schools children demonstrated some knowledge of 
general physical geography, but knew very little about the village, raion, and okruha.273  
Their knowledge of the political economy was devoid of historical perspective and 
context.  A report by the Kyiv okruha educational inspector concluded that in the 
Ivankivskyi raion the four-year school had given little place to the study of the local 
environment and children were generally not engaged in contemporary life.274  In another 
school, students could not name any local bodies of water.  When pressed, one student 
named the Black Sea, but placed it in Japan.  They knew about the October holiday, but 
had no idea that it was to commemorate a revolution and thought Mikhail Frunze, the 
Soviet Commissar of War, was a former tsar.  The inspector concluded that students 
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needed to spend much more time studying the school’s surroundings and, at the very 
least, they should be aware of prominent features of the republic, such as the Black Sea 
and the Dnipro.275 
A 1927 inspector’s report on the Baryshpilskyi raion in the Kyiv okruha criticized 
one school for expanding kraieznavstvo too greatly:  Students were studying geographic 
features of the world, “but they do not know about ‘near Ukraine.’ Local material, the 
agricultural surroundings, are not studied.”276  In another school, students were studying a 
geography primer on Ukraine, but understood it poorly.  Students’ familiarity with their 
immediate environment shaped their understanding of Ukraine.  Each region was a part 
of a larger, wholly integral Ukrainian territory.  
Another report by the Kyiv okruha inspectorate of the Vasylkivskyi raion 
concluded that the plans for transfer to the complex system were too imprecise and that it 
was only in the raion trudshkoly that teachers incorporated concrete material in their 
lesson plans for the complexes.277  A six-day seminar in the raion had apparently refined 
the okruha plan, but the okruha inspectorate required that schools individualize their own 
plans, specifically including local material for kraieznavstvo work.  According to a 1925 
Kyiv huberniia report, the Myronivka Raion Labor School implemented the complex 
method in the younger groups, but during the course of the first trimester, teachers of this 
advanced school switched to instruction by subject area because of large size of classes 
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and shifts in faculty personnel.278  School leaders pledged to return to the Dalton plan in 
the coming trimester.  Other schools observed by the educational inspectors in the raion 
used some hybrid of complex and traditional methodology.  The Myronivka seven-year 
school’s ambition was exceptional.   
It is difficult to see how teachers had time to collect material for a task that 
already appeared to them ill-defined.  One raion labor school director complained that the 
okruha inspectorate’s expectations were too high, arguing that, at the very least, school 
directors should be excused from their teaching duties so that they might concentrate on 
administration of methodology in their schools.279  Some teachers openly suggested a 
return to the old school; others made do as best they could.  The inspectorate’s report on 
the Vasylkivskyi raion suggests as much.  Schools continued to divide class time by 
subject area, giving minimal attention to the creation of complexes organized by 
theme.280  When they did use complexes, they often retained old methods.  Thus, one 
rural teacher in a rural school in the raion proposed a complex on local agriculture, but 
the lesson simply consisted of her reading out loud a passage on the cultivation of 
hemp.281  The teacher made no provision for the children to observe agricultural activities 
in the village and did not apparently include possible exercises in writing, arithmetic, and 
social studies.  It was a complex in name alone, void of pedagogical innovation, and 
perhaps of greater concern, one that did not allow students to work on basic skills. 
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Aside from professional conferences, teachers had little opportunity to study the 
new methodology.  At an April 1925 meeting of the teachers’ union Robos, speakers 
emphasized that teachers were unable to buy the pedagogical press and that concerns for 
retraining had to be narrowed if teachers were expected to cope.282   Teachers in the 
Myronivka Raion Labor School participated in group training during breaks, but they had 
to pass around personal copies of new literature to review or borrow publications from 
the chief employer in the city, the sugar refinery.283  The amount of new literature in the 
school library was so small that “really one must speak of ‘creating’ a library, a teacher 
and student library.”     
Therefore, even if schools had well-trained teachers, they needed to equip them 
properly to succeed.  Schools had trouble procuring not only pedagogical press, but also  
the textbooks necessary for instruction in class.  During 1920-22 there were almost no 
new publications released in Ukraine and teachers worked largely with old textbooks.  In 
1923-24 eighty-two textbooks were released (seventy-nine in the Ukrainian language), 
but they were primarily adapted old textbooks and “only slightly sovietized.”284  It was 
only for the 1924-25 school the year that Narkomos reworked and partly adjusted 
textbooks for the complex program of instruction.    The DVU, the state publishing 
house, released one hundred five textbook titles (sixty-two in Ukrainian) and thirty-seven 
titles for teacher training.  However, the DVU printed a relatively small number of runs 
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for these titles and, as the Myronivka case illustrates, schools outside large urban centers 
had difficulty acquiring them. 
It fell to teachers and school administrators to perfect the complex system.  
Narkomos principally blamed teachers for the methodology’s failures.  The director of 
the Ivankivska Raion Labor School, Kryvenko, maintained at the Kyiv okruha meeting of 
school heads that “the teacher does not have a sense of responsibility for his work, no one 
controls it and [the work] remains dependent upon the unsupervised consciousness of this 
very worker.”285  He further notes that teachers’ work was hampered by an alarming 
shortage of books and laments the fact students were forced to buy their own. Ironically, 
it was the very latitude of the complex system that seems to have troubled him most.  
Without any direct guidance and unable to use sanctioned literature, teachers were bound 
to err.   Kryvenko’s school is included in a 1926 report of the Kyiv okruha inspector.  His 
assessment is generally positive, but it also cites cases where teachers did not allow 
students to participate in the presentation of material, “thus paralyzing in part the 
initiative of the children and their self-activity.”286  It is unknown whether this strict style 
of classroom management was due to Kryvenko’s intervention.  Regardless, there was 
little chance of schools realizing the complex system if teachers kept such an 
arrangement.  
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Good Teachers in Short Supply 
Finding a teacher well-trained in Ukrainian was important, but for most schools, 
not as important as one with acceptable pedagogical qualifications.  Okruha inspectors 
regularly reported on teachers’ poor skills, improper behavior, and public drunkenness, as 
well as more political concerns, such as their religiosity or affiliation with village kulaks.  
The Kyiv okruha inspector labeled one kraieznavstvo teacher’s scolding of students and 
general laziness in the classroom “anti-pedagogical behavior.”287  Such charges carried a 
definite connotation of something more sinister than just bad teaching.  Narkomos 
considered a poor pedagogue as fundamentally un-Soviet, a de facto adversary to its 
campaign to transform culture.  As noted in Chapter 1, Narkomos still worried about 
teachers’ political commitment to a socialism anyhow due to their allegiance to 
counterrevolutionary parties during the Civil War.  Shumskyi had contended that teachers 
had reformed themselves, yet advised evaluations of their political training and 
Komsomol oversight of their activities. 
Of particular concern to educational officials was the situation when a teacher 
acquired authority in a community and then abused it.  An anonymous letter reportedly 
published in a rural newspaper came to the attention of Uprsotsvykh in 1926.  It claimed 
that peasants in a village in the Ivankivskyi raion (Kyiv okruha) had recognized the labor 
school director, Bondarenko, as a community leader.  They expected him to uncover “all 
kinds of lies and evil” in the village, instead he committed them himself.288  He allegedly 
propositioned a widow, drank heavily, and beat and expelled students from the liknep.  
                                                 
287 DAKO, f. 1043, op. 3, spr. 28, ark. 203. 
288 TsDAVOU, f. 166, op. 6, spr. 1961, ark. 2. 
  
159 
The letter concluded “it is necessary to say that there is no place for this comrade in the 
village leadership and teachers ranks, people who always stand on the side of the victors 
of October.”  The then deputy head of Uprsotsvykh Arnautov ordered the Kyiv okruha 
inspectorate to investigate the matter.  Teachers were important representatives of Soviet 
power in rural Ukraine.  Narkomos could not afford to have them further alienate the 
population. 
It was problematic then, outside of prominent urban and experimental schools, for 
any teacher to meet the dual challenge of instruction in the Ukrainian language and the 
institution of the complex system.  Even if teachers were not grossly irresponsible, those 
with a strong commitment to Ukrainization and pedagogical training high enough to 
realize an ambiguously defined progressive methodology were rare.  Indeed, there were 
few teachers willing to serve in rural Ukraine altogether.   The Kyiv okruha inspector 
reported in May 1926 that it took a month longer than planned to appoint a new head for 
the Durdakivska labor school because of an absence of candidates.  Futhermore,  it could 
not find a substitute for a second teacher it wished to fire.  Prospective teachers in Kyiv 
simply had no interest in working in a village for an indefinite period of time.289  
Arnautov also recognized in a letter he wrote to the editors of the newspaper Radianske 
selo that: “the number of qualified teachers among us is insufficient and that they do not 
hurry very much to the village, to work in conditions [that are] generally more difficult 
than in the city.”290  Schools simply had to often make do with incomplete staffs. 
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When communities that believed in the necessity of schooling had good teachers, 
they tried to hang on to them.  In September 1927 parents at Kyiv Labor School No. 47 
petitioned Narkomos to keep the head of their school, Ostromenskyi.  The okruha 
educational inspector had designated Ostromenskyi for transfer to the Kyiv Pedagogical 
Institute two weeks prior to the beginning of the academic year.  In the parents’ letter, 
they praised the school head for his considerable skill in grappling with new demands of 
the Soviet school:  “he had displayed a talent in the sotsvykh system . . . while carrying 
out individual, difficult responsibilities in the formulation of a program, development and 
perfection of methods of work, and drafting and publication of textbooks.”291 They 
pointed, as evidence of his success, to the fact that in the previous year 80% of the 
graduates of the labor school were accepted into professional schools (profshkoly).   Not 
only had Ostromenskyi reformed the school curriculum, but also ensured that the children 
still acquired the basic skills necessary for advancement.  This, of course, was ostensibly 
the objective of the complex system, but few teachers understood it enough to make it 
work properly.  Apparently, Narkomos recognized this deficency because the parents’ 
petition was denied.  Ostromenskyi was needed to train the next generation of teachers. 
Conversely, some communities did not appreciate attempts at a reorganization of 
education.  A local party committee in the Chernkhivskyi raion (Volyn okruha) attempted 
to transfer the rest day for the school children from Sunday to another day in the week.  
General attendance at the school quickly dropped 40-50% after the shift.292 Okruha party 
officials intervened and issued orders to suspend the change until the beginning of the 
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next school year.  It did not disagree with premise of the raion decision, but rather 
claimed that raion officials needed to undertake proper “agitation and explanatory work.”  
Clearly, a significant portion of the raion population, whether out of religiosity or 
tradition, valued the Sabbath (or its violation) enough to boycott schools.  The KP(b)U 
intended to use the new Soviet school as a vehicle to change such long held, popular 
sentiments by beginning the restructuring of society with this institution. 
Personal animosities and jealousies sometimes came into play in a community’s 
dealings with teachers.  Lower level officials acted to suppress teachers who became too 
bold.  In the Rinkynskyi raion (Chernihiv okruha), the raion educational inspector and 
head of the raion executive committee presidium issued orders for the dismissal and 
transfer of a total of seven teachers.  According to the okruha party committee which 
investigated the affair the inspector and presidium head held “unpleasant, bureaucratic, 
and callous views” towards these teachers.293  They apparently found the drive of these 
teachers unsettling, because their orders were “especially directed against teachers who 
worked for the economic and legal defense of the interests of teachers.”  Other members 
of the teachers’ union reportedly supported the decision for dismissal of the teachers, 
hoping to gain something for themselves.  The okruha party alleged that they made false 
charges, while at the same time demanding increased apartment space.  As a result, the 
okruha party apparatus ordered the dismissal of the raion inspector and presidium head 
and reappointment of the teachers.294  It ultimately judged that activist teachers were 
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needed within limits and that, at least in this instance, personal rancor should not play a 
part in the dismissal of teachers who were needed so desperately.  
 
Incomplete Ukrainization as an Impediment to Pedagogical Reform 
The switch to Ukrainian-language instruction was supposed to make all this 
easier.  Narkomos administrators maintained that if schools instructed children in their 
native language, they would produce a more skilled and conscious agricultural or 
industrial worker capable of entering intermediate leadership positions after secondary 
professional schooling or acquiring further training and education.  It also held that the 
new pedagogy would benefit Ukrainian language study, breaking the boredom of study 
by rote and allowing children to understand the importance of language expression 
through a demonstration of its relationship with other disciplines.   
In any given complex, language study assumed an important and fundamentally 
integrating role.  In the complex on Shevchenko and the February Revolution discussed 
above, the Uprsotsvykh program asked students to read original works of Shevchenko, 
the champion of literary Ukrainian, and to draft their own interpretations of his work for 
publication in the school’s wall newspaper.  Furthermore, the teachers were to write 
sentences and words drawn from the children’s interviews with their parents on the 
school blackboard for discussion.295  Uprsotsvykh intended activity to function as the 
basis for language analysis and grammar exercises, as well as lessons in social studies, 
mathematics and the natural sciences.   
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Of course, as has already been demonstrated, conventional forms of pedagogy 
often persisted.  Teachers continued to look to textbooks for classroom drills and blamed 
the lack of Ukrainian-language literature for the failure of “complexes.”  The head of the 
Vasylkivska Raion Labor School complained that among the school library’s collection 
of 2,000 books, there were only 200 Ukrainian lesson books.296  This shortage, he 
suggests, significantly complicated the school’s work, then confined to introducing one 
complex per semester.  Books were less necessary for the complex method, but they still 
functioned as vital references for active study.  Without books, Shevchenko had little 
significance. 
The push to train teachers in complex methodology also coincided with the drive 
for Ukrainization.  The majority of teachers in Ukraine were to teach in the Ukrainian 
language.  Language would be their tool to disseminate new knowledge through 
complexes to Ukrainian-speaking children, persuade the local population of the school’s 
worth, and involve society as a whole in the lofty task of building socialism.  According 
to the theory propounded by Narkomos officials, knowledge of Ukrainian was one 
element that would allow teachers to most effectively perform all that was asked of them.   
It therefore was a source of great frustration to planners of the Volyn huberniia congress 
for teacher retraining that there was almost no material on the study of language by the 
complex method.297  They recommended the congress seek ways to detail and add to the 
program.   How could Ukrainian children be taught by the complex program if teachers 
had no instructions on how to refine their language skills under this program?  What 
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would new kraieznavstvo knowledge mean, for example, if children could not correctly 
repeat and articulate it in their native language?  Instruction by the complex system 
demanded the integration of all subject areas into thematic wholes.  Language had to be a 
part of this equation. 
Some of the many teachers who actively or passively resisted use of the new 
pedagogy also resisted teaching in Ukrainian.   Both instruction in the complex system 
and in the Ukrainian language meant a fundamental shift in the way they had taught.    
Prodded by education officials to study and train themselves and threatened with 
dismissal for failure, these teachers reacted negatively.  Their authority had been 
premised on their strict maintenance of classroom discipline and assignment of high 
prestige to the fluent use of Russian.  The new requirements fundamentally undermined 
these practices.    
Lukashenko, the senior Kyiv provincial inspector, reported at the March 1925 
huberniia teachers’ meeting that in Bilotserkva, near Kyiv, local authorities had retained 
the head of a Russian school and a former gymnasium.  Lukashenko maintained this 
failure to remove him was a serious mistake:  indeed, the director was both a supporter of 
monarchism and an opponent of  pedagogical reform.298  Lukashenko recommended that 
complexes be introduced into the school without delay and further suggested it might not 
be necessary to keep Russian as the school’s language of instruction.   While Lukashenko 
insisted the huberniia section would not follow a policy of forcible Ukrainization, he 
questioned whether there was in fact a true Russian population in Bilotserkva, arguing 
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that he had evidence only of a Russified Ukrainian and Russified Jewish population.  
Lukashenko implied that this school director therefore had no place on three grounds:  his 
political orientation, resistance to the complex system, and patronage of Russian 
language instruction in an okruha where there was no sizable Russian population.   
In fact, it was unclear to Narkomos planners and local educational officials just 
how much Ukrainization of teachers was needed.  It was difficult to accurately gauge 
their knowledge of Ukrainian or willingness to learn it.  Lukashenko criticized the large 
number of teachers who did not know Ukrainian in Bilotserkva and maintained that it 
was difficult to speak of a true Ukrainization of the village school in the okruha.  Another 
participant at the Kyiv huberniia conference, Lypovetskyi, conceded that “there are truly 
workers who do not know Ukrainian perfectly.  This we know and we are giving them 
attention.”299   It was not the case, he argued, that over half of the teachers in the 
Bilotserkva okruha only speak Russian.  However, even if they all knew Ukrainian, that 
was not enough: “We say to our workers that you converse in Ukrainian, but you are still 
not Ukrainized because the majority of you is unfamiliar with the history and economic-
geography along with customs [pobut] and these are necessary to know.”  Teachers not 
only had to employ Ukrainian, but also master enough Ukrainian studies to create new 
complexes, integrate new material, and transform their way of teaching.   Ukrainization 
was as much about redefining what was externally Ukrainian and debunking engrained 
prejudices against Ukrainian culture. 
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Some teachers viewed Ukrainization as an unnecessary distraction to the difficult 
task of teaching according to the new methodology.  In 1927, the Mykolaiv experimental 
Labor School No.28 was in the midst of Ukrainization.  At the very same time teachers 
were attempting to modify the school’s curriculum according to the complex system, the 
okruha inspectorate ordered the school to Ukrainize all groups in the school.  Although 
the director complied, he maintained that “such Ukrainization . . . reflected harmfully in 
the work and vividly demonstrated that it is possible to Ukrainize the school only 
gradually, beginning with the first group when children do not use the Ukrainian 
language in the family.”300   
A series of reports from individual teachers at the Mykolaiv school support the 
director’s general conclusion.  At issue, but never fully defined, was the ethnic make-up 
of the school.  The teachers’ material only contained data on the ethnic composition of 
school by group.  According to the estimates available, the highest proportion of 
Ukrainians was in the fourth group - 31.7%, the lowest in the second group - 9.2%.301  It 
is unclear how the teachers were determining ethnicity.  The first group teacher identified 
speaking ability alone, claiming that it was difficult to use Ukrainian in the classroom 
because “only 20% of the pupils speak the language.”302    It is uncertain whether the 
remainder were Russified Ukrainians or ethnic Russians (or indeed whether 20% were in 
fact ethnically Ukrainian) and his comments cast some doubt on the data by ethnicity 
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cited by his colleagues.   They may have well taken the children’s spoken language as a 
marker of their ethnicity. 
The overall concentration of ethnic Ukrainians in Mykolaiv Labor School No. 28, 
regardless of whether they used Ukrainian, in fact, could have been greater than that of 
most other schools in the city.  The inspectorate may have selected it for Ukrainization 
for this reason or possibly because of its “experimental” status, hoping that it would 
quickly transfer to Ukrainian instruction and then attract and serve the Ukrainian 
population of the city.   The uncertainty surrounding this case is indicative of the 
confusion involved in taking the first steps towards Ukrainization, especially in the 
largely Russian-speaking environment of the cities.   This school, to a greater degree than 
others, had to meet the added challenge of rapidly switching to the complex system at the 
very same time.   
Regardless of the true ethnic make-up of the school, the teachers clearly state that 
a majority of students did not speak Ukrainian as their first language.  Even with the 
youngest students this presented a dilemma for use of Ukrainian in the classroom.  The 
first group teacher, Lyshenko, wrote that the children had to regularly learn new words, 
translating first those they did not know into Russian before they could continue their 
readings:  “[a]s a result, energy and time was lost.  If instruction was done in the Russian 
language, the pace would have been much better.”303  The fourth group teacher 
maintained that work in native language instruction should theoretically lend itself easily 
to instruction by the complex method.  However, Ukrainization frustrated application of 
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complexes because students were unable to express their thoughts in Ukrainian.  He and 
the second group teacher describe a gradual shift to Ukrainian instruction beginning with 
reading and conversation and progressing to writing and lastly to mathematics.   
The consensus among all teachers was that Ukrainization contributed to poor 
student performance. The oldest students perhaps had the greatest trouble, according to 
their instructor, Fish, having already studied four years in Russian only to switch to 
Ukrainian in 1927:  “it must be said in general that this Ukrainization bore us much 
trouble.  Our poor children had to make mistakes a lot.”304 The second group lost eight of 
thirty-five students by year’s end and the fourth group teacher kept back four of eighteen 
student, blaming their poor performance partly on Ukrainization.  Children had to wait 
for the Lyshenko, the school’s methodology specialist, to translate Russian-language 
texts.  Ukrainian texts were in short supply and the teachers generally considered them to 
be of poor quality.   
Although the school pushed instruction by the complex system in each grade, it 
also retained classes organized by subject area, supplementing them with “complex 
material to strengthen work.”  Here, too, most of the teachers at Mykolaiv School No. 28 
believed that Ukrainization complicated work and limited pedagogical innovation.  The 
social studies teacher Fish claimed that because there were few Ukrainian textbooks in 
the field, “it was necessary to introduce a heuristic form of instruction, and to tell the 
truth, even the lecture form sometimes.”305   He used complexes, but could not do so in 
the “active” way Narkomos prescribed.  Fish needed to explain material often, lamenting 
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that it was difficult for the children “due to the fact that they had to write exclusively in 
Ukrainian and became a little mixed up.”306  When he permitted the students to use 
Russian-language material, they performed better.   Similarly, in the natural studies class, 
the instructor had to teach the children Ukrainian terminology and, consequently, had less 
time to ensure they met Narkomos requirements.   
Even when the school dedicated separate class time to Ukrainian-language study, 
it found it difficult to meet Narkomos guidelines and expectations.   The Ukrainian-
language teacher for the fifth group, Buhatska, reported that she spent much of the year 
introducing the students to basic grammar.  She omitted more difficult work from the 
language program recommended by Uprsotsvykh, divided the class into review groups, 
and regularly evaluated their progress.  Although she formed complexes to incorporate 
literature into her curriculum, she often excluded material recommended by Narkomos 
because it was either unavailable or, she believed, too difficult.307  Buhatska concluded 
that only students who had studied in Ukrainian since the first grade could follow the 
Uprsotsvykh program in grammar.  This judgment would hold true not only for Russian-
speaking students, but Ukrainian-speaking students who had never been schooled in the 
language.  Some children may well have found the introduction of Ukrainian in the 
classroom odd, especially in the form it was presented, but the language itself was not 
entirely unfamiliar. 
Indeed, students appeared to have adjusted relatively quickly to the new language 
of instruction.   This was especially true for the younger groups.  After commenting on 
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the difficulties of Ukrainization, the third group teacher, Martynova, reported that in one 
trimester her group’s work had entirely transferred to Ukrainian and that even during 
break hardly any students continued to speak Russian.  Furthermore, as children learned 
Ukrainian, teachers reported a decline in the negative methodological problems 
associated with Ukrainization.  The fourth group teacher commented:  “From the 
beginning, Ukrainization introduced horrible disorder, incomprehension on the part of the 
children . . . but as the children mastered the language later, the pace and discipline 
improved.”308   
Teachers also learned to cope with the lack of literature, supplies, or motivated 
students.  Fish’s problematic social studies students had difficulty mastering the 
terminology of the October Revolution, but responded to his instruction in the history of 
technology.  Improvements in student written and oral work reportedly demonstrated the 
effectiveness of Buhatska’s improved grammar course.  The geography teacher similarly 
cobbled together a course focused on regional and Ukrainian studies without proper 
school maps.  For the theme “Our District” he found a small map included in the 
brochure “Mykolaivshchyna” and for “UkSSR and the USSR” he used a map of Europe 
and Asia.  He reported that the geographic material neatly tied into complexes 
recommended by Uprsotsvykh and that a majority of the students exhibited favorable 
progress at the end of each semester.  In short, although teachers may have believed 
Ukrainization hindered education, it did not greatly harm it. 
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Some schools, in fact, embraced Ukrainization too greatly for the taste of one 
inspector.  Chavdarov, the labor school inspector of the Kyiv okruha, noted that one 
village school in the Baryshpilskyi raion obligatory lessons in Russian were actually 
conducted in Ukrainian.  An article was read in Russian and then worked on in 
Ukrainian.  He further criticized the raion labor school for giving insufficient attention to 
the increased number of children who understood Russian.309  Even here teachers 
substituted a Ukrainian lecture for Russian material.   The schools could have been 
overeager to fulfill Narkomos orders on Ukrainization. Alternatively, they may have been 
deferring to the children’s language strengths, believing that a full program in the 
Ukrainian language would bring the greatest benefit and least confusion.  Schools 
primarily serving ethnic Ukrainians felt pressure to Ukrainize quickly.  Narkomos 
stressed protection for the Russian ethnic minority, but outside major urban and industrial 
centers local educational authorities issued little guidance on Russian instruction. 
Even when teachers and students were ostensibly Ukrainian-speaking, it did not 
follow that Ukrainization proceeded without incident.  Narkomos obligated teachers to 
use a literary Ukrainian that many teachers did not fully understand and their students did 
not recognize.  According to the inspector,  poor writing was endemic among children, 
especially girls,  in the Vasilkivskyi raion, but teachers did little to correct their work.310 
The teachers simply did not know how.   The writing of children in the Vyshenska labor 
school reflected the phonetics of local pronunciation, not standard Ukrainian, and 
teachers in the Baryspilska Raion Labor School incorrectly marked the spelling of 
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students, having little awareness of proper writing themselves.311  Local educational 
authorities recognized that little could be accomplished under such conditions and 
resolutions for at least four schools in the raion set the elimination of teachers’ illiteracy 
in Ukrainian as an integral objective of their Ukrainization campaigns. 
The existence of large numbers of Russified Ukrainian children in the eastern and 
southern regions of the republic raised further questions about the pace of Ukrainization.  
Holovsotsvykh reported that, by the end of the 1924-25 school year, on the republican 
level there had been substantial achievement in the Ukrainization of schools.   Out of the 
15,209 schools then operating in the UkSSR, 77.8% were fully Ukrainized, 4.4% were 
half-Ukrainized (some classes within these schools continued to use Russian), 10.4% 
were Russian and the remainder dedicated to serving national minorities.312   
Holovsotsvykh granted that the 10.4% of schools that operated in Russian should keep 
relatively constant in order to adequately serve “children of Russians.”   However, 
Holovsotsvykh demanded that the half-Ukrainized schools transfer immediately to 
Ukrainian, with Russian kept only as a subject of study.   
The drive to enroll all school-age students in heavily Russified areas had led to 
the creation of linguistically mixed schools and children’s buildings.  Holovsotsvykh 
noted that in Odesa, Katerynoslav, Chernhiv and Donetsk hubernii the percentage of half-
Ukrainized schools was much larger than the republican average.   Children’s institutions 
may have aspired to gradual Ukrainian-language instruction, but the mixing of language-
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speakers often led to the “unacknowledged conquering of one or the other language.”313  
More often than not, this victorious language was Russian in the so-called half-
Ukrainized school.  Holovsotsvykh lamented that among younger children, in pre-school 
institutions, Ukrainization was proceeding very slowly because these younger children 
“overwhelmingly speak Russian, which appears to them to be native.”  Given that most 
schools began Ukrainization with their younger groups, this observation is telling.  
Although the underlying assumption of Narkomos's policy was that schools should teach 
all ethnic Ukrainian children in Ukrainian, the history of russification in the East 
frustrated this goal in actual fact.  Holovsotsvykh recommended a more realistic grouping 
of children by native language, but it held that a child’s native language was defined by 
ethnicity not competency. 
Even elsewhere in Ukraine, where the population was more homogenously 
Ukrainian-speaking, the Russian-language exercised a heavy influence.  Another report 
on schooling in Bilotserkva concluded that Russian-schools continued to operate in the 
okruha in spite of what it viewed as the absence of any need and that “it is necessary to 
transfer their language of instruction in future years, depending on the native language of 
the children,” presumably Ukrainian or Yiddish.314  A republic-wide account by 
Holovsotsvykh noted that although the percentage of Ukrainian-language schools 
(77.8%) was higher than the ethnically Ukrainian percentage of the UkSSR population 
(75.1%), Ukrainian-language schools enrolled a proportionately low percentage of the 
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student population: 62.9% in 1924.315  According to the report, the phenomenon was 
explained by the fact that local authorities had Ukrainized schools in the cities much less 
than in the villages and, similarly, seven-year schools much less than four-year schools.   
The addition of half-Ukrainized schools would increase the proportion of students 
significantly (to approximately 73.2%), just slightly lower than the percentage of ethnic 
Ukrainians.  Proponents of Ukrainization used evidence such as this to argue that 
Ukrainization was incomplete.  Narkomos’s aim was to provide Ukrainian-language 
instruction for all ethnic, school-age Ukrainians first and foremost.  It gave only 
secondary, ad hoc consideration to a student’s actual spoken language.   
In spite of the experience of Mykolaiv Labor School No. 28 then, Narkomos 
hoped that by expanding Ukrainian-language schooling in industrial centers and by 
improving the quality of language instruction throughout the republic, it would 
fundamentally strengthen the school’s chances for pedagogical success.  If the number of 
students attending Ukrainian-language schools were to increase, it would need to employ 
more, and better, teachers.   Narkomos blamed the slow pace of Ukrainization in the 
Odesa, Katerynsolav, Chernihiv, and Donetsk hubernii on the Russian-language 
education of most teachers.316  Donetsk further suffered from the almost complete 
absence of teachers with the most basic skills in Ukrainian.317  Narkomos recommended 
that all local organs use the 1925 summer to campaign for the retraining of teachers, not 
only in the Ukrainian language, but also in the history, geography, and literature of 
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Ukraine.  It viewed the supply of Ukrainian pedagogical literature and the newspaper 
Narodnii uchytel as a necessary part of this retraining.  The Chernihiv huberniia 
educational section reported to Narkomos that it had included work on the Ukrainian 
language in its operative plan for general pedagogical training.  Teachers had organized 
circles for the study of orthography and literature and were examining other detailed 
questions individually.318  However, the Chernihiv section complained, teachers still 
lacked needed literature for their study.  Especially in these more Russified areas of 
Ukraine, teachers willing to take on the challenge of Ukrainian-language instruction 
would need much greater institutional support. 
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5: The Paradox of Urgent, Yet Limited Ukrainization  
 
Raising the Bar: Evaluating Teachers’ Failures 
Teachers in Ukraine faced a daunting task.  They had to transfer their instruction 
to the Ukrainian language, implement a poorly articulated, but essentially new 
methodology, and struggle to achieve authority for themselves and for the school among 
parents and the wider community.  Narkomos considered the first of these tasks, use of 
the Ukrainian language, to be the principal means for achieving the latter two.  However, 
three years after Ukrainization began in earnest, Ukrainian teachers’ knowledge of the 
language remained poor.  Many schools had been Ukrainized in name alone.  Narkomos 
ordered its local sections to make an accurate evaluation (perevirka) of Ukrainization in 
early 1927 and plan for improvement.  
Prior to the beginning of this campaign, regular reports in the teachers’ press 
warned of the poor state of Ukrainization.  A January 1927 article in Narodnii uchytel 
argued that claims that schools had been nearly completely Ukrainized were simply false.  
In fact, “Ukrainian schools are truly much too few and we are very, very far away from 
100%.  In the majority of cases, our schools are hotbeds of Ukrainian semi-literacy.”319  
According to the article insisted the problem was not limited to orthographic mistakes or 
dialectal variation. Teachers lacked elementary knowledge of the Ukrainian language.   
Another report maintained that often Ukrainization was doing more harm that good, than 
schools and other Soviet institutions were sponsoring a distorted form of Ukrainian: 
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“little by little, but constantly, a so-called ‘Ukrainized language’ is being pushed into 
general usage and it is a language that the peasant (that peasant for whom most of the 
work on Ukrainization is being undertaken) does not want to hear and does not 
understand.”320  It is difficult then to speak of Ukrainization when authorities and 
teachers alike were using a language that bore little resemblance to the Ukrainian the 
population recognized and employed. 
The pedagogical press spoke often of the “maiming” of the Ukrainian language by 
teachers.  Nuzhnyi, a correspondent for Narodnii uchytel, reproduced an excerpt of an 
official letter by the head of a Dnipropetrovsk railroad school detailing the results of 
Ukrainian-language study in his school.  The excerpt contains numerous borrowings from 
Russian or slightly Ukrainized forms of Russian words.  Nuzhnyi concludes: “When you 
read the letter, you ask what language this is in.  Language mixing exists among those 
heads responsible for Ukrainization at the railway.”321  The letter was a lesson in 
precisely how not to Ukrainize. 
Local educational sections then were desperate not only for qualified teachers, 
who enjoyed the favor and the support of the communities in which they taught and lived, 
but ones fully proficient in Ukrainian.   Remarkably, just as it was easier to find highly 
trained teachers in urban areas, the pedagogical press and local educational sections 
reported that educators capable of and willing to teach in Ukrainian were concentrated in 
the republic’s largely Russified cities.  Narodnii uchytel maintained that, in regards to 
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Ukrainization of the Dnipropetrovsk railroad, there was an overabundance of Ukrainian 
instructors in the large, junction stations but that the lack of teachers at small stations 
severely limited progress.322  The Odesa educational section similarly reported in 1926 
that a greater proportion of village teachers had no knowledge of Ukrainian compared to 
city teachers (33% compared to 14% according to an early perevirka).323   
Urban areas had greater resources to hire good teachers, as well as to train those 
they had.  However, even this training was limited in scope.  The Southwest Railroad 
administration organized short-term courses in Ukrainian for its various employees, 
including educators employed in schools along its line.  However, the courses were 
oriented towards the writing of simple letters and business correspondence and offered no 
job-specific training for teaching.  Narodnii uchytel lamented this practice, claiming that 
for teachers “language is everything, a tool of work.”324  It allowed that teachers of the 
earliest grades might be able to get by, but not others.  They lacked knowledge of 
orthography, terminology, and the basic literature required to do their job.  The books 
they needed for further study were generally not available in the library, certainly not in 
outlying areas, and teachers could not afford to buy them themselves.  Dnipropetrovsk 
railway employees and teachers who enrolled in Ukrainian-language in courses held in 
1924-25 were said to have forgotten what they had learned by the end of 1926.325  
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Instruction in the classroom or business in the office might have been in Ukrainian, but 
conversation was in Russian. 
In November 1926 Narkomos announced local educational sections would hold a 
series of formal perevirky of Ukrainian knowledge, to begin in January.  This 
announcement caused near instant anxiety among teachers.  According to one account 
published in Narodnii uchytel, a representative of the Bilotserkva okruha educational 
inspectorate announced the upcoming examination at the end of a raion teachers' 
conference.  At first, the teachers simply tried to refuse to undergo the perevirka, but the 
inspectorate representative insisted he would enforce it and dismiss those who failed to 
demonstrate adequate knowledge.326  The newspaper detailed how individual schools 
then formed small self-study groups (hurtky), ostensibly to raise teachers’ qualification in 
Ukrainian.  In fact they drew up formal complaints about the lack of Ukrainian literature 
and the absence of a standard Ukrainian orthography.  In response, the okruha 
inspectorate prepared a circular, recommending that teachers actually study, rather than 
issue protests.   
Such sort of passive resistance to the perevirka appears to have been common.  
The teachers’ press acknowledged that although an outline for a preparatory review was 
widely available, the necessary books and literature were not.327  Teachers delayed, 
pleaded for more time and support, or simply claimed that they did not have to study for 
the exam.  Narodnii uchytel relates a comical story of a Ukrainian teacher who avoided 
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preparing for the perevirka because he was “fully” Ukrainian, with “ancestors stretching 
back to the Zaporizhian Cossacks.”328  He soon learned that the perevirka tested much 
more than the ability simply to converse or write in Ukrainian.  He could not answer any 
basic pedagogical questions about orthography and pronunciation.  The perevirka 
commission placed him in the lowest category (third) and threatened him with dismissal 
if he did not raise his qualifications.  The next night, Petro Semenovych was haunted by 
dreams of a demonic representation of the pre-1917 orthography, “in pince-nez 
eyeglasses with a black beard and black, greasy fleas covering its body.”  He awoke 
committed to learning how to pronounce correctly and “not write like a Russian.”   The 
newspaper’s message was clear.   New Ukrainian teachers had to cast away their servile 
mimicry of Russian and its tsarist era standards.  The perevirka would test their 
understanding and embrace of a Ukrainian language defined distinctly by Soviet linguists 
and reflected in the new revolutionary literature.  
Teachers also sought to avoid evaluation by perevirka commissions by 
demonstrating proficiency through other documentation.  A Narodnii uchytel reader 
asked the newspapers’ editors if teachers might be exempt from the perevirka if they 
submitted proof (dosvidka) they had taken a test in Ukrainian literature previously as part 
of a short-term pedagogical course.  The editors replied that local commissions for 
Ukrainization could make this determination, but that Narkomos instructions provided for 
general exemptions.329  Officially, the following categories of teachers were not required 
to undergo a perevirka: 1) graduates of Ukrainian-language institutes, pedtechnikumy, or 
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secondary schools, 2) those who placed in the first (highest) category in earlier 
government employee Ukrainization exams, and 3) those who had taught in the 
Ukrainian language in older groups for at least two years and in younger groups for at 
least five years.  In fact, according to the head of Kyiv okruha inspectorate, Lukashenko, 
an overwhelming majority of teachers in the okruha belonged to one of these three 
groups.330  Thus, the reality was that only a small proportion of teachers actually 
underwent an examination.  The Narodnii uchytel reader’s question was an attempt to 
diminish this number even more. 
Such exemptions weakened the authority of the perevirka before it even began.  
Lukashenko expressed frustration to Narkomos that his inspectorate could not test many 
of its teachers even when it had evidence that “rural school workers are extraordinarily 
distorting the language, that in 1927 the graduates of pedagogical higher educational 
institutes still do not know the language well and those that graduated from 1920-24 
absolutely did know the language.”331  It could do little to force these teachers to increase 
their qualifications if they did not have to undergo the perevirka.  Boikov, an assistant 
inspector, argued in an October 1927 report to Lukashenko that no exemption should be 
given to graduates of pedagogical higher institutions (pedvyshy) because these institutes 
had generally given too little attention to writing in Ukrainian.  Boikov recommended 
that Narkomos create a state exam in the Ukrainian language for a pedvyshy graduates.  
He argued that not establishing absolute requirements for Ukrainian-language 
qualifications was reckless, comparable to allowing a teacher to teach mathematics 
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without knowledge of percentages:  “the time has already come to take care of the culture 
of the native word, to teach the young generation to love it and develop it, but only a 
person who knows and understands this word can teach it.”332  Inspectors like Boikov and 
Lukashenko believed strongly in the task of Ukrainization.  They saw little point in 
holding a perevirka if it could not effect change. 
Even in its limited form, it was a difficult matter to accomplish a perevirka.  A 
Ukrainization commission in Budaivskyi raion (Kyiv okruha) had earlier chosen not to 
determine the language level of teachers along with other state employees in 1926 “due to 
the absence of directives and funds.”333 In Dnipropetrovsk, authorities did not investigate 
Ukrainization among half of the teachers of the railroad as part of a general perevirka of 
employees.  The teachers’ union, Robos, had reportedly negotiated an exemption for 
those teachers attending Ukrainian-language courses.334  Local officials were 
undoubtedly financially strapped, but also wary about how to accurately gauge what 
should be required Ukrainian-language knowledge for a teacher.  It was no wonder then 
that local officials approached a republic-wide perevirka of the schools with some 
trepidation.  Teachers had resisted earlier attempts and Narkomos instructions on how to 
proceed had been ambiguous. 
While some inspectors were worried about the true level of Ukrainian knowledge 
among teachers, they did not know how to staff the perevirka commissions.  One article 
in Narodnii uchytel questioned whether any commission could examine the knowledge of 
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teachers accurately.  Inspectorates had to rely on teachers to fill the commissions.  These 
teachers might act to protect their colleagues.  Or worse, “it is no secret that even now 
there are persons concluding perevirka of institutions who themselves should be 
evaluated.”335  The observer recommended that central Narkomos authorities appoint 
each okruha commission with responsible experts.  The pool of qualified Ukrainian 
teachers was too small in the localities.   However, it was equally unlikely that Narkomos 
could have dispatched experts throughout the republic.  Nor were there a great number of 
so-called experts at its disposal, even in Kyiv. Noting the weak Ukrainization in the city, 
Boikov asked Lukashenko: “why demand from a province that does not have the ability 
to use the cultural fruits and achievements of the Ukrainian word that are easy to use in 
Kyiv.”336  The provinces would, nevertheless, have to find a way. 
A delay in the perevirka was perhaps inevitable then, given the challenges 
involved.  In response to the teachers’ demand that they have an additional two months to 
prepare for the examination, one Narodnii uchytel correspondent cautioned: “almost all 
teachers believe this and it is necessary to listen to their thoughts.”337  Lukashenko 
reported that the perevirka in the Kyiv okruha would take up to two years to complete.  
As it was, he did not report his concerns about implementation of the perevirka to 
Narkomos until April 1927, three months after the anticipated date for commencement of 
the campaign.338  Faced with the fact that teachers were ill-prepared to undergo a 
perevirka and it would likely yield poor and, consequently, demoralizing results, 
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Narkomos allowed individual okruha inspectorates to postpone.  This suspension 
reportedly greatly relieved teachers, but Narodnii uchytel reminded them it that the delay 
was not intended to remove a “burden,” but rather to allow teachers to undertake in-depth 
study: “the campaign for a perevirka of the Ukrainian language therefore involves 
systematic study.  Short preparation will not bring the anticipated results.”339  It reminded 
them that the Ukrainian language was “the most essential thing” in their work.  
Preparation for the perevirka did not mean preparation for a test by rote but engagement 
in a cultural struggle. 
It is important to stress that assurance of a high level of Ukrainian knowledge 
among teachers was also essential to the success of the Ukrainization campaign 
generally.  Teachers not only evaluated other teachers, but also assessed and trained state 
employees whose knowledge in Ukrainian language studies was poor.  In 1926 the Odesa 
okruha Ukrainization commission prepared and re-qualified some sixty teachers to 
instruct civil servants in the city:  25 for Ukrainian language, 20 for literature, and 15 for 
the history of revolutionary movements in Ukraine.340  According to the head of the 
commission, the okruha administration regularly monitored these instructors to ensure 
their Ukrainian knowledge was good and instruction effective.   
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The Proletariat’s Role Debated 
The KP(b)U, of course, initiated and determined the course and ultimate future of 
the Ukrainization campaign.  Above all, it was concerned with the development of 
Ukrainian speakers in the party ranks and state institutions.   Two further worries also 
drove party direct intervention: fear that party was losing control over Ukrainization work 
and anxiety about how to deal with the Russified and Russian portion of the population, 
chiefly the “proletariat,” the term the party applied to the industrial worker population 
(although most were recent arrivals to the factories). 
The question of Ukrainization of the proletariat had troubled the party since its 
first debates on nationalities policy.  In 1923, Dmitri Lebed, a high-ranking member of 
the KP(b)U, argued in an article in Kommunist that in Soviet Ukraine a battle between 
Russian and Ukrainian cultures was inevitable.  The line between two cultures was clear:  
“In Ukraine, due to historical conditions, the culture of the city is Russian culture and the 
culture of the village is Ukrainian.”341  Russian, as the “higher,” urban culture would win.  
Lebed conceded that Ukrainian might be used for “cultural enlightenment” in the 
villages, maintaining in a separate report on the nationality question that “it is sometimes 
necessary for peasants to educate their children in Ukrainian, sometimes necessary to go 
to the village and answer questions in a language they understand.”342  The party 
absolutely could not promote Ukrainian in the city.  The proletariat had no business 
learning the language of the “backward” peasantry.  Lebed strongly opposed the current 
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trend in the Ukrainization, because it promised increased use of Ukrainian in the city 
among the party and the proletariat, emboldened reactionary elements in favor of further 
nation-building (“nationalization”), and ultimately was a waste of time.  In the end, the 
peasantry would have to accede to use of Russian.  As long as the party remained neutral, 
the victory of Russian culture was assured. 
Most leading members of the party distanced themselves from the theory of a 
“battle between two cultures,” but Lebed himself escaped personal censure.  However, 
his contention that Russian culture in Ukraine had become intrinsically urban remained 
seductive argument for the party’s rank and file.  It influenced the party’s continued 
caution regarding the city and prohibition against the forced Ukrainization of the 
proletariat.  Yet, a policy of Ukrainization confined to the party and organs of 
government serving the peasantry had little value in a proletarian state.  Commissar of 
Education Shumskyi and other strong advocates of an expansion of Ukrainization argued 
that the proletariat was not, by definition, Russian.  In response to Lebed’s Kommunist 
article, Shumskyi claimed that there was no reason that a battle between cultures should 
take place.  Suggesting that the proletariat in the republic was in fact of Ukrainian origin 
and therefore would not permit a struggle against Ukrainian culture, he asked:  “From 
where is the proletariat recruited for industry?  Is a battle to take place within the 
proletariat itself?”343  The real battle, he suggested, should be about development of the 
proper language environment for a “single essential culture of worker-peasant industry.”  
He clearly believed that Ukrainian should dominate this setting in the UkSSR, because it 
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could best secure a union among laborers in Ukraine.  For Ukrainization advocates, this 
union, touted by party propaganda but often ignored in practice, was essential.   
Shumskyi was unwilling to concede that the proletariat was wholly Russian or 
even Russified, although he did not deny that the Ukrainian-speakers were concentrated 
among the peasantry.  He argued that the proletariat was already growing because of 
Ukrainian membership.  The future of industry in the UkSSR would depend on the 
productive capacity of these and other workers drawn from the peasantry.  Shumskyi, in 
agreement with party doctrine, maintained that the proletariat must lead the peasantry.  
However, he and other Ukrainizers believed that this could not mean neglect of the 
national question or peasant concerns.   The proletariat would guide, not combat the 
peasantry.   
Ukrainizers maintained that Ukrainization was the key for the merger of a single 
Ukrainian, but distinctly socialist nation of laborers.  Opponents of Soviet power existed: 
the bourgeois intelligentsia and kulaks.  It was these forces that the proletariat must 
oppose, by robbing them of any opportunity to stir up national dissent.  Shumskyi insisted 
that the bourgeois intelligentsia, both Russian and Ukrainian, were in essence battling for 
their “daily bread” (khleb nasushniii), vying to attract segments of the population to their 
cause.  Proletarian neutrality in the national question would only increase their chances of 
success.   In the village, if the proletariat permitted a struggle over language, it would 
“give a reason for the peasants to unite under the kulaks, serve kulak interests of an open 
battle with the proletariat (not just a cultural one).”344  Shumskyi thus acknowledged the 
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potential of a cultural divide and the peasantry’s susceptibility to nationalist influence.   
The solution, however, he saw was in engagement.  The proletariat needed to assume 
leadership of the development of national culture precisely because of its “great 
meaning” to the peasantry. 
What divided Lebed and Shumskyi therefore was not a difference in belief about 
the possibility of a struggle between national cultures, but divergent views about its 
inevitability and the proletariat’s relationship with the peasantry.  Although Lebed spoke 
about the need to unite the peasantry with the proletariat, the party would accomplish this 
alliance through the former’s submission.  The party, he wrote in response to Shumskyi’s 
criticism, had to do away with its previous policy of concessions to the peasantry, “who 
lead the petliurivshchina.”345  The coming fight over Ukrainization would remain colored 
by this judgment.  Those who opposed it insisted that there was no need for the 
proletariat to yield to a language predominantly spoken by a backward and politically 
suspect population, the peasantry.  Those who argued forcefully in favor of it maintained 
that proletarian mastery of Ukrainian would simultaneously fuse the laboring 
populations, legitimize and strengthen proletarian leadership, and alter the direction of 
Ukrainian culture.  Ukrainian culture would become fundamentally modern, proletarian, 
and socialist.  
In 1925, the new first secretary of the KP(b)U, Lazar Kaganovich established a 
Ukrainization commission under the Politburo in an attempt to reassert the party’s 
authority over the campaign.  Kaganovich had grown up in a Jewish family in a 
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Ukrainian village.   Upon assuming leadership of the KP(b)U, he polished up his 
Ukrainian language skills and demanded that party members learn Ukrainian, use it in 
official functions, and thereby take on greater leadership of the Ukrainian population.  
His arrival marked a new campaign for the vigorous Ukrainization of officialdom, yet 
there was still a limit to the measures he proposed.  In March 1926 he suggested that the 
party reassert its disavowal of the forced Ukrainization of the proletariat in its new theses 
on nationalities policy.  This proposal did not find support by all in the KP(b)U.  
Shumskyi raised strong objections to Kaganovich’s management of Ukrainization in a 
private meeting with Stalin.   
According to a letter Stalin wrote to the KP(b)U, Shumskyi argued that although 
the intelligentsia was Ukrainizing fast and Ukrainian culture growing, the party and 
proletariat risked losing influence over the process.346  In Shumskyi’s view, one of the 
greatest “sins” of the party and trade unions was that they had not recruited communists 
who had “immediate ties with Ukrainian culture” to leadership positions.   Furthermore, 
the party had permitted incomplete Ukrainization, especially among the proletariat.  He 
criticized Kaganovich’s leadership and urged that the party appoint ethnic Ukrainians to 
prominent positions in the government and party, recommending, specifically, former 
commissar of education Hrynko as head of Radnarkom.   
Stalin turned Shumskyi’s criticisms on their head, agreeing with some of 
Shumskyi’s basic contentions but sharply condemning his proposed remedies.  Stalin 
conceded that the party could not allow Ukrainization to fall into foreign hands and that 
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the party needed cadres who both knew Ukrainian culture and understood the importance 
of the policy.   However, he argued that Shumskyi’s call for greater Ukrainization among 
the proletariat suggested a policy of forced Ukrainization of Russian-speaking workers.  
While Stalin allowed that “the population will become nationalized (Ukrainized)” over 
the long-term, he firmly rejected any coercive interference in this “spontaneous” 
process.347  Secondly, he maintained that Shumskyi’s insistence on Ukrainian leadership 
of Ukrainization had blinded him to the “shady side of this process.”  Due to the still 
weak Ukrainian roots of the party, non-Communist intelligentsia might lead the policy 
and take on “the character of a struggle against ‘Moscow’ in general, against Russians in 
general, against Russian culture and its high achievement - Leninism.”  He argued that 
the writings of Ukrainian essayist Mykola Khvylovyi  demonstrated the real potential of 
this tendency.  Khvylovyi’s case for the derussification for the proletariat and integration 
of Ukrainian culture with European tradition represented a “run away from Moscow.”348  
The party had to struggle against this danger.   The development of Ukrainian national 
culture had to be accomplished within the framework of the Soviet Union, under the 
leadership of the All-Union Communist Party, the VKP(b). 
Even if taken at face value, Stalin’s letter to the KP(b)U reveals something about 
the limits of proposed Ukrainization.  The central party leadership intended for the 
campaign to primarily serve the needs of ethnic Ukrainians.  It would not permit any 
Ukrainization of the Russian population.  Furthermore, it would not aggressively 
Ukrainize the Russified proletariat and rejected any measure that set the urgent 
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transformation of this group as its target.  Secondly, Stalin regarded the Ukrainian ethnic 
elite, non-party or not, with great suspicion.  He would not sanction any promotion of 
Hrynko because of his lower “revolutionary and party status.”  Although Stalin lists other 
Ukrainians already prominent in party leadership, their numbers are comparatively few.  
The dilemma the party faced then was how to Ukrainize if the Ukrainian element in the 
party was admittedly weak.   The party had to rely on non-party intelligentsia to lead 
Ukrainization in education, but also, as has been suggested, in the training and evaluation 
of civil servants and party members.  In time, it would grow anxious about the 
intelligentsia’s management of this campaign, even as agents of Soviet power.  
The KP(b)U Politburo’s reply to Stalin conceded some difficulties in 
Ukrainization, but emphasized that the party had made considerable gains and, under 
Kaganovich’s leadership, was headed in the right direction.  For example, from 1924-26, 
Ukrainian membership in the party had risen from 33 to 44 percent and in the Komsomol 
from 50 to 63 percent.  Furthermore, it insisted that others in the party had “just as much 
right to be called Ukrainians as Shumskii [Shumskyi]” and that “we think it is not 
necessary that 100 percent of the higher leadership be Ukrainian by blood.”349  This latter 
statement suggests the notion of a supra-ethnic Ukrainian identity.  The Politburo did not 
further define this identity in its letter, but ethnically Ukrainian or not, the party 
leadership could not claim to have to large numbers of Ukrainian-speaking cadres to head 
the largely linguistic campaign of Ukrainization.   Its count of Ukrainian membership in 
the party was based purely on ethnicity and although there was a rise, the proportion of 
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Ukrainians in the party was still much smaller than their proportion of the republic’s 
population.    
By the Politburo’s own admission, the civil war legacy of antagonism towards 
Ukrainian national culture persisted among the party’s rank and file.  Ethnic Ukrainians 
such as Shumskyi and Hrynko could not join the KP(b)U Central Committee because 
they “had no influence on the party masses” and still needed to overcome their past 
“mistakes.”350  The Politburo letter did not specify what their errors were, but suggested 
that their former membership in the Borotbist party was enough to compromise their 
authority, although it did not completely exclude the possibility of their eventual 
advancement.  The party had for a time sanctioned their management of the 
Commissariat of Education.   Yet, even in these positions, the party did not entirely trust 
Hrynko and Shumskyi and acted to remove each, although for very different reasons.  For 
Shumskyi, his intervention with Stalin was the beginning of the end. 
To compensate for its acknowledgment of low Ukrainian membership in the 
party, the Politburo offered as evidence of the progress of Ukrainization a description of 
its greatest success: the expansion of the Ukrainian-language schools.  It maintained that 
primary schools were nearly 80 percent Ukrainized, secondary schools were Ukrainizing 
fast, and higher educational institutions had made Ukrainian language knowledge a 
requirement for admission.  Ironically then, by the Politburo’s own admission, the most 
dramatic advance of Ukrainization had occurred under Hrynko and Shumskyi’s watch.   
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Although the Politburo had sanctioned an increase in Ukrainian education, at the 
same time it worried about the development of Ukrainian national culture under party 
members it did not fully trust.   The party had prioritized political consolidation and 
economic recovery and growth over the educational and cultural fields, but it was in these 
areas that it found the greatest danger because it did and could not have complete 
authority over them.  At the same time, education and cultural advancement offered the 
greatest potential for the party to Ukrainize the proletariat without obvious force.  It 
placed hope in the cultivation of a new generation of Ukrainian-speaking proletariat.  
However, the large numbers of Ukrainized schools the party touted also represented a 
ticking clock.  It had to intervene to rein in politically unreliable educational 
administrators, oversee teachers, and ensure the ultimate trustworthiness of school 
graduates.   Otherwise, the party feared, the schools might produce a generation that 
would undermine its rule in Ukraine. 
For the time being, the party attempted to maintain a middle course.  A 1926 
KP(b)U Central Committee report argued that it was impossible to complete 
Ukrainization without the active participation of the proletariat.  The proletariat and the 
party needed to head the campaign, completely familiarize themselves with Ukrainian 
culture, and clean it of its national bourgeois content (pereval).351  However, it also 
recognized that a significant portion of the Ukrainian proletariat was Russified and might 
react negatively to any ill-considered, hasty campaign.  Ukrainization of the proletariat 
would take time (the report considered the eight years that had passed since the 
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revolution brief) and under no circumstances would the party allow the “imposition of 
Ukrainian culture on workers of other nationalities.”  Those who argued for an increased 
pace forget “there is not enough strength for this” and make a “fetish” out of national 
culture.   The party had to proceed with careful deliberation, at a rate correspondent with 
the number of trusted Ukrainian instructors it had its disposal, and in a manner sensitive 
to the concerns of the Russian-speaking population.    
As a practical matter this meant the party would push Ukrainization hardest 
among officials who served the rural population and administered the schools.  A 
proletarian party could not concede that Ukrainian culture was the preserve of the 
peasantry.  Such an acknowledgment would undermine the rationale and intent of the 
campaign: the liberation of an oppressed national culture and its orientation towards 
socialism.  However, the Ukrainization of the proletariat had to be accomplished 
gradually.  In addition to urban academic insitutes, the greatest concentration of 
instructors for the state-run Ukrainization courses was in the schools.  It was here them 
that officials hoped to best manage and form a new Ukrainian, proletarian culture. 
The party’s principal organization for oversight and advancement of Ukrainized 
education was its youth wing, the Komsomol.  A March 1926 meeting of the KP(b)U 
TsK commission emphasized that the Ukrainian Komsomol had to take a leading role in 
Ukrainization in children’s institutions and that the TsK would hold Komsomol 
leadership personally responsible for progress in the campaign.  The problem was that the 
commission also found Ukrainization within the Komsomol itself to be unsatisfactory.352  
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Although ethnic Ukrainian membership in the organization generally had risen to 63%, 
one commission report found that only 43.5% of its sections in industrial areas reportedly 
carried out their work in Ukrainian (compared to 86.6% of rural sections).353  An 
additional report on Ukrainian membership within the Komsomol confirmed these 
general figures, noting, however, that Ukrainization of the Komsomol apparatus was 
poor.  Furthermore, a postscript to this report, added in pen, conceded that “a significant 
portion of those identified in the report as Ukrainian do not know Ukrainian.”354   A 
Komsomol with few Ukrainian-speaking members had little authority or ability to press 
schools to rapidly switch their language of instruction.   
Not only had the Komsomol failed to Ukrainize, the TsK commission also 
doubted the commitment of some members to the policy.  It concluded that lower ranking 
activists in the organization had generally not learned Ukrainian and in few instances 
opposed “the political meaning of Ukrainization.”355  The commission found little 
leadership in the Komsomol for transfer of official functions to Ukrainian, negligence by 
okruha sections regarding Ukrainization, and wide use of Russian by members in all but 
the most rural areas.  Whether by design or not, the Ukrainian Komsomol was resisting 
the very nationalities policy set by the party. 
While Ukrainization of the Komsomol itself was important, it was necessary 
because of the supervisory role the organization was supposed to have over Ukrainian 
youth.  Firstly, the TsK commission mandated that all Komsomol activists take part in the 
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organization of Ukrainian language schools, specifically in industrial raiony. 356  Together 
with the party’s propaganda wing, agitprop, the Komsomol members had to work to 
ensure “political literacy” in the second level of newly Ukrainized schools.  The 
organization would find it impossible to accomplish both of these tasks and lead 
“Ukrainian cultural life” in the future if the rank and file did not deepen their knowledge 
of Ukrainian studies and the language.  The Komsomol also assumed a direct role over 
the Communist children’s movement, the Young Pioneers.  While the schools would 
provide political training for its students, the Pioneers’ chief responsibility was to arrange 
public activity for children outside the school.  In almost all urban areas and in many of 
the few villages where the Pioneers had sections, work was in Russian. 357   The 
Ukrainization commission considered it an “especially abnormal phenomenon” that 
Pioneer sections operating in fully Ukrainized schools still spoke in Russian regularly at 
their meetings.  The commission placed blamed for the failures squarely on the 
Komsomol.  It is little wonder then that some in the party worried about the ability of 
Communists to manage Ukrainization properly.   
 
Re-Ukrainizing Ukrainians 
While the Komsomol found it difficult to keep pace with Ukrainization of schools 
in urban and industrial centers, Narkomos officials continued to worry about the effect 
the broader Russian language environment in these areas had on the capacity of schools 
to fully transfer to Ukrainian.  In particular, they pointed to the harmful influence of 
                                                 
356 TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 20, spr. 2247, ark. 18. 
357 TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 20, spr. 2248, ark. 57. 
  
197 
Russian chauvinism among civil servants, who adamantly refused to send their children 
to Ukrainian-language schools, even if they were ethnically Ukrainian.  Similarly, 
according to one newspaper account, some older teachers remained hostile to 
Ukrainization, having before the revolution, “with the courtesy of inspectors and cultural 
trainers, painstakingly implanted a foreign language and foreign culture in our children, 
crippling their living spirit.”358  A 1927 meeting of Kyiv party and school employees 
identified at least three schools in the city headed by Russian chauvinists like these.359  
Narkomos officials labeled such attitudes anti-Soviet and cited their spread as reason for 
even more concerted campaign of Ukrainization. 
Narkomos had repeatedly set as its target Ukrainian-language schooling for all 
ethnic Ukrainian school children.  In a detailed letter addressed to Arnautov, now head of 
Uprsotsvykh, the Kyiv okruha school inspector Lukashenko detailed the shortcomings of 
Ukrainization that persisted as late as 1927.  He specifically raised concern that the 
overwhelming majority of children not attending school were of Ukrainian origin and 
came from what he labeled the most insecure portion of the city’s population: day 
laborers and the unemployed.360  The city’s schools had to embrace this population, and 
continued migration of ethnic Ukrainians into Kyiv would also mandate an increase in 
the number of Ukrainian-language schools operating at the time.  A 1926 report presented 
by a representative of Uprsotsvykh to a meeting of the Kyiv labor union soviet indicated 
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that the proportion of ethnic Ukrainians in the city was likely to rise.361  Furthermore, at 
the beginning of the 1925-26 school year, 32.5% of the city’s students were studying in 
Ukrainian-language groups, although the proportion of ethnic Ukrainian children in 
school stood at 40.5% as a whole and 44.8% in the first-grade alone.  Significant numbers 
of Ukrainian children were not enrolled in Ukrainian-language groups or schools. 
Lukashenko placed the blame for this gap squarely on the shoulders of Russified 
Ukrainian parents, who wished to send their children to Russian-language schools 
because they continued to believe that such schools offer “greater perspectives.”362  In 
doing so, Lukashenko argued, they ignored the “native language” of the child and made 
their selection on the basis of what school used to be the privileged gymnasium during 
tsarist times or had a better administrator or facilities.  Lukashenko counseled caution in 
dealing with these parents.  Insensitivity to their wishes might only increase their own 
chauvinism and hostility towards Ukrainization.  District school enrollment commissions 
needed to take “an approach of propagandizing and convincing [shliakh propahuvannia i 
perekonanannia]” with individual parents.  Every increase in enrollment of Russified 
Ukrainians in Ukrainian-language schools would strengthen the authority of these schools 
and the push towards Ukrainization in general.  Only when parents could not be 
convinced otherwise should enrollment commissions assent to their wishes. 
However, for Lukashenko, a family’s decision to send ethnic Ukrainian children 
to Russian-language schools was largely a matter of choice.  So, notwithstanding his 
words of restraint, he condemned the russophilism he found to be most prevalent among 
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white-collar workers:  “in spite of the Ukrainization of the Soviet apparatus and his 
personal work, the Soviet office worker is, en masse, demanding to educate his children 
in the Russian school.”363   Nakomos officials like Lukasheko must have seen hope in the 
increasing numbers of working-class children who were attending Ukrainian schools.  
The KP(b)U and, as a consequence, Narkomos considered the proletariat’s embrace of 
Ukrainization the best determinant of the policy’s success or failure.  Stalin in his letter to 
the KP(b)U Politburo had cautioned against the forced Ukrainization of the proletariat, 
both ethnically Russian and Russified.  The KP(b)U prohibited the Ukrainization of the 
former.  Its approach to the Russified Ukrainian population was more nuanced.  Here 
Narkomos encouraged, and the party did not contravene, the Ukrainization of the former 
bourgeoisie.  It ultimately decided on a more gradual approach towards the proletariat, 
whose Ukrainization the party needed, but could not compel.  
It was a school’s obligatory transfer to Ukrainian-language instruction in the 
southern city of Mykolaiv (Nikolaev), far away from the cultural capital of Kyiv that 
raised the question of Ukrainization of the Russian-speaking population generally for 
Narkomos and, eventually, the party.  In November 1926, TsKNM (the Central 
Committee of National Minorities, a subsidiary organ of  VUTsVK) requested that 
Narkomos investigate the “abnormal” Ukrainization of Mykolaiv Labor School No. 15.  
According to a letter subsequently sent to Narkomos by parents of students attending the 
school, the okruha educational inspector had Ukrainized the first grade of the school 
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without regard for the predominantly ethnically Russian composition of the school.364  
The letter further claimed that parents of five children in the Ukrainized group had 
removed their children from the school and the other sixty-five were only waiting to 
remove their children until their case had been re-considered.  The parents who wrote the 
complaint justified their petition on the basis of a governmental decree protecting the 
educational rights of national minorities. 
In his defense of the Ukrainization of the school, the Mykolaiv okruha 
educational inspector, Podolskyi, detailed the reasons for Ukrainization of the school.  He 
argued that the Mykolaiv inspectorate had concentrated its early campaign for the 
Ukrainization of primary schools in workers’ districts, where the Ukrainian population 
was highest.365  However by 1926-27 it turned its attention to the Ukrainization of the 
lower grades of schools in the central district of the city, where the majority of the 
population was white-collar or artisan.  This move was justified firstly on political 
grounds, because workers had come to believe that the inspectorate was targeting only 
their districts for Ukrainization and not the districts of government employees, “who 
should in fact be the first to demonstrate a model for the implementation of the directives 
[on Ukrainization]  of the central of organs of power and do not read [in Ukrainian].”366  
Secondly, the national composition of the district demanded some limited opening of 
Ukrainian schools.  Ukrainization had taken place in three schools of the central district 
and parents moved quickly to reserve space for their children in them.   
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According to the Mykolaiv inspector, any school could have been Ukrainized.  
The inspectorate chose Labor School No. 15, in specific, because it occupied the building 
of a former gymnasium, owned by the director of the school.  The school had used its 
reputation as gymnasium among the population and gathered around it a group of 
supporters.  Therefore, Podolskyi argued, “In taking the path of Ukrainization, the 
Inspektura Narosvity intended to simultaneously and definitively destroy the reputation 
of this school as a gymnasium and to further change the pedagogical staff of this school, 
to dismantle any remnants of the olden days of schooling [shkilnoi starovyny] in it.”367  
Out of all the schools Ukrainized in the city, this was the only school parents petitioned 
to remain Russian.    
Podolskyi argued that it was primarily parents of older students, whose instruction 
in fact remained in Russian, who protested the school’s Ukrainization.  An overwhelming 
majority of parents of the students in the Ukrainized first grade registered their children 
to stay in the school and a second group was set up in the school to accommodate the 
number of students.   The inspectorate organized another group in a neighboring Russian 
school for those students who wished to transfer.  In the final analysis, Podolskyi claimed 
that the parents’ protest of the Ukrainization of Labor School No. 15 was reactionary:  
“the parents were not speaking out to defend ‘their children,’ but the remnants of the 
olden days of schooling.”368   
Uprsotsvykh had tried to find the middle ground between the Mykolaiv 
inspectorate and the parents of Labor School No. 15.  It affirmed the general thrust of the 
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inspectorate’s Ukrainization policy, but recommended that the inspectorate organize a 
parallel Russian group for the first grade in this school.369  Both the parents and the 
Mykolaiv inspectorate rejected this proposal.  In the end, Uprvsotsvykh sided with 
inspectorate, arguing that the first grade children in the school had ample opportunity to 
transfer to Russian groups in other schools and that children of the parents who mounted 
the protest were in older groups unaffected by Ukrainization.370  It recognized that the 
chief motive of the parents appeared there to be unwillingness to let a Ukrainian-
language group use a room in a school renovated out of community funds.   
 
Limits Set 
What appeared to be at issue in the Mykolaiv case was the question of whether 
Russians were a national minority and what sort of protection they deserved.   Mykolaiv 
authorities sought to escape reprimand by arguing that Russian parents still had the 
option of educating their children in Russian and that the Ukrainization of Labor School 
No. 15 served a distinct pedagogical and political aim.  However, as Podolskyi noted, this 
school was not the only school Ukrainized in Mykolaiv.  Ukrainization proceeded apace 
in other schools in spite of predominantly Russian student bodies.  A December 1926 
meeting of the KP(b)U Politburo commission on Ukrainization offered a chance to take 
stock of the direction of Ukrainization. 
The commission met under the veil of criticism mounted by Iurii Larin at an April 
1926 session of the All-Union Central Executive Committee (TsIK).   At this meeting 
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Larin addressed the previously taboo question of whether not the Ukrainian government 
should treat Russians as a national minority, arguing forcefully for the affirmative.371  To 
support his case, Larin pointed to a series of discriminatory acts against Russian-speakers 
in Ukraine, including the forced instruction of their children in the Ukrainian language.372  
Unlike Larin, however, several representatives at the meeting of KP(b)U commission 
meeting made an effort to separate the question of rights for ethnic Russians versus those 
of Russified Ukrainians.  The problem of what to do about latter remained open to 
interpretation.   
A June 1926 KP(b)U report by Left Opposition member Lobanov was an 
indication of the confusion over what constituted a Ukrainian.  He allowed that the party 
needed to pursue the Ukrainization of its leadership and that of the government and trade 
unions, but insisted it must reject the forceful Ukrainization of its rank and file.   Even 
Ukrainization of the leadership had to proceed at a rate correspondent with the Ukrainian 
make-up of the Soviet apparatus in general, a figure he insisted must be determined by a 
survey of language not “parentage” (proiskhodzhenie).373  The party would not abandon 
Ukrainization among the general population, but it had to proceed cautiously, supporting 
Ukrainian cultural institutions in a bid to increase their attractiveness. 
Lobanov was trying to walk a fine line.  He conceded that the party could simply 
wait for the gradual re-Ukrainization of the city, yet it must allow for some amount of 
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coercion:  “The Communist Party, having come to power during a revolution, cannot 
contemplatively, patiently regard the historical process’s ‘games of power,’ observing 
‘neutrality’ towards national relations which are being spontaneously formed.”  However, 
the party’s “artful forcing of this process” must have limits.  Lobanov’s report concluded 
that the present, unbounded policy had allowed for the rise of a competitive struggle 
among language workers.  Its continuation would lead to the growth of Ukrainian 
nationalism “in some Soviet-protected form” and concealed Russian chauvinism.  The 
party had to act to make the Ukrainian intelligentsia understand the policy had boundaries 
and to remove any excuse the Russian intelligentsia had to complain of oppression.   
Lobanov stopped short of demanding “constitutional” recognition of national minority 
status for Russians, but demanded that local authorities guarantee access to judicial and 
cultural services in Russian, especially in workers’ districts.  The schooling of workers’ 
children was a key element of this requirement.  However, the Lobanov’s stress on 
language as a marker of ethnicity did not meet with the agreement of current policy.  
In the view of many present at the December meeting of the Politburo 
commission that a certain amount of  involuntary Ukrainization of the Russian-speaking 
population had occurred.  Volodymyr Zatonskyi argued that while continued work on 
Ukrainization was needed among the upper grades of schools, Narkomos had approached 
the “extreme” of coercive Ukrainization in lower grades.374  He concluded that continued 
work in this direction might provoke protest and alluded to the situation in Mykolaiv as 
an example.  The next speaker, Lazovert, was even more specific.  He cited the case of 
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Mykolaiv Labor School No. 15 and supported the demands of the parents to reverse the 
school’s Ukrainization, claiming that the ethnically Russian city of Mykolaiv needed 
more Russians schools.   Even Mykola Skrypnyk, a defender of Ukrainization and future 
Commissar of Education, acknowledged that the policy had sometimes been 
inappropriately applied: “I personally believe that the dissatisfaction of the population, 
which does arise, is due to the fact that the requirements of the population are not being 
met.”375  In effect, he validated the sort of protests mounted in Mykolaiv, if not their 
specific motivation. 
Skrypnyk led the push to recognize the Russian population as a national minority, 
playing off the more provocative cries of national oppression by speakers such as 
Lazovert.  He conceded that abuses of Russian interests had occurred in individual cases 
and recognized openly that the Russian population in Ukraine constituted a national 
minority and that the party should secure for it corresponding rights.376  The very success 
of Ukrainization mandated such action.  Other representatives at the meeting echoed this 
course.  Ethnic Russians would be afforded state protection and the right to educate their 
children in their native language, previously guaranteed, would be strictly guarded377.  
The Ukrainization commission refrained from calling for an outright constitutional 
definition of Russian national minority status.  Protection of Russian rights would instead 
be a matter of rigorous application. 
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The meeting was decidedly less clear on the question of Ukrainization of 
Russified Ukrainian children.  Zatonskyi made a convincing case that ethnicity did not 
determine an individual’s native language and argued for cautious Ukrainization among 
the children of railroad workers.  For Skrypnyk, the solution to charting a more 
appropriate course was stricter management of local organs implementing Ukrainization.   
Particular sensitivity would have to be paid to the demands of the working class, but 
Skrypnyk, and those who supported his view, maintained that the party must still push 
fundamental Ukrainization at the primary school level: russification continued to 
influence parental choice and Ukrainian school attendance was disproportionately low.378  
Ukrainization among children of the proletariat would have to be carefully calibrated. 
                                                 
378 TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 20, spr. 2247, ark. 104;  TsDAVOU, f. 166, op. 6, spr. 10841, ark. 136. 
  
207 
6: The Ukrainization of the Proletariat 
 
Guided Ukrainization of the Proletariat 
The party’s debate over the status of Russians in Ukraine, provoked by Larin’s 
initial attack, made clear that the party would disallow the Ukrainization of ethnic 
Russians.  It found a solution in the younger generation of Russified Ukrainians.  The 
regime would achieve the gradual Ukrainization of the proletariat through the state’s 
guided, if not coercive, instruction of the proletarian young.  Skrypnyk, who took over 
the post of Commissar of Education from Shumskyi, drafted a report in 1927 to all 
okruha educational inspectors, ordering them to respect parental wishes.  However, they 
were to halt russification, by speaking “about reading and writing in the native language, 
so that further instruction can occur in a language that the child understands.”379  
Skrypnyk made clear elsewhere that the Russified Ukrainian children spoke “a mixed and 
spoken language,” whose base was Ukrainian.380  The true native language of Russified 
Ukrainians was Ukrainian and Narkomos needed to recognize this fact in designing 
educational policy. 
More than anything else for Skrypnyk, if Ukrainization was to continue, school 
enrollment and the process of switching a school’s language of instruction had to appear 
more transparent.  As some of the above examples have made clear, there was 
considerable public skepticism and hostility towards Ukrainization.   Even in Ukraine’s 
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cultural capital, Kyiv, parents questioned the motivation for the transfer of their 
children’s school to Ukrainian-language instruction.  Central authorities appeared equally 
confused about the targets of Ukrainization here as they did regarding Mykolaiv.  In 
response to a petition by a group of parents, Uprsotsvykh head Arnautov demanded that 
the Kyiv okruha inspectorate explain its motivation behind the Ukrainization of city 
school no. 6.381  He did not directly criticize the inspectorate, but the uproar the Mykolaiv 
cases created compelled him to take parental complaints seriously and require inquiry. 
Narkomos needed to proceed carefully with Ukrainization of children of the 
Russified population, but proceed nevertheless.  The same report by Kyiv okruha 
inspector Lukahsenko that codemned the pretention with which some parents continued 
to view Ukrainian schools had advised a cautious path but simultaneously sounded the 
alarm.  Lukashenko maintained that some 1,975 Ukrainian children in the okruha 
(together with 9,035 Jewish children) were studying in Russian schools.382  There were 
Russians and Jews studying in Ukrainian schools, but their numbers were comparatively 
small.  These discrepancies, Lukashenko suggests,  had to be changed.  It was only in the 
rarest of instances that parents could claim that a school did not exist in their raion that 
could provide native language instruction.  Of course, in spite of Skrypnyk’s later 
judgment, what the “native language” of a child was a matter of dispute. 
It is difficult to overestimate the influence urban prejudice against all things 
Ukrainian had on parental preference.  In the minds of members of the ambitious new 
proletarian elite and the old intelligentsia the Ukrainian language was a peasant language, 
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uncultured and parochial.  The government’s promotion of Ukrainian only increased their 
antagonism towards it.  One Luhansk worker and party member wrote to the KP(b)U TsK 
that anger towards the Ukrainian language was growing among the proletariat’s rank and 
file due to Ukrainization’s rapid advancement “by decree.”  Workers, who had struggled 
to learn to read Russian, now confronted Ukrainian public signage and literacy training:  
“semi-literate people prefer to converse or shut up during reading or writing and in place 
of lessons; one begins to regard the Ukrainian language with hostility.”383  Even new 
Ukrainian laborers, recently arrived from the village, may well have been perplexed by 
the obligation to read and write in Ukrainian if they had acquired basic literacy in 
Russian.  Education in Ukrainian was unwarranted according to the Luhansk writer, 
because it only dragged the proletariat behind: “A worker is always ready for travail, if he 
knows it will bring a more enlightened and better way of life.  But he has already failed 
to understand the Ukrainian language, because his life has no place for it.”  He allows 
that Ukrainization might be begun with the youngest generation but stresses society’s 
weak support for the policy throughout his letter, going so far as to recommend a 
plebiscite to determine its course.  The workers he describes would never countenance 
Ukrainian-language schooling for their own children. 
Some white collar workers looked upon Ukrainization with equal distaste.  A 
December 1926 article that appeared in the wall newspaper of the Petrivska polyclinic in 
Kyiv lampooned Ukrainization.  It recounted a conversation between two men 
(representative state employees), one of whom was enrolled in a Ukrainian studies 
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course.  This man, designated V., complained that Ukrainization had increased his 
“suffering,” taking valuable time away from his professional training by forcing him to 
memorize tracts of Ukrainian literature and poetry.  After a twelve-hour working day he 
had little time to study:  “I have to read a lot in our field, but instead of this, you have 
Aneid, you caress the works of Shevchenko, how he hounded ‘zhydiv’ and ‘kapatsiv’ 
[pejoratives for Jews and Russians].” 384  V. clearly believed Shevchenko was a 
nationalist and, yet, he risked being labeled a chauvinist himself for holding this opinion.  
He renamed the Ukrainization commission, “the commission for concentration of 
capital,” suggesting that it was opportunistic and akin to the “bourgeois” practice of 
economic monopoly.   This article hung for over a year in the polyclinic secretary’s 
office.  Both its publication and display suggest the sentiment polyclinic workers had 
towards Ukrainization.  Ukrainian studies were a burden imposed by the state.  If 
Russified Ukrainians could truly exercise free choice in the selection of a school for their 
children, some undoubtedly would have decided upon Russian. 
A year after the article was removed from the Petrivska polyclinic, in March 
1929, the okruha party committee in Kryvyi Rih (Krivoi Rog) reported that the Russified 
portion of the local intelligentsia was opposed to Ukrainization.   Although they 
maintained a “technically passive relationship” towards Ukrainization measures, in fact 
they consciously resisted studying Ukrainian and sometimes even resorted to 
“demonstrative actions.”385  The report does not give further details about who pursued 
what sort of tactics, but its emphasis on the Russified (as opposed to ethnically Russian) 
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intelligentsia is noteworthy.   Ukrainization benefited ethnic Ukrainian elites most and 
yet these Russified Ukrainians were either unable or unwilling to take advantage of the 
professional advancement the policy afforded them.  Like the many teachers described in 
Narodnii uchytel articles, they lacked confidence in their own Ukrainian abilities and, 
with the exception of careerist types sensitive to which way the wind was blowing, saw 
little long-term value in investing in further study.  Russian, for them, remained a prestige 
language that they believed offered the greatest advantage.  Whether consciously or not, 
it had become their “native language.” 
In a draft to his 1927 order advising okruha educational inspectors to observe 
parental choice, Skrypnyk suggested a plan on how to properly determine a child’s native 
language.  Notably, the procedure he advises did not begin with parental identification of 
a child’s native language.  Ideally, schools would create acceptance committees that 
would decide on the language of instruction for children after an interview.  In practice, 
this method might be seen as coercion.  Therefore, he proposed that acceptance 
commissions converse with children after they received information that the children 
spoke a language other than “that which the parent considers native.” 386  If they found 
that the language differed, then the commission had to attempt to convince the parents of 
the “impracticality of teaching a child in a foreign language.”  The final decision, 
however, rested with the parents.  The Skrypnyk’s official order directed okruha 
educational inspectors to pay attention “to all thoughts of relatives, pupils, and sections of 
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city soviet” when Ukrainizing the schools.387  However, it also kept the requirement that 
they try to convince parents about the importance of reading and writing in the native 
language.  Regardless of the specific method used for the determining a language of 
instruction, it would be the state, through the schools, that would identify a child’s 
“native language.” Parents had to refute this affirmation of fact. 
Although Skrypnyk was concerned about public cries of forced Ukrainization, he 
believed that they were mostly the result of “misunderstanding.”  In particular, he 
maintained parents often objected to a change in the language of instruction of a school 
(and refused to allow the transfer of their children to another school) because they had 
contributed to the school’s betterment.  Thus, he advises early notice of a language switch 
so that educational sections might solicit donations for school renovations in good faith.  
Otherwise, parents might always have the argument: “[w]e repaired the location and you 
changed the language of study and forced our children to go to another institution and not 
ours.”388   
While Skrypnyk found this argument credible, he did not believe force was at 
play.   His chief worry was that Ukrainization not “infringe upon the interests of national 
minorities,” a category in which he included Russians since the December 1926 KP(b)U 
Ukrainization meeting.  However, there were enough schools, according to his 
assessment, for national minorities.  The key was to have educational sections plan 
correctly for the formation of schools by national composition and remove any 
appearance of force or, more specifically, lack of choice.  Of course, Russified Ukrainian 
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parents still had to demonstrate that their child’s native language was Russian if 
educators questioned their choice.  The paradox, Skrypnyk noted, was that claims of 
forced Ukrainization were being made at a time when Ukrainization was insufficient in 
some okruhy and cities and “a significant proportion of children who speak Ukrainian, 
study in the Russian language.”  A large proportion of these were children of urban 
Russified Ukrainians. 
Instructions for local educational sections made no allowance for continued 
Russian instruction of Russified Ukrainians.  Contrary to the expectation of Lebed and 
other like-minded party members, Narkomos officials continued to view a person’s 
assimilation to a “non-native” language as a negative phenomenon.  "Nativeness" was 
determined by ethnicity.  Thus, a February 1927 Uprsotsvykh memorandum to okruha 
educational inspectors asks:  “How is native language study instruction secured for 
children of workers.  Did it not happen that children of Russian workers were Ukrainized 
and children of Ukrainian workers were Russified?”389  Uprsotsvykh’s assumption was 
that, in some instances, schools were altering children’s ethnic identity through language.  
It ordered sections to report such cases and in particular incidents of parental complaints.   
But, like Skrypnyk’s order, Uprsotsvykh was chiefly concerned with process, 
questioning how local officials determined the language of study for a school.  
Anticipating the answer, it suggested that the number of true cases of state-sponsored 
linguistic assimilation were rare, asking if parents faced an entirely different dilemma: 
“not to teach children in a school they do not want or not to teach them at all because 
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there is nowhere to send the children.”  Chiefly, it was soliciting evidence to bolster its 
presumption that there was an appearance of forced Ukrainization because of parental 
choice or circumstance: parents did not wish to move their children from a newly 
Ukrainized school to a school of lesser prestige or there was a shortage of Russian 
schools in a given area.  Narkomos wanted to ensure ethnic Russians had adequate 
options for Russian-language schooling, but it generally discounted complaints regarding 
the Ukrainization of any one school if there was another Russian school in the area.  
Russified Ukrainians would have to continue to prove that the native language of their 
children was not Ukrainian, especially if the children were already enrolled in a school 
chosen for Ukrainization. 
At the same time the KP(b)U first began a serious discussion of the issue of 
“forced Ukrainization,” Narkomos continued to push for the expansion of Ukrainian-
language schooling.  In June 1926, Hordienko, a representative from its Kyiv section, 
reported on Ukrainization of trudshkoly to Kyivprofrada, the umbrella union organization 
that included the municipal teachers’ union.  According to Hordienko, currently 32.5% of 
children enrolled in the city’s schools were studying in Ukrainian, but during the 1925-26 
school year 44.8% of the student body was ethnically Ukrainian.390  He proposed that 
after the designation of nine additional Ukrainian schools, 40% of children in the schools 
would study in Ukrainian.   
This Ukrainization would inevitably cause dislocation for the city’s Russian-
speaking children who would have to transfer out of the newly Ukrainized schools.  
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Hordienko conceded that it would be necessary to establish norms for the number of 
schools and groups needed for ethnically Russian children.  However, the Ukrainization 
campaign would also allow children enrolled in Russian schools, but specified by the 
educational section as ethnically Ukrainian, to move to or remain in the new Ukrainian 
schools.  According to Hordienko’s numbers, 12.3% of the city’s schoolchildren were 
ethnic Ukrainians attending non-Ukrainian (most likely Russian) schools.  These 
students, along with Ukrainian children not attending school and children of anticipated 
migrants to the city, would fill the Ukrainized schools.  When all the groups in these 
schools had fully transferred to Ukrainian-language instruction the proportion of children 
studying in Ukrainian would ultimately rise to 52%, a target Hordienko expected to 
correspond with near term growth of the city’s Ukrainian population.   He suggested that 
the main schools the educational section should target should be large schools in the 
center of the city.  Narkomos needed large schools to contain these increased numbers 
and central schools to ensure “equal distribution of Ukrainian trudshkoly”:  to break the 
monopoly of Russian schools in this area, induce children of Russified elites who lived 
here to attend school in Ukrainian, and create space for children of new Ukrainian 
workers.391 
It should be stressed that many parents readily supported the transfer in language 
of instruction and most accepted the shift as a matter of course.  In response to the above 
complaint regarding the Ukrainization of Kyiv Labor School No.6, the school head 
reported that when parents were told in 1925 that the first groups of the school would 
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transfer to Ukrainian “there was no dissatisfaction on part of the parents with the 
exception of six persons who transferred their children to other schools.”392  There were 
apparently so many students whose parents wanted them to study in Ukrainian that the 
following year the school had to move twenty-seven first grade students to another 
Ukrainian-language school.  One resident of the village of M. Traitske in the Kyiv okruha 
wrote to the inspectorate to applaud Ukrainization of the schools and ask for the 
establishment of a Ukrainian-language school.393  In rural locations, parents who believed 
in education were desperate for any school, all the better if it was Ukrainian.   
As a practical necessity schools pursued Ukrainization in a piecemeal fashion, 
beginning the transfer at the youngest grades where children not yet had extended 
schooling in Russian.   Kyiv Labor School No. 6 may not have had the staff to transfer 
even the first year entirely to Ukrainian because some Russian groups remained.  
Furthermore, Russians and Jews continued to attend the school for the time being.  They 
would either complete their schooling in Russian language groups or transfer to a Russian 
or Yiddish school when the school had been fully Ukrainized.  In fact, the report suggests 
that some non-Ukrainians at the second and third grade level may have wished to study in 
Ukrainian, an inclination the school may have been willing to satisfy if only to make its 
task easier in the short-term.  Above the third grade, the preference of the majority of 
these students (and 11 of 29 Ukrainian students) was for Russian-language classes or 
mixed Ukrainian-Russian classes.  
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Narkomos firmly rejected any claim that Russian was superior to Ukrainian. The 
push to increase Ukrainian schools in the city was part of a larger campaign to promote 
Ukrainian as a modern, urban language, equal to Russian.  Although a strong belief in the 
correlation between language and ethnicity motivated Narkomos policy to “re-Ukrainize” 
Russified children (and thereby bend the general prohibition against Ukrainization of the 
proletariat), the commissariat did seek to extol Ukrainian among the ethnic Russian 
population as well.  In Ukraine, all elementary students (regardless of ethnicity) were to 
enroll in Ukrainian studies classes and students had to demonstrate knowledge of 
Ukrainian for entry into higher education.394  While respecting national linguistic rights, 
Narkomos’s hope was that culture in the UkSSR would have a prevailing, Ukrainian-
speaking character.  RSFSR Commissar of Education Anatolii Lunacharskii lent his 
support to the Ukrainizers’ task during a 1928 visit to Kyiv.  Criticizing their opponents, 
he proclaimed that: “We, Russian communists, are outraged at those fine people [liudtsiv] 
who see in the quickly developing Ukrainian language and Ukrainian culture some kind 
of unwanted competition.”395  He argued that Russians needed to increase their 
knowledge of Ukrainian as “an independent part of the world treasury” and proposed the 
opening of Ukrainian departments in the Russian republic’s post-secondary institutions   
 
Meeting the Needs of the Ukrainian Proletariat 
The years 1926-27 saw a heightening of party vigilance against the “excesses” of 
Ukrainization, but also a renewed commitment to accelerate the campaign.  A draft 
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prepared for June 1926 KP(b)U TsK resolution on the results of Ukrainization noted 
some problems (nedochety) in the “nationalization” of public schools and pointed out the 
absence of Russian schools in some localities where the ethnic Russian population was 
significant.396   On a republican level, it concluded that the number of Ukrainian sotsvykh 
schools was in line with the ethnically Ukrainian proportion of the population.  However, 
these schools needed to do a better a job of attracting Ukrainian children to education.  
Only 45.95% of Ukrainian children were attending school.397  Okuha educational 
inspectors had maintained that Ukrainization of schools in the cities was helping to 
increase enrollment, but this Ukrainization had to be implemented responsibly.  
Ukrainian-language schooling could not be limited to truncated four-year schools or to 
workers’ districts alone.   
Educational planners regularly argued that incomplete Ukrainization limited 
schooling opportunities for working-class, Ukrainian children.  While respecting the 
bounds it had set regarding the ethnic Russian population, the party saw the linguistic 
Ukrainization of the city as an urgent task.  A December 1926 resolution of the Politburo 
Ukrainization commission concluded that Narkomos needed to design a plan for the 
Ukrainization of schools in the growing workers’ areas.398  Under the watchful eye of the 
party, local education officials would pay attention to the wishes of the population, but 
their primary aim was to establish a complete network of Ukrainian schools, with full 
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seven-year schools as the base.  They were to tie the seven-year schools to a specific plan 
for the Ukrainization of secondary and post-secondary institutions.  Narkomos would not 
limit Ukrainian-language education to primary schooling, as Lebed and opponents to 
Ukrainization in the party wished.  The Ukrainian population, and particularly the 
emerging Ukrainian proletariat, had to believe that primary schooling in their native 
language was the beginning of path of advancement for their children.   
Newly Ukrainized schools were to strengthen their authority by raising the quality 
of their instruction and doing away with confusing mixed-language instruction.  As the 
example of Kyiv Labor School No.6 demonstrated, the immediate conversion to 
Ukrainian might have been more of a wish than an achievable objective.  Recognizing 
that “native language” might not be as innate as the Ukrainizers would have hoped, 
educational inspectors reported that Ukrainian children did not adjust quickly to the 
switch from Russian.  In a fully “Ukrainized” schools such as in Komorovets (Kharkiv 
okruha), children continued to speak in both Russian and Ukrainian with each other.399  It 
did not help, furthermore, that teachers continued to use Russian texts and speak a mixed 
Ukrainian of their own.  Still, Narkomos’s argument was that such idiosyncrasies would 
be temporary.  If Ukrainization was accomplished quickly, according to its logic, children 
and their parents would find classroom activities less perplexing and schools would be 
more effective in meeting their educational goals. 
For Narkomos officials, it was important to retain a proletarian focus to the 
Ukrainization campaign in schooling.  As was suggested briefly above, Kyiv okruha 
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inspector Lukashenko wrote in his long complaint to head of Uprsotsvykh that Ukrainian-
language groups in the city’s schools had a higher proportion of working class children 
than any other language group.  Workers’ children accounted for 44% of the enrollment 
in Ukrainian groups.  The next largest representation of working-class children was a 
26% enrollment in Russian groups.400   Schools, Lukashenko concludes, were increasing 
their authority among a developing, non-Russian proletariat, dominated by Ukrainians:  
“the move to a nationalities policy in the school has led to an interest in education and an 
elevation of the cultural level of these same culturally backward elements of our society.”  
He considered it critical for schools to increase this respect.   
The problem was that schools were still not adequately serving the Ukrainian 
population.  It has already been mentioned that Lukashenko found the comparatively low 
Ukrainian attendance rates of Kyiv schools alarming.  At the December 1926 meeting of 
Politburo Ukrainization commission Skrypnyk placed the proportion of school-age 
Ukrainian children who did not attend school on a republican level at 54.4% compared to 
46.6% for Russian children.401  Ironically, Skrypnyk suggests, Russian dissatisfaction 
was greater because before the revolution all urban schools had been Russian and now 
educational officials had to divide up largely the same number of schools among different 
language groups.  Beyond isolated cases of school realignment to meet “the requirements 
of the population,” Narkomos would have to establish new schools.   
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Lukashenko clearly argued school shortages contributed to dissatisfaction and 
“nationalist sentiments.”402   Classrooms in Kyiv were already stretched to their limit: 
40.8 pupils per Ukrainian group and 40.1 per Russian group. Narkomos needed to ensure 
access to Russian-language schools, as well as expand the network of Ukrainian schools 
to attract children of “the unorganized labor population” to school.  In Myronivka, okruha 
authorities recommended building a hostel for children from neighboring villages.403  
Demand for schooling in this city was so great that any further educational progress 
required an expansion of infrastructure. 
Ukrainizers insisted that failure to pay proper attention to the Ukrainization of the 
proletariat would mean a weakening of the party’s influence in the republic.  Thus, 
although members of the Politburo Ukrainization commission condemned the forced 
Ukrainization of the proletariat and acted to protect ethnic Russians as a national 
minority, the party needed to persuade new Ukrainian labor and Russified Ukrainians to 
send their children to Ukrainian schools.  At the December meeting Chubar suggested 
that a detailed study of the ethnic make-up of worker’s regions would justify the need for 
Ukrainian schools.  Narkomos had to determine the number of schools based on these 
data, not an account of initial preference: “to do otherwise would put us on the path urged 
by Larin, where each person can select the language he wishes, the one he wants to study 
and emphasize.”404  Chubar argued that if educational authorities did not encourage and 
plan for “native language” study in the cities, then in five years’ time Ukrainian students 
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would have nowhere to go for higher education in Ukrainian except Poland.  Mass study 
in Ukrainian at the primary level would increase demand and strengthen the rationale for 
this higher education in the UkSSR.  Chubar insisted that Ukrainization was necessary 
not so much because the proletariat needed to learn Ukrainian, but because it needed to 
teach it “so that the proletarian leadership is strengthened and does not slip away, so that 
the proletariat will build its own state.”  In a republic of largely Ukrainian-speaking 
peasants the proletariat had to show the way.  The Ukrainian language offered the means 
for command. 
In spite of the heightened concern that the party demonstrated regarding 
Ukrainization of the schools, Narkomos continued to have difficulty in implementing its 
charge.  Just as the party wanted to exercise control over Narkomos, Narkomos wanted to 
set strict targets for its okruha sections.  Its expectations were high, but if offered little 
support on how to achieve them.  One persistent problem was that Narkomos had failed 
to set up a Ukrainization program designed specifically for the demands of teachers and 
yet continued to complain that teachers taught poorly.  According to the Kyiv okruha 
inspector Lukashenko, Narkomos promised that a program for teachers’ study of 
Ukrainian would be released in October 1926, repeatedly delayed its publication, and one 
year later still had not circulated one405  He reportedly informed Skrypnyk who was at a 
loss to explain the delay.  Arnautov, the head of Uprsotsvykh, maintained that 
Narkomos’s internal Ukrainization commission was responsible for working out the 
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program and, despite Uprsotsvykh’s prodding, he did not expect it until February 1928.406   
He blamed the “bureaucratic process,” but, as Lukashenko pointed out, okruha sections 
were forbidden to release their own programs to fill the gap.   Whatever the specific 
reason for the holdup, the Ukrainization commission clearly did not want local authorities 
taking matters into their own hands.  The program had to set standardized norms for all 
teachers in the republic. 
To a certain extent then, Narkomos’s mismanagement contributed to its problems.  
In the absence of an obligatory program for use in teachers’ training courses and faculty 
groups, Narkomos issued material for a correspondence course.  An article in Narodnii 
uchytel explained such an approach was needed because of the high demand for courses 
in Ukrainian studies among the public (i.e., present and prospective state employees) and 
teachers alike, but few qualified instructors to teach the material.407 Ukrliknep (the 
administrative command of the campaign to liquidate illiteracy) designed the courses, not 
Uprsotsvykh, but geared them to the demands of each professional group.  For teachers, 
Ukrliknep’s commission for self-study composed assignments “specific to school duties 
for the next school year.”408   The commission instructed them to read lectures, complete 
weekly exercises, send them back to be corrected, and then receive new material.  There 
was a charge for this course, but Narodnii uchytel recommended students form groups of 
five to seven to save on costs and work more effectively.   Students were also invited to 
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listen to free lectures on the radio or visit the commission’s head office in Kharkiv for 
consultations. 
It is unknown how many teachers enrolled in these courses.  However, their 
incentive to enroll in them increased with the May 1927 announcement that yet another 
round of Ukrainian language examinations would be held at the beginning of the 1927-28 
school year, likely targeted for those areas where it had been postponed.  The only 
preparatory work Narkomos organized for the perevirka was correspondence work, 
which Narkomos published in an addendum to Narodnii uchytel.   The first lecture 
appeared in the newspaper in July and the publication of new lectures continued until the 
end of the year.  The newspaper or Uprsotsvykh archival record makes no mention of 
where and when the perevirka actually occurred.  Preparation must have been difficult.  
Lukashenko pointed to the continuing “famine” [holod] of books and textbooks.409  The 
state publishing house was printing pedagogical literature now, but not in the volume 
needed.    This made it difficult not only to teach in the classroom, but also to procure 
recommended material needed for Ukrainian-language study.  
Narkomos’s publication of the lectures in Ukrainian studies was a recognition that 
there was a problem, but it continued to rely on teachers’ initiative to first seek out 
Narodnii uchytel, form a study group, and dedicate time to reading and writing out the 
assignments.   The teachers’ union, Robos, offered to answer questions on the lectures 
published in the newspaper, but at a cost: 1.20 rubles for each month’s lecture.   Few 
teachers would have been able to spend even this amount of extra money. 
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Distrust of the Intelligentsia: Early Cries of a Nationalist Threat 
The party leadership expected teachers to take up the banner of Ukrainization for 
the policy to succeed.   As Narkomos had argued, an improvement in the quality of 
Ukrainian instruction,  would raise the authority of Ukrainian schools, increase 
attendance, and ensure a more effective education.  The party, however, did not entirely 
trust teachers and non-party intelligentsia to design and implement Ukrainization.  In a 
series of documents beginning in 1926 repulbican party leaders pointed to the danger of 
poor oversight over Ukrainization. 
An unsigned Politburo report from March 15, 1926, likely given by Zatonskyi at a 
meeting convened specifically to consider his assessment of the state of Ukrainization, 
pointed directly to the effect of the campaign on the intelligentsia.  In spite of the 
centralized leadership of Ukrainization, the party had tolerated some “spontaneity” and 
“uncontrolled elements.”410  Lower organs, particularly in the Right Bank and Poltava, 
had pursued Ukrainization aggressively.  Their success had caused a shift in the attitudes 
of intelligentsia, particularly some teachers.  The report suggests that nationalists were 
seeking to capitalize on the success of Ukrainization and turn the intelligentsia against 
Soviet power.  The report cited several reasons for this apparent nationalist infiltration: 
the increased frustration of low-ranking intelligentsia over their “unendurable, difficult 
material situation,” weakening union influence over the teacher, debts owed by the state 
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press to Ukrainian academics for work they had completed (for example, Hrushevskyi), 
and the party’s neglect of intelligentsia loyal to Soviet power.411   
Thus, the Politburo report argued, the party had failed on two accounts.  Firstly, it 
failed to address what it considered to be a legitimate issue of the intelligentsia: adequate 
compensation.  Party leaders were fully aware that teachers, in particular, received 
miserable pay, but their  priorities lay elsewhere.  What is more surprising is that this 
report identified a causal link between earnings and national frustration.  Perhaps not all 
party members agreed with this logic, but all must have paid heed to the report’s 
discussion of a disregard of “anti-Soviet elements.”  Perhaps here was the rationale 
behind Narkomos’s insistance discussed above that it develop  a standardized plan for 
Ukrainian language instruction for the whole republic.  The party could not trust Right 
bank educational sections, such as Lukashenko, to develop their own.  Who knows what 
they might recommend?  The report singled out Kyiv party “higher-ups” in particular for 
lack of proper leadership, linking this shortcoming with a perceived growth in 
nationalism and peasant political activity.  The party had difficulty combating such 
tendencies, it explained, because of the “extreme weakness of Marxist forces” among the 
intelligentsia.  In short, the report charged that due to a lack of qualified Communists, 
Soviet authorities had relied excessively on non-party intellectuals to implement 
Ukrainization and some of them were trying to bend the policy to their own design. 
Even Shumskyi conceded that anti-Soviet elements had taken advantage of the 
climate permitted by Ukrainization.  He put a definite face on these forces in material he 
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prepared for a Politburo meeting at the end March, maintaining that one group had 
coalesced at meetings of the Rukh publishing house.  Their platform united “part of the 
Galician immigrants, some teachers, including teachers of the Ukrainian language, and 
members of the autocephalous citizenry.”412  He too explained they were capitalizing 
upon lack of proper government support for Ukrainian cultural affairs. Among several 
government missteps, he pointed to the nonpayment of honorariums to Ivanytsia (later 
tried as a member of SVU).   Communists also “covered their ears” at what Shumskyi 
suggested was a sincere attempt at a Marxist interpretation of the writings of the famous 
pedagogue Drahomanov by Hermaize (also arrested as a SVU organizer) and 
Doroshkevych.  The party had slighted the intelligentsia for no apparent reason and 
ignored important allies.  Some of the Ukrainian intelligentsia, as a result, was 
demanding a greater role in the administration of culture and anti-Soviet groups working 
among them were “winning over the sympathies of the mass of Ukrainian society.” 
The solution, Shumskyi asserted, was in more Ukrainization, not less.   Firstly, the 
party needed to ensure that teachers were properly paid.   Teachers’ salaries had risen 
comparatively little versus those of workers, civil servants, and even other higher ranking 
intelligentsia.  They were overburdened and received no extra compensation for their 
efforts.  “Non-proletarian powers, former counter-revolutionaries, and Petliurists” were 
inciting discussion of a teachers’ strike in twenty-two okruhy.413  The party needed to 
reexamine the question of payment immediately or risk losing political influence.   The 
party also had to increase the authority in trade unions and “fulfill the promises given by 
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Soviet authorities.”  It was critically important that the party manage the cultural front, 
prepare workers trained in the nationalities question, and bring sympathetic members of 
the intelligentsia into the party.  However, in making this argument, Shumskyi unwisely 
planted the seed of suspicion and foretold his own downfall.  Whom could the party 
trust? 
The republican party leadership could not permit Shumskyi’s protest to Stalin 
regarding Kaganovich’s management of Ukrainization to go unpunished.  In the summer 
of 1926, the KP(b)U Central Committee criticized Shumskyi for his defense of “disloyal” 
Ukrainian intellectuals such Khvylovyi.   After a series of such criticisms, in March 1927, 
a plenum of the Central Committee forced Shumskyi to step down from his post as 
commissar and recommended transferring him outside Ukraine.  Karlo Maksymovych, 
the Western Ukrainian Communist Party (KPZU) delegate to the plenum, spoke against 
Shumskyi’s demotion and argued that these measures only harmed the Communist 
Party’s standing among Ukrainians in Poland and benefited Ukrainian nationalists and 
Polish “fascists.”414 Maksymovych’s defense of Shumskyi led to a split within the KPZU 
when Maksymovych and his majority faction unsuccessfully protested to the Komintern 
regarding the KP(b)U’s treatment of Shumskyi.  The Komintern forced a replacement of 
the entire KPZU leadership in 1928.  As Terry Martin writes: “The Shumskyi affair, then 
escalated dramatically over the course of the two years from a typical factional struggle 
in the non-Russian republics to an international scandal and the condemnation of a fascist 
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deviation within the Ukrainian Communist Party.”415  It confirmed in the minds of many 
party members an essential suspicion of Ukrainization. 
The party’s anxiety about Ukrainian nationalism was already high enough  in 
1926-27.  It received regular reports that a Ukrainian nationalist movement was growing.  
A 1926 KP(b)U TsK assessment entitled “Results of Ukrainization” reminded members 
of the civil war history of nationalist banditry and linked it to a resurgence of Ukrainian 
nationalism in the village and in Ukrainian literature.416  It was careful to note that there 
was also a parallel rise in Russian chauvinism among government employees who were 
conducting a campaign against Ukrainization, through anonymous letters and other 
writings.  However, even at this early date, the party leadership claimed that Ukrainian 
nationalism presented a particular threat for several reasons.  Firstly, the KP(b)U’s 
information maintained nationalism was growing in the countryside, about which the 
party knew less and still viewed as unreceptive if not hostile.  Secondly, whereas the 
party had made some inroads in sovietizing government employees, the Ukrainian 
intelligentsia was largely non-Communist.   The likelihood of its turning against the 
regime was, therefore, viewed as comparatively high.   
Another report, prepared for the drafting of the June 1926 KP(b)U TsK plenum 
theses, pointed to the susceptibility of the rural population to influence by kulaks, who 
were the supposed custodians of Ukrainian nationalism, according to party propaganda.  
The theses stated that their authority was growing largely because “it goes without 
saying, the continued insufficient satisfactory material position of the basic groups of the 
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rural intelligentsia (teachers, agronomists, and doctors) only favors the growth of kulak 
influence on them.”417  Nationalism in the city was also reportedly rooted in the village, 
imported by petty bourgeois and intelligentsia migrants.  The report also held 
Ukrainization partly to blame, noting a rise in nationalism among government employees 
in the Ukrainized Soviet apparatus.  It stopped well short of criticizing Ukrainization as 
whole, but reasoned that the tie between Ukrainian petty bourgeois elements and the 
newly Ukrainized elite was strong and that the former would soon try to spread their 
influence to the proletariat and party. 
A previous draft of the report was even more explicit about the peasant origin of 
Ukrainian nationalism, yet also contended that in the city the ideology had taken on an 
even more dangerous bent.  It identified nationalism’s rise in the village with the 
increased strength of the kulak under the post-civil war NEP, suggesting it had spread to 
the city due to an attraction “to the culture of peasant elements,” reinforced in part by the 
Ukrainization of higher education institutes.418  However, the nationalists also sought to 
play on the bourgeois and intelligentsia’s embrace of modernism.  These “modernist 
nationalists” rejected the romanticization of the peasant:  “This group is decidedly sick 
with the ethnographism of khutor-kulak ukrainophilia and provincialism, with the 
outmoded organicism of the latter, with the idealization of dumplings and cherry-tinted 
imprisonment.”  The group stood for the industrialization of Ukraine, its opening up to 
world culture, and most critically, for the rejection of Russian as an imposition on 
Ukrainian development.  It applauded Ukrainization but wanted even more.   
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Somehow these seemingly irreconcilable two groups came to a “deal”:  the kulak 
provincial nationalist and the elite urban chauvinist.  The report suggests the possible 
collusion of a foreign power.  It found the latter faction more dangerous because it 
allegedly included some Soviet specialists, as well as post-secondary instructors and 
literature analysts.  Its position was far too seductive: “it holds in its hands a rather 
serious ideological position, making it possible to influence - with its Europeanism, 
scholarship, technical level, and formal loyalty - young students, sometimes workers and, 
finally, even some “well-shod” Marxist elements inside our party, who have again 
warmed up the theory of the battle of two cultures and forgot the testament of Lenin.”419 
 What mattered, of course, was that the party claimed this union to be the case.  A 
deep-seated distrust of the peasant, represented in his most antagonistic form as the 
kulak, had developed into a suspicion of all those who promoted the peasant’s language 
too zealously at the expense of Russian.   Mykola Khvylovyi was the chief representative 
of the latter view.  But the party viewed any gesture away from Moscow as nothing short 
of heresy.  Khvylovyism, as it came to be called, confirmed the party’s distrust of the 
intelligentsia and allowed it to instinctively question displays of intellectual independence 
as signs of potential nationalism.  
 
Independence Provokes Suspicion 
The reality was that few teachers could be characterized as nationalists.  The 
pedagogical press regularly reported about their poor Ukrainian skills.  Not only were 
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teachers unable to improve their Ukrainian, some remained openly hostile to the policy.  
As Narodnyi uchytel characterized such attitudes, there were school directors “who at 
every opportune and inopportune occasion attempted to prove their contempt for the 
Ukrainian language and of Ukrainization in general.”420  Perhaps worse, some teachers 
had managed to posture themselves as Ukrainizers, but knew little Ukrainian:  “they 
offend the task, lend a hostile attitude to the Ukrainization of employees, and provide 
material for damaging anecdotes.”421  In some cases, teachers employed as Ukrainian 
studies instructors could only teach the Ukrainian alphabet.  Poor instructors in 
pedagogical institutions were cultivating “semi-literacy” among their graduates.422  This 
was not a problem limited to the old guard then, accustomed to teaching in Russian, but 
also existed among the lauded next generation of teachers. 
The teachers’ press maintained that animosity towards Ukrainization was 
prevalent precisely because teachers such as these did not know how to teach Ukrainian 
properly.  The muddling of the Ukrainian language by teachers emboldened those 
teachers and members of the intelligentsia who cared about Ukrainization.  Narodnii 
uchytel speaks repeatedly of the “profanization” of Ukrainian.  Teachers were not simply 
making mistakes; they were polluting the language and doing lasting harm to its future.  
Such talk disturbed those party members who saw Ukrainian more as a tool for 
administration and less as a cultural value.   
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Of course, the teachers’ general poor knowledge of Ukrainian prevented them 
from accomplishing the very political tasks that the party expected of them.  Firstly, 
teachers could not take on the lead role in explaining Soviet nationalities policy and the 
importance of studying and using Ukrainian.  One Narodnii uchytel contributor labeled 
teachers who refused to improve their Ukrainian and assume a primary role in 
administering Ukrainization as “blockheads” (tverdolobi).  He described teachers who 
only spoke in Ukrainian when inspectors visited their schools and one director who made 
a cursory attempt at using Ukrainian at a conference and then switched to Russian, 
apologizing: “You know, after you speak a little in that “mova,” the jowls hurt.”423  This 
sort of formal approach to Ukrainization or outright rejection of it reduced the party’s 
own ability to counteract societal prejudice against Ukrainian.   For example, one 
government employee in Dnipropetrovsk refused to undergo a perevirka in Ukrainian 
because he claimed the language was “dog-like.”424  Party assessments of Ukrainization 
contain several reports of similar anecdotes. One Narodnii uchytel comic depicts a 
hippopotamus receiving a shot marked “Ukrainization.”  The caption reads: 
“innoculations for thick-skinned people.”425 Such extreme attitudes may not have been 
wide-ranging, but they also were not uncommon. 
Teachers who did not know Ukrainian well were also of little use in the party’s 
campaigns to eradicate illiteracy in the countryside and propagandize among the 
peasantry.   Some might have felt comfortable using Ukrainian in the classroom, but still 
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did not know the language well enough to use it for this sort of  political work among the 
general public.  They worried about speaking Ukrainian to their students’ parents, 
“fearing compromising themselves in front of the peasantry.”426  Others who had a better 
grasp of the language simply did not believe that Ukrainian should be used for activities 
outside the school.  They procured Russian books for the village reading rooms and 
thereby both slowed down Ukrainization and reinforced an understanding of Ukrainian as 
a non-literary language.  Vorobiov, a Narodnii uchytel contributor, conceded that 
peasants may have had trouble understanding the sort of standardized Ukrainian being 
touted by Narkomos, but maintained that teachers still had to forsake their reliance on 
Russian.427  Ukrainization would have no meaning otherwise and peasants would 
continue to view the teacher, as an extension of Soviet power, as fundamentally foreign. 
Of course, the shortage of Ukrainian-speakers meant that some who knew the 
language well had the advantage and could profit.  A 1926 report sent to the KP(b)U TsK 
by Narkomos’s in-house Ukrainization commission, noted that a new type of Ukrainian-
language teacher had appeared in the past two years.  This teacher was more “developed” 
(rozvynutyi), largely as a result of experience or education in Soviet higher pedagogical 
institutions.428  These teachers performed duties for literacy centers, local party cells, and 
municipal Ukrainization committees, but they also displayed “elements of self-seeking 
behavior.”  The report claimed some Kharkiv teachers had abandoned their work in 
schools altogether for better paid work as Ukrainian studies instructors under Ukrliknep.  
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The demand for their skills was so great that they could “slip into positions” and receive 
even higher, unregulated wages.   
This practice undoubtedly increased the party’s suspicions of the Ukrainian 
intelligentsia generally.  The majority of the teachers were not party members.  Some 
were former autocephalous priests, whom Ukrliknep attempted to expose and remove 
from their positions.  Ukrliknep made use of the few Communist instructors it had, 
putting them in workers’ clubs and factories and ensuring they had ample opportunity to 
raise their qualifications.  Nevertheless, the 1926 Narkomos report cited twenty-five 
Communist instructors for the campaign against illiteracy in the whole capital city of 
Kharkiv.   This was not a promising trend.   The conclusion the party must have drawn 
was that Ukrainian cultural forces in the party remained weak and that non-party 
intelligentsia could not be trusted.  The logic these party documents suggested was that if 
Ukrainziers were not nationalists, they were opportunists, seeking to exploit 
Ukrainization for their own personal gain. 
Of course, there were few options.  In effect conceding the culpability of both the 
party and Narkomos itself, Narkomos Ukrainization commission assessment noted that 
sometimes okruha sections employed intelligentsia without a proper understanding of 
their political orientation:  “willfully or not, agitprop and organs of Narosvita in localities 
sometimes used the work of the intelligentsia ‘on trust.’”429  Adherents of Mykola 
Khvylovyi’s discredited ideas on Ukrainian autonomy were allegedly particularly strong 
among the Odesa intelligentisa, althought the report did not elaborate.   
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What appeared to be most vexing to Narkomos was that members of the 
intelligentsia were operating outside its control.  It maintained that they were trying to 
publish their “own organs” in Kharkiv, Kyiv, and Odesa.430  A literary circle in Kyiv 
called “Chas” (Time)  had succeeded in putting out an anthology of classical Ukrainian 
works on its own.  Furthermore, some members of the intelligentsia viewed cultural work 
as apolitical.  A professor Syniavskyi, a member of Narkomos’s orthography 
commission, told an assembly of teachers that “political” matters had no bearing on his 
work.431  In another context, this perhaps could be considered an admirable sentiment.  
The orthography commission did strive to establish a standardized Ukrainian that could 
be recognized by all, doing away with Russian borrowings to the language and 
integrating Galician variant forms.  However, its work was fundamentally political in the 
sense that the orthography was intended for use in party and government work, for 
propaganda and administration of Soviet power. 
In the absence of competent governmental or party authority, the local 
intelligentsia had stepped in to administer Ukrainization.  For example, the Odesa 
educational section had reported that in 1925 the huberniia political education section had 
organized a scientific commission of Ukrainian activists and intelligentsia.  This group 
attracted dozens of workers to compile a program in Ukrainian language, literature, and 
embroidery, monitor Ukrainization of Soviet institutions and sotsvykh schools, and 
organize the Ukrainian intelligentsia.  Although Odesa officials granted that the efforts of 
this commission were sincere, it operated independently of the okruha education section 
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because of lack of supervision and assumed “inappropriate functions.”432  Therefore, the 
okruha executive committee subordinated its activities to a city inspector of 
Ukrainization, a position provided for by Narkomos instructions, who in Odesa also 
headed an okruha Ukrainization commission.  Local authorities needed the help of 
members of the intelligentsia such as teachers, but they could not be permitted to set the 
agenda for the campaign themselves.   
In Kyiv, educators also displayed an excess of initiative that alarmed Soviet 
authorities.  In March 1927 the Kyiv okruha inspectorate received a memorandum from 
Kybamchyi, the head of Kyiv Labor School No.38.  Kybamchyi wrote to honor the tenth 
anniversary of the establishment of the Taras Shevchenko Labor School No. 1, now 
specified as an experimental school under the patronage of the All-Ukrainian Academy of 
Sciences.  He spoke glowingly of its early founding three weeks after the overthrow of 
the tsar, struggle to survive during Kyiv’s occupation by the White general Denikin, and 
rescue by Soviet power.   It had prospered and guided the development of other 
Ukrainian schools largely due to the efforts of Durdukivskyi: “this is ten years of tireless, 
constant work by its founder and organizer, the current head,  ‘the soldier of the great 
army of workers of the Ukrainian school,’ comrade V. F. Durdukivskyi.”433  Kybamchyi 
made a “secret request” that his school be renamed after Durdukivskyi, “the Pioneer of 
the Ukrainian labor school.”   
The response of Narkomos administrators demonstrated that this petition was too 
presumptuous.  Narkomos named schools after high-ranking party members and 
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acclaimed figures from Ukraine and Russia’s revolutionary past, not non-party 
intelligentsia. Kyiv education inspector Lukashenko wrote to the okruha agitprop section 
expressing unease about the enthusiasm of teachers for the May celebration of the tenth 
anniversary of Labor School No.1:  “Considering that without proper leadership from our 
side, this celebration can acquire an undesired  character . . .  I believe an appeal is 
necessary to create under Okrnarosvita a commission for the preparation of this 
anniversary.”434  He asked for directives from the party for the creation of this 
commission, naming possible members from the okruha education section, party 
committee, and Robos.  Among the proposed candidates, Lukashenko included 
Durdukivskyi.  His addition possibly represented an attempt to watch over and contain 
his activity rather than a sign of esteem.  A year later the DPU (OGPU) arrested 
Durdukivskyi for his alleged association with the SVU.  At this earlier date his growing 
popularity among Kyiv’s national intelligentsia was clearly a matter of concern. 
Thus, regardless of whether the members of the intelligentsia were “nationalists” 
or not, republican party documents reveal that its leadership resented giving control of 
Ukrainization to them.  It viewed independent activity as potentially dangerous because it 
was incapable of leading the Ukrainization campaign itself.   Its language insecurity, 
coupled with the memory of its struggle against Ukrainian independence during the civil 
war, only increased its suspicions.  It worried that even if the intelligentsia were not 
involved in political activity directed against Soviet power, intellectuals were not fully 
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committed to its survival.  The intelligentsia had be active propagandists for socialism 
and not rest content in their scholarship.   
The party and Narkomos made a distinction between high intelligentsia, 
academics, essayists, and pedagogical theorists, and low intelligentsia, teachers.  
Teachers did not know Ukrainian as well as the former.  However, as has been already 
noted, the party worried that the nationalist intelligentsia might exercise undue influence 
over teachers and take advantage of teachers’ resentment of their poor standard of living.  
Especially in the cities, teachers who did know Ukrainian joined with more prominent 
intellectuals in academic circles.  Ironically, Narkomos’s own recommendations to 
teachers for Ukrainian study encouraged the very sort of unregulated work that it came to 
frown upon.  In rural locations, teachers occupied an even more prominent position as 
representatives of Soviet enlightenment.  They led literacy centers, ran reading houses, 
and, of course, exercised authority over children and their parents.  For the party, their 
potential intellectual autonomy threatened party control.  
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7: Fear and Regimentation 
 
Shifting Contexts 
By 1928 the political environment in the Soviet Union had changed significantly.   
Having defeated the Left Opposition in 1927, Stalin initiated a “revolution from above,” 
designed to rapidly propel the Soviet economy forward.   A war crisis, begun with 
Britain’s decision to break relations with the Soviet Union in May 1927, undoubtedly 
contributed to Stalin’s conviction that the party needed to ensure increased production 
relative to the capitalist world.   He encouraged a climate of hysteria that enabled him to 
demand unity versus his critics and advance his plans for rapid industrialization.  
Confronted with a grain shortage, in early 1928 Stalin moved against the Right’s 
gradualist program in agriculture and called for the arbitrary confiscation of grain as well 
as the arrest of peasants who had earlier refused to sell their yield at the artificially low 
prices set by the Soviet government.  The export of grain was desperately needed in order 
to finance the ambitious plan for industrialization outlined in the country’s new economic 
scheme, set to begin in October 1928: the First Five-Year Plan.   
Grain confiscations continued throughout 1929 and, in November, Stalin 
announced that the mass collectivization of agriculture was required to guarantee an 
adequate supply of foodstuffs.  Although Stalin portrayed the initial collectivization 
campaign as “voluntary,” the VKP(b) TsK made clear to local authorities that they 
needed to demonstrate widespread “success” in recruitment and meet targets well above 
those designated in the Five-Year Plan.  Concurrent with the collectivization campaign, 
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the party leadership also demanded an assault on kulaks.  Officially, the term designated 
rich peasants but in reality it applied to the broad stratum of middle income peasants that 
opposed collectivization.   Together collectivization and dekulakization - the arrest and 
seizure of peasant property - led to near civil war conditions in the countryside.  After 
first announcing the campaign’s general success, Stalin blamed local authorities for 
“excesses.”  Collectivization continued through the early 1930s, but at a slower pace. 
In the cultural field, Soviet authorities capitalized on a general resentment among 
Komsomol members, young party activists, and working-class recruits towards the NEP-
era policy of collaborating with bourgeois specialists and intellectuals.  The spring 1928 
show trial of fifty-three engineers from the Shakhty mining area in the Donbas on charges 
of sabotage and collusion with foreign powers set the stage for the future prosecution of 
non-party intelligentsia.   It also signaled the mobilization of society for the defense and 
support of the First Five-Year Plan.   As part of this campaign, the party leadership 
permitted and partly encouraged a “cultural revolution,” described by Sheila Fitzpatrick 
as “a political confrontation of ‘proletarian’ Communists and the ‘bourgeois’ 
intelligentisa, in which the Communists sought to overthrow the cultural authorities 
inherited by the old regime.”435   The transformation of culture, guided by a “proletarian 
intelligentsia,” would enable the behavioral shift required for public participation in the 
Five-Year Plan.  The course of the “cultural revolution” was sometimes spontaneous, but 
generally the social purging demanded by lower level activists served the short-term 
needs of central authorities from 1928 to 1932.   The “cultural revolution” gave popular 
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sanction to Stalin’s “revolution from above” and created space for the assertion of greater 
party authority after local activists were brought under control 
In the case of Ukrainian primary education, the First Five-Year Plan was to have a 
number of effects.  It placed new demands on teachers to participate in public campaigns 
beyond the classroom, chiefly collectivization.  While in Russia, the longstanding 
commissar of education, Anatolii Lunacharskii, was dismissed in 1929 following charges 
of “bureaucratism” and bourgeois appeasement, Skrypnyk’s assumption of the Ukrainian 
commissariat delayed a similar shake-up.   However, Skrypnyk conceded the need for a 
radical shift in classroom methodology and structural reorganization.  The end result of 
this effort was a rejection of progressive pedagogy and the subordination of the Ukrainian 
educational system to all-Union norms.  Finally, of preeminent concern to this study, the 
party leadership sanctioned a move against what it perceived to be a growing danger in 
the schools and educational system:  Ukrainian nationalism.    
 
Teachers Compromised 
The identification and suppression of Ukrainian nationalism among educators 
provided an added dimension to Stalin’s revolution in the republic.  Fitzpatrick writes 
that prior to the cultural revolution, central authorities generally treated Soviet teachers 
lightly because they presented “no potential political threat.”436  Local authorities, 
however, ignored this restraint.  In the case of Ukraine, Stalin and some republican 
leaders already shared a common suspicion of what they believed to be the very real 
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political hazard of Ukrainian nationalism.  The cultural revolution provided the vehicle to 
extinguish it.   Furthermore, what was imagined to be at stake was not just “class” 
leadership, but the potential corruption of the next generation.  Ukrainization would 
persist, but it would be robbed of the force needed for its realization. 
While the KP(b)U Central Committee’s reports made generally vague claims 
about the spread of nationalism, local authorities cited specific cases.  A meeting of party 
and Komsomol school staff in Kyiv found that Russians and Ukrainians had begun to 
“show their real face” in 1927.437  A report by one participant, Klekh, claimed that 
Russian chauvinist sentiment predominated in at least three of the city’s schools.  In one 
of these schools, Labor School No. 67, a former member of the center right Kadet party 
served as director and purportedly fostered an environment marked by nationalist 
anecdotes, poetry, and drama.  Of critical importance to Ukrainization, Klekh singled out 
the danger represented by Durdukivskyi’s Labor School No. 1.  He maintained that 
nearly all the teachers at the school were former members of the Ukrainian Social 
Democratic Party and the direction of the school remained oriented towards the former 
national platform of this party.  Furthermore, the school administration selected its own 
employees: “The school is a closed circle.  Strangers are not permitted to become 
acquainted with the circle and its work.”438  Klekh suggested that local Narkomos 
authorities were partly at fault for allowing this situation to persist by approving (if not 
initiating) appointments to the school.  He reported that another school, Labor School No. 
                                                 
437 DAKO, f. 1043, op. 3, spr. 31, ark. 52. 
438 Ibid. 
  
244 
64, staffed Ukrainian “chauvinist” teachers: the faculty was only 50% “Soviet” and often 
did not support the activities of the school’s reportedly competent head.    
The Kyiv meeting blamed the growth of nationalism on the absence of proper 
local party leadership.  A second speaker, Ianushivska, insisted that Narkomos knew little 
about actual events in the schools, had done little to orient teachers towards a labor-based 
curriculum, and that non-party inspectors and administrators had allowed “deviations” in 
the schools and were exercising a negative influence over Komsomol members.  She 
cautioned the danger of this neglect was real, an anti-Soviet mood was spreading, and 
“the idea is being introduced about the organization of a faction of non-party teachers in 
order to achieve victory over the Communists.”  Another city-wide gathering of 
Communist pedagogues confirmed that teachers had joined Russian monarchists and 
Ukrainian “yellow-blues” (nationalists).439  The party had been too weak to effect a 
change in their attitudes to date: “the conditions of work here, as in the periphery, are 
complicated enough because we cannot politically influence the whole mass of workers 
with our forces, capabilities, and apparatus.”  Party leadership and growth was needed to 
combat this perceived nationalism. 
If the party’s work among educators to date had been insufficient, Robos (the 
teachers’ union) had also failed.  According to Tkach, a contributor to Narodnii uchytel, 
the union had not adequately explained the “ideological essence and social roots of this 
nationalist deviation.”440  As a result, even if the majority of educators supported the 
party, some had fallen victim to the “spontaneous pressure of bourgeois nationalism and 
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remnants of the past.”  The union needed to explain to teachers the true direction of 
Soviet nationalities policy, but also the harm committed by Shumskyi, Khvylovyi and the 
economist Volobuiev (as well as the Russocentric arguments of Larin and Zinoviev).441 
Tkach did not criticize Ukrainization directly.  On the contrary, he insisted that it enabled 
recruitment of the peasantry to the socialist cause and permitted a strengthening of its 
relationship with the proletariat.   But the union’s achievements in Ukrainization had 
largely been formal in character.   
Teachers needed to actively pursue Ukrainization, but also guard against 
perversions of the campaign.  According to speakers at a June 1928 Robos conference, 
the teachers’ chief failing was passivity.  This passivity had led to lax Ukrainization, but 
it had also permitted enemies of Soviet power to co-opt the campaign for their own use.  
An educator could not claim to be a Soviet educator, one Robos member insisted, if he 
remained a “mute witness” to the struggle against nationalism and risked falling under its 
influence.442  Teachers needed to take an “enormous role” in explaining the proper 
meaning of Soviet nationalities policy to the proletariat and peasantry.  Failure to do so 
would mean forfeiture of the policy’s very goal, the maintenance of a union between the 
laboring classes:  “Language is the form through which millions of Ukrainian peasants, 
millions of nationalities oppressed by tsarism, should be tied to the socialist construction 
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of international proletarian culture.”443  Teachers had to commit themselves to the active 
study of language and convince others of the extreme importance for securing cultural 
leadership. 
Conference speakers argued that the union had failed to safeguard against the 
distortion of this mandate.  Although the majority of teachers had turned away from the 
Ukrainian counterrevolutionary parties that bid for their allegiance during the civil war, 
negative influences persisted.  During the course of Ukrainization, even “responsible 
parties fell into the labyrinth of great-state or Ukrainian chauvinism.”444  Some pushed 
the slogan “Ukraine for Ukrainians,” claiming the republic served as a colony of Russia.  
Teachers remained at risk to such a movement because the union’s leadership had not 
been clear.  It had promoted knowledge of the Ukrainian language, but had not properly 
explained its purpose.  In the struggle with “Khvylovyism, Shumskyism, and 
Volobuievshchyna,” the union “did not show clear direction and did not come together 
with the party and Soviet power.”445  How could teachers enlighten the peasantry and 
proletariat if they did not understand nationalities policy themselves?  Conference reports 
suggest that because teachers had participated in Ukrainization without a proper 
understanding they were uniquely susceptible to nationalist influence.  A little knowledge 
was a dangerous thing. 
As statements by the Robos leadership made clear, the Ukrainization campaign 
was intimately tied to broader political campaigns that demanded teacher involvement.  
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Just as teachers could not remain neutral in the Ukrainization campaign, they could not 
passively regard the growth of enemies of Soviet power.  For one thing, according to the 
party, kulaks and petit bourgeois traders (NEPmen) were respectively the carriers of 
Ukrainian and Russian nationalism.  Yet, “there are those teachers that may be nice to 
workers and to NEPmen, to landless peasants and to kulaks.  They want to have authority 
among one and the other - to serve the Communist guide and please the bourgeois 
devil.”446  Such appeasement only increased the authority of counterrevolutionary circles 
and contributed to nationalist attitudes.   
Delegates to the Robos conference expressed dismay that earlier slogans by the 
union regarding “voluntary” public work had allowed some teachers to excuse 
themselves from public campaigns altogether.  Most village teachers were consummate 
activists, one representative claimed, performing multiple tasks:  “the village teacher is, 
as they say, ‘a shoemaker, reaper, and plays the pipe.’”447  However, there were those 
who had done so little that other segments of the population took charge of public 
education, freeing teachers to walk a “bachelor’s walk.”  Others sunk to the lowest levels 
of peasant culture, condemning religion publicly, but then observing religious customs in 
their own home.  The union could not permit teachers to ignore their responsibilities 
beyond the school or give them duplicitous attention; they needed to take the lead, as 
“informed” fighters of the revolution. 
Teachers who did not assume a role in broader public campaigns and educate the 
population in their meaning risked political isolation and the taint of nationalism.  
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Skarbek, a Polish teacher, argued that Ukrainian chauvinism was rising among the 
peasantry in her raion in response to the party’s grain requisition campaign:  “the 
Ukrainians say, in regards to the implementation of this campaign, that the grain is being 
collected by katsapy [a derogatory term for Russians].”448  She claimed that other 
teachers had not done enough to combat this tendency and protect the interests of non-
Ukrainians in the region, including the Polish population.  Teacher involvement may 
have not made any difference in staving off peasant anger over the confiscation of their 
grain.  Yet, the party likely took any teacher absence from the campaign and failure to 
combat Ukrainian nationalism as signs of anti-Soviet behavior and, in this context, 
chauvinist sympathies.   
Some teachers tried to demonstrate their commitment to the Soviet cause by their 
public activism, but they had little specific guidance on appropriate conduct.  
Starchevskaia, a representative at the Robos meeting, maintained that the union had failed 
to offer concrete support for teachers trying to increase their involvement.449  If they 
sought to consult the main academic journals for direction, they risked further exposure 
to nationalist deviation.  A meeting of the Politburo meeting on Ukrainization concluded 
that the leading literary journal, Chervonyi shliakh (Red Path), had “fallen under the 
surrounding influence of non-class elements.”  Another political and cultural journal, 
Zhyttia i revoliutsiia (Life and Revolution), had been established to rally the 
intelligentsia, but was now reportedly being used by “hostile forces.”  The kraieznavstvo 
organ, Ukraina (Ukraine), had dabbled too much in the trivialities of the past and needed 
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to address more contemporary issues proposed by Marxist academics.450  The 
commission urged greater Ukrainization, particularly in the Donbas region.  Yet in spite 
of this and Robos’s invocations, too much activism on the part of the teachers and other 
intellectuals was a dangerous thing, particularly in matters concerning Ukrainization.  
Teachers were doubly damned.  Passivity signified political indolence; energy marked 
assertiveness bordering on counterrevolutionary plotting.   
Two brief reports from okruha party organizations regarding Komsomol activity 
in 1929 demonstrate the hazards of lax public activism.  In the Luhansk okruha, the party 
committee claimed that Komsomol participation in production questions was weak, 
particularly among young workers in artels (communal teams of laborers).  In the 
villages, some Komsomol members resisted collectivization and the grain requisition 
campaign; most did nothing.  They also failed to appreciate the danger of rightist 
deviations within the party that favored some compromise with rural interests and did not 
push for a renewed campaign of political education:  “parts of the backward worker youth 
and Komsomol members exhibited destructive attitudes, narrow-mindedness, and were 
delinquent in their studies.”451  On top of all this, the okruha party section’s report 
stressed that Komsomol sections almost entirely avoided work in the “building of 
Ukrainian national culture” and among national minorities.  In short, Luhansk Komsomol 
organizations were too passive on all fronts.  There was little chance of progress on 
divisive national questions when the Komsomol shrunk from engagement on hard-line 
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political issues.  Its rural cells were setting a poor example for young teachers and 
students alike.   
In the Lubny okruha, the okruha party committee suggested that the Komsomol’s 
inattentivess had led to the growth of kulak membership in the organization.  It blamed 
the organization’s passivity and confusion on “defilement” by these foreign elements.452  
Komsomol members had lost “class awareness” and failed to counter the threat embodied 
by capitalist enemies and deviations in the party.  They had neglected recruitment of 
workers and agricultural laborers and some had also resisted the party’s political and 
economic campaign, that is, collectivization.  The party found that the only type of 
activism prevalent in the Komsomol was “unhealthy.”  It recommended an immediate 
purge of the okruha organization.   
Okruha control committees in 1929 reported that this lack of party and Komsomol 
discipline endangered pedagogical oversight.  In the Kyiv okruha, party cells at the 
Prytiat construction site had permitted the appointment of the wife of a priest to a Pioneer 
group (maidanchyk).  She taught the children to sing “God Save the Tsar.”453  They also 
had turned a blind eye to bribes offered to the site’s administrators by kulaks and children 
of White Guards seeking employment.  In the Dnipropetrovsk okruha, the secretary of the 
party section in the village of the Khrestoprovets supported the claims of a teacher that 
agriculture was in decline because of party policy.  Under the influence of the teacher and 
party official, the head of the village council, who was also a party member, failed to 
mention the size of the community’s granaries in his description of taxable property in 
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attempt to avoid “a decline of agriculture.”454  The party believed rural authorities were 
all too susceptible to counterrevolutionary activity it associated with “kulak” teachers. 
Occasionally, soviet officials lent an unambiguous label to the 
counterrevolutionary, rural activism they described in their accounts:  Ukrainian 
nationalism.   A 1928 report from the Obukhovskyi raion education inspector in the Kyiv 
okruha found that Cherkaskyi, a teacher in the village of Khodosiivsky, was organizing 
peasants to oppose Soviet power.  As early as 1921 he had allegedly distributed Petliurist 
posters at a secret meeting of prosperous peasants and former members of the defunct 
cultural association Prosvita.  Although Cherkaskyi presented himself as “a Soviet 
worker to the eye,” he stood with prosperous peasants at meetings, first suggesting that 
funds raised by taxation would never be spent in the village and then supporting peasant 
opposition to the head of the school, who was trying to introduce an early school year.  
According to the account, he had further expressed dissatisfaction with Soviet 
nationalities policy, claiming that “we do not have our people, they gave us a Lithuanian 
as head of the RVK [raion executive committee], some Pole as an inspector, and so 
on.”455  His nationalist leanings purportedly fueled his protection of kulaks.  Cherkaskyi 
refused to work with the head of the reading hut because “he is very Red” and tried to 
monopolize space in the building for his conspiratorial, kulak group.  The report claimed 
that his aim was nothing less than the destruction of peasant trust in Soviet power. 
The raion inspector’s exposure of Cherkaskyi intentions was not unusual.  Local 
party officials repeatedly charged educators and students with duplicity in the “cause of 
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the people.”  In January 1928 the Mykolaiv okruha party committee found a group of 
students had prepared counter-revolutionary propaganda to contest local elections.  
According to the committee’s report, the students sent the most politically active peasants 
leaflets asking them “to help the people” and resist the proposals of Communists and the 
poor peasants’ league (bidnota).  At night, they purportedly pasted posters calling on 
peasants to “Kick party members from the village soviets.”456   What was alarming to the 
Mykolaiv party committee was not just the apparent boldness of this group, but the fact it 
counted nine former Komsomol members among its membership.  Authorities had 
deprived their parents of their right to vote, presumably due to their identification as 
kulaks.  Another report from April 1929 maintained that teachers and kulaks had 
apparently organized students for an anti-Soviet demonstration in the Shevchenkove 
okruha, near Kharkiv.  An unspecified number of teachers were arrested as a result of the 
demonstration.457  Thus, kulak influence had corrupted former Komsomol members and 
teachers alike, who used their authority to manipulate youth and challenge Soviet power 
with populist appeals. 
The category of kulak was, in fact, a political one, although the party claimed to 
construct it according to economic criteria.  The number of truly “prosperous” peasants 
was few, with a single head of livestock differentiating them and so-called “middle” 
peasants.  The party’s grain requisition campaign and drive towards collectivization led 
to widespread social dislocation and popular unrest.  A DPU report claimed that some 
12,000 peasants had led thirty-seven mass protests across the republic in January 1930 
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alone.458  The KP(b)U often identified those who opposed its campaigns as “kulaks,” 
regardless of their actual wealth.  Dissatisfaction with these campaigns may have 
provoked the very sort of demonstrations against Soviet power described by the okruha 
party committees.  The Ukrainian peasantry had reason to believe that the party was 
robbing them of their very means of survival.  It is difficult to confirm the accuracy of the 
specific charges made in the reports, but the likelihood that the peasantry turned to 
teachers, as representatives of local authority, to protest the grain requisition campaign 
seems real.   
Regardless, teachers’ close association with the peasantry was enough to make the 
party wary of their influence in besieged rural communities.  As has been argued above, 
teachers earned the party’s suspicion if they failed to push the party’s programs enough, 
but also if they appeared overeager, especially regarding Ukrainization.  Either they came 
from kulak, religious, or bourgeois background themselves or the party believed they 
were far too vulnerable to the sway of such hostile forces.   The stage was then set for a 
direct campaign against the Ukrainian intelligentsia, including prominent educators and 
teachers.  They had been the targets of protracted slander.  Beginning in May 1929 the 
DPU rounded up a total of 45 suspects for alleged membership in a nationalist, 
counterrevolutionary organization, the SVU.  
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Union for Liberation of Ukraine 
The SVU was an invention of the party leadership, created to justify its repression 
of the activity of the Ukrainian intelligentsia, activity that it had long held suspect and 
could not entirely control.   Although the KP(b)U Politburo formally authorized a show 
trial for a Ukrainian nationalist organization on November 3, 1929, the VKP(b) Politburo 
issued regular instruction to the Ukrainian central committee on the trial’s preparations, 
including a personal telegram from Stalin ordering doctors to be included among the 
accused.459    The Ukrainian DPU subsequently composed a detailed program and 
administrative structure for the SVU and placed the most prominent non-party Ukrainian 
intellectuals at its head.  The DPU designated Serhii Iefremov, the vice-president of 
VUAN and an expert on Ukrainian literature, as the principal leader of the alleged 
organization.  On February 5, 1930 Stalin called a special meeting of the VKP(b) 
Politburo to confirm members of the court and the prosecution team for the main trial 
(held from March 9 to April 19, 1930).460  Out of the forty-five people selected for 
sentencing, twenty-five were professors, teachers, or students.  These included: 
Volodymyr Durdukivskyi, Iosyp Hermaize, Vasyl Doha, and Hryhorii Ivanytsia.  
Voldymyr Prystaiko and Iurii Shapoval estimate that the DPU arrested some 700 people 
across the republic in connection with the trial.461  It specifically targeted labor school 
teachers and professors for these arrests.    
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The public show trial of the SVU, held in the Kharkiv opera house, sent a warning 
to Ukrainian intellectuals everywhere, especially teachers in Ukrainian-language schools.  
Mere announcement of arrests was enough to incite protestations of loyalty.  On 
November 24, 1929 the Robos leadership and editorial board of Narodnii uchytel first 
publicly reported on the SVU affair, calling on all educators to demand the “most severe” 
punishment for those charged.462  Three days later the Robos presidium insisted that the 
SVU represented a minority, but conceded that the union needed to renew its efforts to 
oppose “unfit members of the intelligentsia” lurking in its midst.  It ordered teachers “to 
intensify their work, to have a correct Marxist-Leninist understanding and to strengthen 
their proletarian-class education in the union and reject those who want to infiltrate it.”  
The best answer to the SVU threat was for educators to take a more active role in the 
“building of socialism,” including the campaigns for industrialization, collectivization, 
and “Ukrainian culture with national form and international content.” 463  If Ukrainization 
was to proceed, teachers had to accomplish it under the guidance of the party and 
Komsomol and in concert with the wider political and economic agenda of the First Five-
Year Plan. 
Local groups of educators similarly pledged their loyalty to Soviet power and 
committed themselves to fight nationalism at every turn.  A Kyiv okruha conference of 
Robos issued telegrams to the VKP(b) TsK and the DPU condemning the SVU in the 
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name of “an army of 18,000 educators.”  It also claimed to have organized a popular 
demonstration against the SVU, after having learned of similar resolutions by raion and 
municipal executive committees.  The national question could only be resolved under 
Soviet power, it insisted, and those enemy elements who sought to rally the population 
with “national slogans,” were hiding their true intention- a return of power to the 
propertied classes.464   
Many Robos cells and educational institutions threatened a purge of their own 
ranks.  A Robos meeting in Kamiantsa boasted it would “use all its strength to expose all 
class enemies who are hiding under the mask of culture.”  Kharkiv Labor School No. 30 
pledged to submit its workers to a review of the city’s executive committee.465  Educators 
in the city of Slaviaksyi, Artemivsk (Artemovsk) okruha, pledged to conduct similar 
internal purges and the Robos section in Sumy promised to kick wreckers out of the ranks 
of the “red teachers.”466   None of these groups specified the form of these campaigns, but 
all felt it necessary to announce their commencement, perhaps in order to preempt the 
DPU’s own investigations.  
Other educators sought to demonstrate their loyalty by fundraising for the Five-
Year Plan and Soviet institutions.  Instructors at the Izium pedagogical technicum 
(Kharkiv okruha) pledged money towards a “contract for industrialization” as a sign of 
protest against the SVU.  Some post-secondary students and local scholars vowed to 
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solicit funds for the cost of a new airplane and school teachers promised to raise cash for 
the Red Army’s operations in the Far East.  Teachers had to not only display a 
commitment to Soviet power but also confirm a central role for education in the 
construction of socialism.  Thus, they needed to build Ukrainian culture and distinguish 
this task from the activities of the SVU “wreckers.”  Teachers in Uman pledged to renew 
their efforts to tie “proletarian education and practice.” In the Stalino okruha, teachers at 
the Selydivska seven-year school called on their compatriots to simultaneously build 
Ukrainian culture, liquidate illiteracy, and collectivize agriculture. 467  Education and 
Ukrainian culture had to be linked to the primary task of training present and future 
workers for economic transformation. 
  Nevertheless, it was in the field of education that authorities located the crucial 
danger.  The UkSSR chief prosecutor, Akhmatov, warned Narodnii uchytel readers about 
the work of the Scientific Pedagogical Society (Naukovo-Pedahichne Tovarystvo - NPT).  
The NPT, Akhmatov argued, allowed for the consolidation of “Petliurists.”468  He 
charged that members of the society, led by prominent pedagogues Ivanytsia and Doha, 
regularly criticized the Soviet school in order to foment dissatisfaction among teachers 
and create distrust in the educational system.  Akhmatov claimed Ivanytsia advanced the 
slogan “do svitla” (to the light) in his textbooks, but had found inspiration only among 
counterrevolutionary circles abroad.  He further charged that Doha, then an instructor at a 
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Kyiv pedagogical technicum, had barred Communist and Komsomol members from his 
courses to “preserve the purity of the Ukrainian school.”   The two had allegedly attracted 
enough anti-Soviet teachers to form a shadow Ministry of Education in waiting.   
Although the government stressed the threat represented by scholars such as 
Ivanytsia and Doha, its charges of a counterrevolutionary conspiracy by previously 
lauded teachers suggested a more insidious source of concern.  When Narodnii uchytel 
reported that students and instructors at Ukrainian-studies courses in Kharkiv had 
criticized the plotting of purported SVU academicians as “a disgraceful and insolent 
attack on our youth,”469  it was essentially repeating the official account: the SVU was 
not just an organization content to band together the remnants of the national bourgeois 
intelligentsia for the possible overthrow of Soviet rule.   Its power depended on the 
recruitment of the next generation.   An effective way to bridge the gap between the 
duplicitous activity of academicians and the assemblage of a counterrevolutionary 
movement was to implicate teachers in the SVU conspiracy.   The emotive language of a 
corruption of youth, instigated by scholars but carried out by teachers, lent a sense of 
urgency to the state’s charges.  The very future of the revolution was at stake. 
Conveniently, the DPU identified a “school group” of the SVU.  It charged the 
well-known pedagogue and advocate of Ukrainian schooling, Durdukivskyi, as head of 
this group.  Akhmatov alleged that Durdukivskyi, contrary to his published record, was 
an advocate of the tsarist gymnasium and opposed to the new Soviet school.  He and four 
other teachers at Kyiv Labor School No. 1, who were also arrested, reportedly sought to 
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prevent the admission of children of the proletariat, fearing their influence on the children 
of “conscious” Ukrainian intelligentsia.470  As proof of their treachery, Akhmatov 
claimed they had read poetry dedicated to Petliura and collected money for a monument 
to immortalize him.  Furthermore, they had admitted only four Jews to the school.  Given 
the Soviet government’s own drive towards ethnic consolidation in the schools this fact, 
even if true, was unsurprising.  Kyiv Labor School No. 1 was designated by Narkomos as 
a Ukrainian school.   
Akhmatov’s information was drawn from a set program that SVU members 
confessed to at trial.  An internal DPU report outlined the program, detailing several other 
functions of the school group, including preventing children from joining Young Pioneer 
groups.471  Labor School No. 1 allegedly functioned as an organizational center for 
nationalist teachers across the republic.  The school group expanded by recruiting 
provincial teachers who came to Kyiv on excursions, perhaps with their students as the 
Narkomos poradnyk recommended.  Similarly, the Scientific Pedagogical Society sought 
to use its public meetings to win over teachers to an anti-Soviet orientation. 
 Not only had teachers organized, but even more menacingly the government 
claimed, so had the youth.  Akhmatov maintained that a fraternal student organization, 
the Society of Unity and Concord (Tovarystvo iednannia i zhody - TIe) had secretly 
created a parallel youth wing to the SVU, the Union of Ukrainian Youth (Spilka 
ukrainskoi molodi - SUM).472  He named Mykola Pavlushko, the Kyiv Komsomol 
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secretary, a member of TIe, and a Kyiv Institute of Public Education (INO) student as the 
organization’s head.473   Under the tutelage of teachers, schoolchildren had also 
apparently formed counterrevolutionary groups.   A DPU document detailing arrests of 
cultural leaders, professors, and teachers throughout the country for ties to the SVU 
pointed to one alarming example.  In the Pryluky okruha, a teacher and 1925 graduate of 
the Kyiv INO had organized a nationalist group, composed primarily of kulak children.  
The DPU report claimed that the group had read nationalist literature in secret and used 
Shevchenko’s poetry as their inspiration to campaign in surrounding villages for a 
popular uprising against Soviet power.  Authorities arrested six labor school students as a 
result of their investigation.474  Arrests of children appear to have been rare, but the 
DPU’s inclusion of information in its report was an indication of just how far it was 
willing to go in its operation against the Ukrainian intelligentsia. 
The list of the supposed crimes planned by the SVU revealed at the trial was long, 
beginning with proposals for the murder of everyone from Skrypnyk to Stalin and 
culminating in an elaborate plan for an insurrection against Soviet power and a Polish-
aided invasion by émigré Ukrainian nationalist forces.  The role of youth, Akhmatov 
made clear, was to incite the population for this uprising and spread nationalist myths, “in 
defense of Ukrainian culture.”  The SVU insured that the revolution was robbed of its 
heirs, but also made students foot soldiers in a campaign for its overthrow.    Reinforcing 
the image of corrupted youth, Akhmatov lamented that the SVU had planned its treason 
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from the “body of the young socialist republic,” deceiving the childlike Soviet society 
with its blend of national bourgeois historicism and pseudo-Marxism.  Elsewhere, 
Skrypnyk made clear to young cultural activists that the SVU was fighting for control of 
the preparation of new cadres, a key task of the Five-Year Plan.475  At stake were the 
future of next Soviet generation and the fulfillment of socialism. 
The prosecution of “model” teachers and students, themselves products of the 
Soviet educational system, sent a warning to educators.  In addition to Akhmatov’s 
warnings and the regular articles in Narodnii uchytel and the general press, the 
government transmitted the court proceedings on radio.  The incentive for Robos to make 
a distinction between the educator-activist and self-indulgent (potentially traitorous) 
intellectual was high.  One Robos section protested that SVU activity had nothing in 
common with “the work of the broadest stratum of labor intelligentsia and especially 
teachers, who together with the proletariat and the Communist Party are carrying out the 
Five-Year Plan of socialist building.”476  Teachers’ critical role in the classroom, coupled 
with their participation in public work (the fight against illiteracy and the promotion of 
collectivization) made them suspect, but at the same time gave evidence of constructive 
“action.”  Scholars had to demonstrate the same.   
In November 1929, over 700 educators met to consider the SVU conspiracy in the 
eastern Ukrainian city of Luhansk.  The group consisted not only of teachers and 
professional education instructors, but also members of the local section of scientific 
workers.  After listening to a report on the SVU by a representative of the okruha DPU, 
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the head of the Robos section of scientific workers claimed that local scholars had been 
too passive:  “In the age of socialism it is not possible to just stand on the ‘Soviet 
platform.’  We must sit near the engine and help the train travel faster to socialism.”477  
The Robos section head conceded that Luhansk scholars had compromised too long with 
reactionary views of scholars of the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences (VUAN) and 
therefore were partly too blame.   As evidence he pointed to a 1924 lecture given to 
graduate students at the Luhansk Marxist-Leninist Academy by Hermaize, a VUAN 
historian, textbook author, and now arrested member of the SVU.  He suggested that 
administrators of the academy and local scholars in general had thereby created an 
environment of reconciliation (prymyrenstvo), refusing to see early signs of treason.  The 
meeting denounced the SVU, taking the added step of tying it to a recent attack on a 
Soviet diplomat in Lwów (Lviv), Poland by a Ukrainian student, and resolved to “triple 
the effort to build the fortress of the socialist homeland of laborers.”478   Scholarly work 
would have to be justified even more in terms of service to the state. 
The SVU arrests and trial did not mean the end of Ukrainization.  Instead of 
attacking Ukrainization, prosecutors argued that the SVU had formed because of the 
policy’s success.  Akhmatov himself authored an article in Narodnii uchytel in which he 
maintained that the SVU members viewed Ukrainization as a Soviet “provocation” 
designed to wrest control of Ukrainian culture from “conscious Ukrainians.”479  While 
SVU members conceded a practical cooperation with the Soviet government in order to 
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keep the policy “in Ukrainian hands,” Akhmatov claimed they worked behind the scenes 
to bring about its downfall.   They exploited the romanticism of some circles of the 
Ukrainian intelligentsia and managed to convince them that Ukrainization offered a 
means to simultaneously defend the Ukrainian language and oppose Russian speakers.  
He again invoked the idea that the SVU was both a counterrevolutionary and anti-Semitic 
organization premised on the seemingly contradictory idea that Jewish nation was “the 
carrier of the idea of Russian statehood.”  Members allegedly taught anti-Semitism in 
pedagogical institutes, advocated pogroms, and sought to bar Jewish candidates from 
scientific organizations.480 Fundamentally, Akhmatov stressed, the SVU sought control 
over Ukrainization in order to foment national hatred among youth.   He repeated that 
VUAN was the center of the organization’s activity, but it relied on the rural 
intelligentsia (specifically primary school teachers) to spread its ideas, disseminate 
nationalist literature to the young and combat the work of the Komsomol and Pioneers to 
develop a Soviet generation.   
The only way to successfully defend Soviet power, authorities claimed, was to 
reassert a “pure” understanding of the meaning of the revolution and Leninist 
nationalities policy.  A 1930 Komsomol pamphlet claimed that “Ukrainization will deal a 
horrible blow to the nation of SUM [Union of Ukrainian Youth] adherents.”481  
Nevertheless, while the Komsomol and party lauded Ukrainization, seeing in its success 
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the motive for the desperate acts of the SVU and SUM, at the same time the affair 
deprived the state of committed and capable administrators of a campaign desperate for 
talent.  More ominously, the arrests of alleged Ukrainian nationalists and the SVU show 
trial sent an unequivocal message to the rank and file Ukrainizers:  they might be next.  
One local Robos section’s proclamations captured these contradictory sentiments:  “The 
exuberant [buinyi] blossoming of Ukrainian proletarian culture testifies that valid national 
questions are only solved by the working-peasant masses under the leadership of a 
proletarian-peasant party and its proletarian state.” In the same breath, it called for severe 
punishment of those accused and ordered educators to assist the DPU in exposing 
“individual scoundrels, who have penetrated the ranks of educators.”482   
The limits of just how much a teacher might add to the “blossoming” of Ukrainian 
culture were unclear.  Few could countenance the crimes with which the state charged 
SVU members.  It was best not to stray into areas that might be considered suspect and 
much of Ukrainian culture now was.   Martin argues that the party viewed the bulk of the 
Ukrainian intelligentsia as “smenovekhovtsy,” a term derived from an émigré Russian 
nationalist organization, smena vekh (Change of Landmarks), which advocated tactical 
cooperation with the Bolsheviks.483  From the party’s perspective, Ukrainian bourgeois 
intellectuals had made a similar choice.  Martin maintains that the party viewed the SVU 
show trial as a necessary preventive measure because it accepted as a “psychological 
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truth” that the intelligentsia would oppose the Five-Year Plan’s cultural revolution, a 
program for the creation of a new proletarian ethos.484  
As Chapter 6 argued, the KP(b)U leadership had very little trust in the 
intelligentsia.  The DPU, in fact, had planned to deport the accused SVU leader Iefremov 
as early as 1922 and in 1926 had prepared a report on “rightist” elements among the 
Ukrainian intelligentsia.485  The DPU, in particular, was one of the fiercest critics of 
Ukrainization and the least Ukrainized institution in the republic.  However, the DPU 
acted against the Ukrainian intelligentsia not simply because it had always suspected 
them, but because it feared the power of intellectuals to direct education and culture 
beyond the sphere of the party.   It was the uncertainty of the consequences of the 
intelligentsia’s work that troubled the DPU most. Nevertheless, Ukrainian educators were 
not the calculating opportunists of the DPU’s image.  Iefremov and others resisted party 
involvement in academic life and Iefremov’s own opinion of Soviet power was less than 
favorable.  However, the Soviet government put the SVU defendants, Iefremov included, 
on trial for precisely what it had exhorted them to do: develop Ukrainian culture. 
 
Simple Priorities 
Given the challenges already described in promoting high Ukrainian-language 
proficiency among teachers, it was unsurprising that many teachers readily abandoned an 
overt promotion of Ukrainization.  Their very survival was another matter altogether.   
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Press reports suggest that some teachers did oppose collectivization.  The extent and 
openness of their resistance is unclear.  Narodnii uchytel maintained that the number of 
so-called “kulak sympathizers” among teachers was not great.  However, an article in the 
newspaper listed numerous crimes that teachers had committed.  It divided 
counterrevolutionary teachers into two groups: those who by landholdings were kulaks 
and others who sided with them by their actions.   One teacher’s husband allegedly made 
the dramatic statement at a village meeting:  “Do not give your grain because the 
authorities do not give you anything and give only to the workers.  When there is war, 
kill the workers first.”486  It is astonishing that anyone would make such a bold statement 
in a public forum, although it reveals some insight into the rationale of the requisition 
campaign.  The teacher herself was suspect because of her marriage to this alleged 
troublemaker. 
The article attests that okruha Robos meetings further revealed the true attitude of 
some teachers towards collectivization.  At one such meeting, a teacher suggested the 
campaign was entirely unrealistic.  Others apparently reported that their colleagues 
confided to the peasantry that they were opposed to the operation, but nevertheless had to 
publicly support it.  Some refrained from taking a leadership role, insisting that the 
peasantry would not listen to them.  They logged hours for “civic political work” without 
any real commitment to the collectivization campaign.   The newspaper labeled this 
approach “kulak” and demanded the dismissal of these “traitors.”  The teachers’ behavior 
was, however, reflective of a sentiment shared by the peasantry and teachers who lived 
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amongst them and depended upon their support: the grain requisition campaign 
threatened to cause severe food shortages in the already impoverished countryside.  It is 
reasonable to assume that some teachers took a skeptical, passive, even, as described in 
the newspaper, a duplicitous approach towards a policy that in Ukraine would culminate 
in the deaths of millions.  In the climate of danger introduced by the SVU trial such a 
stance was impermissible. 
As if to make the line even more clear, at the same time Narodnii uchytel was 
warning of the nefarious activities of SVU educators and cautioning against 
counterrevolutionary behavior by rural teachers, it was lauding the bravery of the activist 
teacher.  It thereby provided a model of normative behavior for teachers to follow and 
honored them for their revolutionary heroism.  The Soviet press had taken care in the lead 
up to the SVU trial to demonstrate the kulak-peasant origins of Ukrainian nationalism.  A 
series of articles on kulak violence against teachers unambiguously exposed the potential 
of enemies of Soviet power.  The newspaper’s message was that it was in the teacher’s 
interest to side with public campaigns such as collectivization.  To do otherwise meant 
risking identification with a vilified enemy and the label of bourgeois nationalism.   
Akhmatov again set the stage.  In response to the latest in a series of reported 
murders of teachers, Akhmatov issued a statement to the press in November 1929.  He 
announced that two teachers, Zadorozhnyi and Beta, had recently been murdered by 
kulaks in rural eastern Ukraine.  They had purportedly been targeted for their active 
participation in the collectivization and literacy campaigns (involvement in the latter was 
also strongly identified with Soviet power).  Akhmatov took these murders as well as 
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other acts of kulak “terrorism” (arson, physical assault, and earlier murders) as evidence 
that the class struggle in the village was sharpening.  The majority of teachers, he 
emphasized, were “on one side of the barricade, together with the poor and hired 
farmers.”487  Kulaks saw teachers as mortal enemies because they were Soviet workers, 
critical leaders in the task of building socialism.  He promised to make the prosecution of 
these murders his direct responsibility and to afford teachers all legal protection to defend 
them against future attacks. 
Reports of other acts of violence committed against teachers soon followed.  One 
teacher informed Narodnii uchytel readers that kulaks in the Artemivsk region had 
murdered two poor peasants in connection with their political work and had forced a 
teacher in one village to flee her post.  In another village, kulaks had staged a smear 
campaign against a teacher, complaining to educational authorities that she was 
“conducting anti-pedagogical work versus the students.”488  A raion commission found 
the charges baseless.  The Robos raion section later concluded that the local village did 
nothing to protect the teacher and oppose the kulaks.   Its findings implied that village 
authorities were firmly in kulak hands and the teachers stood alone against their 
influence.489 
The pedagogical press presented teachers in the most positive light possible in 
order to repair their public image as well as serve the broader interests of the state.   The 
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press touted teachers as defiant heroes, valiantly carrying out collectivization and the 
demands of the Five-Year Plan in the face of a threat mounted by what it presented as a 
small, but desperate minority.   Consequently, when Narodnii uchytel reported that the 
head of a labor school in the Bilotserkva okruha had died from eight bullet wounds and 
four of his colleagues narrowly escaped a similar fate, it also extolled his high reputation 
in the community and among his peers.490  Another, apparently botched, shooting of a 
teacher and Komsomol member in the Chernihiv region was explained as “kulak revenge 
for the teacher’s active work.”491 In spite of the increase in attacks, such teachers refused 
to back down from their political work.  One teacher in the village of Khorostiuk who 
sustained an attack vowed to continue his work for collectivization and Soviet power.  
Another group of village teachers had contributed to the full realization of the grain 
requisition campaign in spite of pressure from kulaks.  In this instance, the head of the 
village Soviet had purportedly succumbed to kulak influence and, instead of explaining 
the importance of the campaign to the village, had blamed it entirely on the teachers.492  
If true, this tactic suggests just how unpopular the grain seizures were.   Given the 
apparent weakness of local authorities, the state relied very much on teacher leadership in 
this operation.  Thus, it followed a complicated strategy of warning educators of traitors 
in their midst, but exalting those who stood with Soviet power.  In the desperate 
environment introduced by the collectivization campaign, Ukrainization was a negligible 
concern for rural teachers.  They were simply trying to stay alive. 
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Ukrainization and the Five-Year Plan 
Inevitably, the heightened political language of the Five-Year Plan had an effect 
on the classroom itself.  The Sumy okruha party section informed the KP(b)U Central 
Committee that a local newspaper, Serp i molot, had reported on class struggle among 
children in the schools.  According to the party section, the newspaper had incorrectly 
emphasized the battle against children of class enemies and had not adequately discussed 
the principal tasks of the school within the wider environment of class struggle:  
strengthening of instruction, party leadership over education, and the organization of self-
reliant Pioneer organizations to oppose bourgeois infiltration of the schools.493  The party 
did not intend the harassment of children, but rather a full scale redirection of 
education.494  The okruha section ordered a purge of the newspaper’s editorial board and 
instructed its agitprop activists to prepare another article explaining party educational 
policy. It is not surprising, however, that the newspaper made this “error.”  Broader 
pedagogical questions took a decidedly inferior place to daily reports of rural class 
struggle, kulak violence, and orders for proletarian vigilance.   
As discussed above, the party rejected the forced Ukrainization of the Russian-
speaking population, but Narkomos continued to favor the gradual Ukrainization of the 
Russified, but ethnically Ukrainian, proletariat through their children.  Without the 
Ukrainization of the proletariat, Soviet nationalities policy had little meaning in the 
republic.   In the post-SVU environment, in spite of Narkomos’s efforts, the campaign 
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hesitated.  Of course, the need for the Ukrainization of the proletariat was officially even 
greater.  Clearly, in the party’s eyes, the old national elites could not be trusted to 
administer the republic’s scientific and educational establishments.  If Ukrainian national 
culture was to survive, Narkomos had to situate it firmly in the proletarian camp.  The 
new emphasis on the use of trusted cadres (ideally party members) meant the circle of 
qualified Ukrainian-language instructors was still small.  Furthermore, with some of the 
most prominent Ukrainizers purged, the teachers Narkomos relied upon to move the 
campaign forward, grew even more timid.  Ukrainization was supposed to be for and by 
the proletariat.  However, the incentives for educators to realize this strategy seemed few, 
the practical challenges many, and the risks high. 
The attack on bourgeois culture and specialists that defined the “cultural 
revolution” of the Five-Year Plan generally argued for a shift in Ukrainization strategy.  
The party began to turn its attention to the concerted “cultivation of modernized, 
industrial Ukrainian culture.”495   On December 23, 1929, seven months after the first 
SVU arrest, the KP(b)U published a decree on the state of Ukrainization in the critical 
industrial centers.   It emphasized that the proletariat needed to take a leading role in 
building of Ukrainian national culture, but recognized that the government was still 
battling with “russophilic banter” that the proletariat were indifferent.496  While the party 
had some success in the general development of Ukrainian culture, it conceded that lower 
party organization in the industrial regions of the Donbas had not responded to the party’s 
calls for an intensification of the campaign and work remained sporadic.  The decrees of 
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the party had proven insufficient, proper checks on implementation did not exist, and 
many cadres did not even understand the need for the campaign.  It blamed part of the 
failure on the influence of industrial specialists educated during the pre-revolutionary 
period:  “from here arises not only a negative attitude on the part of a significant part of 
specialists to Ukrainization, but signs of open russophilic great-state attitude.”497  The 
party had not done enough to rebuff these attitudes and they were spreading to the 
working mass.   
Importantly, the KP(b)U also held the educational establishment responsible.  The 
tempo of Ukrainization, it reported, was particularly weak among local Narkomos 
sections.  While recognizing there was a shortage of Ukrainian-speaking instructors in the 
Donbas, it recommended a full-scale review of their numbers in order to properly develop 
and staff a network of Ukrainian schools.  Teachers who did not know Ukrainian would 
have to be quickly trained.  The party also assumed a renewed responsibility to Ukrainize 
and promote Ukrainian-speakers within its own ranks.  It ordered okruha party 
organizational sections to each produce thirty workers for Ukrainization in the Donbas, 
Kryvyi Rih, and Dnipropetrovsk in two months time.498  It would have to change attitudes 
towards Ukrainization fast. 
In spite of this bold gesture by the party, it remained ill-equipped to prod these 
industrial areas into action.  In the view of one metal worker, who was part of a 
delegation from the Donbas that met with Commissar of Education Skrypnyk, sentiment 
for Ukrainization in the region was not high among the young.  According to him, a 
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group of students from the Kharkiv agricultural institute which had come to the Donbas 
to evaluate its cultural needs in 1928 informed the local Narkomos section:  “The Donbas 
does not need qualified Ukrainian workers because the Donbas is Russian [ruskyi].”499  
The metal worker complained to Skrypnyk that the students had no right make this 
determination.  Nevertheless the anecdote’s assumption is instructive.  These 
representatives of the new Soviet intelligentsia, who might have been recruited to staff 
Ukrainian-language schools, propagandize among the unions, collective farmers, or even 
the party, were doubtful of the program’s utility.   
Furthermore, attempts to expand a proletarian Ukrainian culture in Donbas were 
problematic.  A KP(b)U directive had ordered trade unions to organize a month of 
Ukrainian culture in the Artemivsk, Luhansk, Dnipropetrovsk, and Kryvyi Rih regions 
for June 1930.500  It further instructed them to organize brigades of writers to popularize 
Ukrainian literature and scholarship, award workplaces that organized the best “red 
corners” on Ukrainian culture, and generally popularize Ukrainian culture.  However, one 
week after the month was supposed to have commenced, little had been accomplished.  
According to Narodnii uchytel, Robos members had been particularly negligent in their 
responsibility as “the vanguard of the cultural front.”501  When the secretary of the Robos 
All-Ukrainian Committee was asked what his organization had done for the month, he 
answered:  the entire union was on vacation.   
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The place of Ukrainian in the eastern Stalino region further illustrates the 
weakness of Ukrainization in industrial and mining areas, even in spite of a clear influx 
of ethnic Ukrainian laborers.  The okruha executive committee in this region reported that 
the use of “broken Ukrainian,” or language that pretended to be Ukrainian, was 
commonly used in soviet institutions.   Apparently, local authorities saw little use in 
studying Ukrainian or promoting its use.  In spite of the fact that the worker population 
was over 30% ethnically Ukrainian, children overwhelmingly attended Russian-language 
schools.502  Out of 2,340 Ukrainian children enrolled in school, only 193 studied in the 
one seven-year Ukrainian school that existed in Stalino.  Russian and national minority 
schools had sought to even bypass the Narkomos requirement for a separate class in 
Ukrainian by creating courses in Esperanto.    
In mining sites located outside of the city, where the ethnic Ukrainian population 
constituted a clear majority of the working force, there were no Ukrainian cultural groups 
and only a smattering of Ukrainian literature available in workers’ libraries.  In the past 
year, over seven thousand Komsomol members and 1,200 contractors had come to work 
in the mines.  All of them reportedly spoke Ukrainian, but trade union authorities led 
cultural work in Russian only.  Until fall 1929, there were no Ukrainian studies courses 
available to workers throughout the okruha.  Union leaders were either apathetic or 
openly hostile towards Ukrainization.  Only as a result of pressure from okruha leaders, 
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did the okruha union administration consent to the assignment of Ukrainizers to the 
region.503   The challenge for the future, however painted, was immense.   
 
The Façade of “Full Ukrainization” 
The shortage of Ukrainian schools in Stalino was characteristic of new 
manufacturing and mining centers in the Donbas.  The ethnic Ukrainian population in this 
area fluctuated according to the labor demands of expanding industry.   It was admittedly 
more difficult for local authorities to determine the specific educational needs of groups 
within diverse, growing populations.  In more established urban centers, Ukrainization in 
the schools appeared fine on paper.  According to a 1930 report by the Kharkiv okruha 
inspector, there were 28 Ukrainian schools out of the 63 schools in the city (43.7%) and 
488 out of 686 four-year schools in the surrounding raiony (85.5%).  These figures 
indicate a slight excess of Ukrainian schools relative to the proportion of the ethnic 
Ukrainian population in the city (38.4%) and in the countryside (81.7%).504  Okruha 
inspectors reported similar successes in formal Ukrainization in Dnipropetrovsk and 
Chernihiv.505 
What is surprising is that at late as 1930, the okruha inspectors were still reporting 
on the existence of schools of mixed Ukrainian-Russian instruction.  There were 10 such 
schools in the city of Kharkiv, 3 in the city of Dnipropetrovsk (11 in the countryside), and 
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3 in Chernihiv.506  Although local authorities foresaw the “full Ukrainization” of these 
schools, the fact they continued to exist suggests that schools did not have enough 
qualified Ukrainian speakers to staff all its schools and raises questions about the quality 
of instruction in the formally Ukrainized schools.  If there were competent Ukrainian-
speakers in surplus Ukrainian schools, why were they not transferred to schools 
designated for Ukrainization?  Why were half-Ukrainized schools needed anyhow if the 
Narkomos leadership’s objective continued to be the formation of monolingual schools 
comprised entirely of a single ethnicity?  In fact some of the formally Ukrainized schools 
were schools of mixed instruction.  This was especially true for the higher grades.  Full 
seven-year Ukrainian schools were still small in number.  
Narkomos recognized that figures regarding full Ukrainization were suspect.  It 
therefore instituted new perevirky of teachers in the winter of 1929-30.  Articles in the 
pedagogical press explained the need for and requirements of the examination.   
Prysaizhniuk, a contributor to Narodnii uchytel claimed that it was not uncommon to 
encounter teachers who continue to use the Ukrainian language with Russianisms 
[rusytsyzmamy] and that this habit of mixing Ukrainian and Russian was being passed 
onto the children.507  The teachers’ language was in some instances so muddled that 
children could not understand the lessons.  Prysaizhniuk claimed there were instances of 
local authorities appointing teachers who even deliberately confused children in this 
manner.   He argued some remedy was needed quickly or teachers would continue to 
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“pollute” the Ukrainian language and, significantly, harm the development of the 
children.  They would be literate in neither Ukrainian nor Russian.  
News of a coming perevirka again sent teachers into a panic.  They scrambled for 
literature and demanded more detailed instructions.  Prysaizhniuk described their 
desperate, last minute preparations as behavior similar to “feeding hounds when they are 
starving.”508   They did not intend mastery of language, nor understand why it was 
necessary.  They simply wanted to survive the process.   
Given what has already been discussed about the lack of Ukrainian-language 
schooling and studies in the Stalino okruha, it is not surprising that a December 1929 
perevirka in this area revealed an utter lack of knowledge of Ukrainian.  It disclosed the 
extent of the ignorance and apathy in detail.  Only a minority of the teachers knew 
anything about Ukrainian culture and history.  Even teachers in the higher grades who 
had some ability in Ukrainian had not read any new writers or engaged in any substantive 
language study.  Even if they had read Ukrainian classics such as Pesny Shevchenko they 
did not understand their value and, importantly, failed to provide any Marxist social 
analysis of these works.  The only teachers that purportedly attempted to keep up to date 
on pedagogy were in the Russian schools.509  In short, teachers not only had weak 
Ukrainian skills, but were also ill-equipped to apply any such knowledge to Narkomos’s 
principal goal:  the transformation of the school for the building of socialism.  Thus, 
when Martin points to Skrypnyk’s report that 97.4 percent of Ukrainian children enrolled 
in school were attending Ukrainian-language institutions in 1929-30, this did not mean 
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that the instruction in the Ukrainized schools had changed greatly.  Quantitatively 
speaking the Ukrainization of schools was “one of the greatest successes” of the 
campaign. However, authorities needed to do much more to assure that these numbers 
meant anything. 
The situation was reportedly no better in the Ukrainian-speaking heartland of the 
Kyiv region.  One Narodnii uchytel writer, Kost, claimed that teachers’ understanding of 
language had declined.  Kost reviewed the archive of a tsarist-era higher zemstvo school 
and argued that the written work of teachers in this school was superior to that of 
contemporary teachers:  “We are not idealizing the old school, but only underlining that a 
certain knowledge of grammar (etymology and syntax) was demanded from the teacher.   
Without this knowledge, a person is not a teacher.”510  He claimed that it was not only 
Narkomos which required teachers to improve their language skills, but populations 
served by these teachers.  These communities sought punishment for those teachers who 
continued to demonstrate language is crippling (shkutylhaie).  Kost insists that teachers 
needed to recognize their obligations themselves, they had to be “smiths and jewelers” of 
the word.  If they failed in their duty, they would compromise their students’ future.   
Local authorities sometimes made allowances for shortcomings in the teachers’ 
knowledge.  Another Narodnii uchytel contributor, Eskiz, claimed that only one teacher 
formally passed the Ukrainian-language perevirka in the Makarivskyi raion (Kyiv 
okruha).   Most teachers petitioned the examination committee for a postponement of 
their examination until the spring or summer break; the remainder fell into the lower 
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second or third categories of knowledge.511  The committee evidently chose either to 
grant these petitions or “temporarily” place teachers in the above categories and give 
them the option of repeating the evaluation.  Eskiz suggests that the perevirka may have 
been too demanding.  It consisted of written work in Ukrainian literature, an oral quiz in 
syntax, and dictations.  During the oral quizzes participants were required to talk about 
the content of some author’s work and use proper style and pronunciation.  The problem, 
he maintains, was that teachers rarely received new Soviet literature or a description of 
the Narkomos program.  Narkomos gave them no time to prepare or any indication of the 
themes that would be covered.   It was no wonder then that the teachers failed to perform 
adequately.  A postponement in the perevirka for most meant that local authorities 
recognized the challenges in preparing for the perevirka and had to adjust accordingly. 
One article in Narodnii uchytel blamed the difficulties teachers’ encountered in 
the perevirka on the union.  He claimed that the problem of Ukrainization was worse in 
rural schools. Yet the union had not pressed state publishers to distribute literature across 
the republic.  A “wave of perevirka of Ukrainian studies has swept to distant corners 
‘blocked by heaps of snow,’” but book deliveries had not broken through to these far-
flung locales.512  Even if teachers managed to get their hands on some literature it was 
almost always technical in nature.  Literary journals, which reviewed and published the 
new authors covered in the perevirka, were reportedly impossible to obtain.  Although 
okruha educational inspectors had promised to organize preparatory courses, they had 
broken this pledge.  Union officials assumed no accountability themselves.  In short, the 
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article concluded, teachers faced “insurmountable difficulties.”   Ukrainian literacy, 
according to this understanding, was fundamentally about command of the content and 
style of new “red” literature, not simply a demonstration of conversational fluency.  
Teachers had to prove they could participate in the cultural campaigns associated with the 
Five-Year Plan.  The random publications to which rural teachers had access were clearly 
insufficient.  
However, not all in the press were willing to give teachers such latitude.  Another 
correspondent for Narodnii uchytel, Samarchenko, reacted to reports of teacher anxiety 
and complaints with indignation.  He questioned why, more then ten year after the 
revolution, Narkomos still had to raise the question of “Ukrainizing Ukrainian teachers.”  
Ideally, teachers had nothing to fear from a perevirka:    
Teachers should come to the commission in a comradely way and demonstrate 
that the ‘modern teacher’ is an unquestionably literate [pismenna] person in 
regards to Ukrainian studies and that he will not simply cripple [kalichyty] the 
children’s language, but rather will raise the language of Ukrainian children to the 
higher level of a literary language.513 
 
Reality, however, was shattering such “rose-colored dreams.”  Teachers still did not 
know Ukrainian well enough and resisted having their knowledge evaluated.  Previous 
perevirky had obviously made little impact.   
Samarchenko rejected the notion advanced by Eskiz and others that perevirka 
commissions were too harsh.  Teachers did not have the excuse of not having access to 
books, he claimed.  Those who really wanted to could procure them.  At the very least, 
they should not confuse the literature they had read.   Furthermore, their knowledge of 
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basic Ukrainian grammar and syntax was so poor that even the teacher petitions were 
filled with mistakes.  The perevirka was meant to send teachers a signal.   However, 
ultimately the teachers’ had to overcome their own apathy.  State-run courses in 
Ukrainian knowledge, Samarchenko implied, could not simply “plant knowledge of 
Ukrainian studies in the head.”514  Teachers who did not pursue this knowledge 
themselves had no right to teach in Ukrainian schools.  He contends that the “depressed 
mood” predominant among teachers taking the perevirka would befall Soviet society 
generally.  How could teachers illiterate in Ukrainian advance the cause of socialism in a 
predominantly Ukrainian-speaking republic?  Soviet Ukraine would be the eventual 
victim of their failings. 
In spite of the threat of additional perevirky and even dismissal, Narkomos reports 
confirm that teachers’ Ukrainian knowledge remained poor.   The Kryvyi Rih okruha 
inspectorate informed Narkomos in 1930 that “schools still do not clearly and intensely 
undertake lesson in the Ukrainian language.”515  The results of an earlier perevirka found 
that teachers still made extensive use of slang: 69 passed the examination, 598 failed, 168 
did not appear, and 148 were given exemptions.  The okruha educational section did 
attempt a remedy.  Raion methodological sections organized a total of sixty courses in 
Ukrainian studies and the state of Ukrainization became a regular subject of discussion in 
teachers meetings and in the okruha newspaper, Chervonyi hirnyk (Red Miner).  
However, a second perevirka in 1929 was delayed.  As of the writing of the report in 
May, authorities had carried out a perevirka only in the city of Kryvyi Rih and in two 
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raiony.  In the city, fifty percent of the teachers passed, in the surrounding countryside 
only thirty percent passed.  The inspectorate pledged to carry out a perevirka in the 
raiony by the end of the year.  However, the continued high failure rate of teachers was 
alarming.   Furthermore, although the inspectorate had promised to expand Ukrainian-
language use for children’s extracurricular activities, all youth work in the okruha’s 
principal cities remained in Russian.  The chance of dismissal was slight and few teachers 
or youth leaders saw real incentive to improve their Ukrainian language skills.516  
Demonstration of a bare minimum of knowledge provided grounds for a regular delay in 
an examination and postponement of disciplinary action.   
Authorities in Mykolaiv corroborated this picture of the state of Ukrainization in 
the schools.  In April 1930 the Mykolaiv okruha inspectorate and Robos head sent a letter 
to teachers in the region.   It reported the results of a perevirka held at raion teachers’ 
conferences.   Only five to ten teachers in each raion had met Narkomos’s minimum 
requirement for Ukrainian language knowledge.  Most did not know grammar or 
orthography well, some were entirely illiterate.   If they spoke Ukrainian, they often had 
only mastered the local peasant dialect.517  Furthermore, they used archaic expressions in 
their writing and expressed astonishment that there was anything new in the Ukrainian 
language, regularly referring to the authority of the “Shevchenko language.”  Regarding 
Ukrainian studies, they were either familiar with only a few names of Ukrainian authors 
or could repeat excerpts of their writing without reference to context.  Their knowledge 
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of Ukrainian history was similar.  They had memorized phrases written by the Marxist 
historian Iavorskyi, but had little understanding of what they meant.  They had ignored 
kraieznavstvo altogether.  
The letter stressed that the central role of the Ukrainian language in the Five-Year 
Plan and called teachers to action.  If teachers neglected Ukrainian knowledge, they 
diminished the influence of Soviet power:   
The matter of Ukrainization has acquired special significance now when the 
question of a cultural revolution has been broadly posed, [a question] that, in 
specific conditions of Ukrainian culture, especially in the village, should concern 
the work of conscious Ukrainian citizens, primarily, of course, the cultural 
authority in the village - teachers who uphold Ukrainian culture in its essence and 
in competent work.518   
 
Teachers needed to be “armed” with Ukrainian culture for both their pedagogical and 
public work.  Thus, the inspectorate promised to pay special attention to the state of 
Ukrainization during the course of its regular inspections and threatened Narkomos 
would “take measures against those who do not achieve the program’s minimum.”  It 
recommended that teachers form their own groups (hurtki) for Ukrainian knowledge.  In 
a separate communication to Narkomos, the inspectorate announced it had already 
enrolled 155 teachers in special courses on Ukrainian studies and promised to hold 
another perevirka at the end of the academic year.519  Clearly, it felt the need to 
demonstrate some sort of progress. 
The problem was that the shortcomings educational authorities cited and the 
solutions they proposed in 1929-30 were little different than those suggested when the 
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Ukrainization campaign began.   At the time of the SVU arrests and trial, few in 
Narkomos were willing to suggest bold solutions to the vexing problem of Ukrainization 
and educators responded to renewed campaigns with as little effort as needed.  An April 
1929 article in Narodnii uchytel on the state of Ukrainization in higher education reveals 
some of the inherent tensions in the party’s nationalities policy at the time of the cultural 
revolution.   It found that many post-secondary administrators took a formal approach to 
Ukrainization. 520 Professors either did not push Ukrainization or were openly opposed to 
it.  Students did not understand the policy and some sought to deliberately sabotage it.  
Educational administrators purportedly did little to oppose such “rabble rousers.”  
It was not enough for educators to rest content with an improvement in their own 
language knowledge.  They needed to be ever watchful against “stewing” of groups 
opposed to Soviet nationalities policy.    The article claimed that this danger came from 
two fronts: russophilic bureaucrats and the bourgeoisie, who were opposed to Ukrainian 
culture generally, and Petliurists and kulaks, who sought to co-opt it and incite Ukrainian 
chauvinism and anti-Semitism.  It instructed the post-secondary instructors to see 
Ukrainization as a call to battle:  “He should be and active builder in the construction of a 
Ukrainian culture in form, but proletarian and international in content.”521   
Martin argues that the SVU show trial established a pattern of “asymmetric 
terror,” where the party framed fighting bourgeois nationalism as a core task and 
korenizatsiia as a secondary one.522  Those who resisted Ukrainization did not suffer the 
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same fate as “deviationist” Ukrainizers, in spite of Kaganovich’s attempt to exert greater 
pressure on them.  Although Martin claims that threats of dismissal motivated some 
higher education instructors to accept Ukrainization, the above Narodnii uchytel report 
casts doubt on the sincerity or value of their efforts.  Certainly, at the primary school 
level, teacher avoidance and failure of examinations revealed that resistance was still 
widespread.   
The safest course was the principal approach the article was criticizing: passivity.  
Clearly, many post-secondary instructors had already chosen this path.  Primary school 
teachers were unlikely to turn from their example.  Open resistance to Ukrainization 
invited charges of Russian nationalism; an overzealous embrace raised the flag of 
Ukrainian nationalism.   The warnings associated with Ukrainization stand out in much 
greater relief than the article’s invocation.   Few tempted fate by trying to sort out the 
difference between cultural form and content.  It was best to prove one’s commitment to 
Soviet nationalities policy only as much as necessary.   
 
The Subordination of Ukrainian Educational Norms 
A fundamental redirection in educational policy would take place in the 
organization of the Ukrainian system of education.  Debate over standardization of 
educational norms coincided with the commencement of the First Five-Year Plan and 
presaged a prioritization of all-Union demands over republican interests.  Skrypnyk 
sanctioned the dismantling of the Ukrainian system largely out of consideration of the 
VKP(b)’s broad economic goals.  This process occurred gradually, overlapping in part 
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with the SVU show trial.  Although not directly connected to the educational 
standardization talks, the SVU affair offered Narkomos an excuse for a redirection once 
discussion had begun.  A consequence of this effort was a framework for increased party 
control, particularly from the center, over education.  Ultimately, the door was open for a 
rejection of the progressive pedagogy that Ukrainization was supposed to have enabled. 
In October 1928 the subject of centralization of republican educational systems 
assumed center stage at an All-Ukrainian Conference for Sotsvykh Workers.  The head of 
the conference’s commission on unification declared at the outset that he did not believe 
that standardization was necessary:  the Russian and Ukrainian systems of education, the 
chief competing options, answered the specific needs of each republic and centralization 
would “cripple education.”523  Another participant agreed, arguing that the thought of an 
identical educational system throughout the Soviet Union was ridiculous:  “it is 
impossible to put all institutions under one stamp.”  Much of the debate centered on the 
meaning of a polytechnical education.  The conference attendees criticized the Russian 
polytechnical school as being too abstract.524  They defended the link between the 
Ukrainian labor school and the secondary professional school.  Better coordination 
between the schools might be needed, but the system enabled children to receive focused 
professional training only after they had acquired an education in basic labor ideology at 
the labor school level.  This system best met the needs of Ukraine’s labor shortage 
economy and represented a true polytechnical approach. 
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Discussion at the local level varied.  Kyiv okruha educational authorities passed a 
resolution in April 1929 confirming the centralization of the Soviet educational system on 
the basis of the Ukrainian model.  It emphasized that the labor school must offer a 
terminal polytechnical education, but offered little in the way of modifying the current 
system other than suggesting an eighth year of primary schooling might be added when 
economic conditions improved.  It even confirmed the continuance of the pre-
professional industrial FZU school and agrarian ShKM (School for Collective Farm 
Youth) at a level parallel to the labor school’s higher grades.   
A report by the Odesa okruha inspectorate indicated considerable debate over the 
question of centralization in the region.  The report claimed that there was a general 
consensus among the educators for centralization of the educational system on the basis 
of an eight-year school.  However, there was a handful of teachers opposed to 
centralization entirely, as well as those who argued for rigid adherence to the Ukrainian 
seven-year school and those who wished wholesale replication of the Russian nine-year 
school.525  In December 1928, educators confirmed a series of theses on centralization.  
They insisted on maintenance of the Ukrainian system’s nomenclature, a division 
between social upbringing and professional education. The labor school, as the basis of 
this system, was not just a general educational school, but also a “public-political” one, 
designed to “bring up” (vykhovaty) children in the values of socialism.  The educators’ 
resolution suggested the labor school had neglected this task due to an overload of 
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expectations.  It thus proposed an additional year of labor school instruction without an 
accompanying increase in the school’s program.    
Commissar of Education Skrypnyk argued similarly for centralization based on a 
reform of the existing Ukrainian system.  He had long believed that the republic’s 
professional secondary schools were too specialized, in spite of his predecessors’ 
insistence on their polytechnical character:  “I think that this theory is only a belated 
attempt at correcting an inopportune theory of monotechnism.”526  He maintained a 
compromise between the Ukrainian and Russian systems might be reached if the 
Ukrainians generalized the curriculum of their professional secondary school:  “Our 
schools must be professional-polytechnical.  They must dispense knowledge and prepare 
a worker for a specific qualification, but simultaneously must provide theoretical and 
practical familiarity with every important field of production.”527  Other republics might 
then adopt this secondary school. 
Skrypnyk linked the task of the centralization of the system of education to the 
economic priorities of the Five-Year Plan.  He stressed that an all-Union scheme for 
economic coordination required educational unity between the republics.  All educational 
institutions had to be devoted to the common task of training the next generation of 
laborers.  His commissariat had already come under criticism for its failure to produce a 
large educated workforce.528  Skrypnyk repeated his commitment to the goal of universal 
primary schooling and its qualitative improvement, arguing for the replacement of rural 
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four-year schools with seven-year instruction wherever possible.  He maintained that the 
seven-year school offered the best chance of giving the young a comprehensive, labor-
oriented education, yet still assuring they begin “professional-polytechnical” training by 
age fifteen in order to participate in the building of socialism in the shortest time frame 
possible.  The demands of industrialization meant that a student’s general education in 
the labor school should not be lengthened.  It could also not be shortened.  Skrypnyk was 
sharply critical of the FZU’s recruitment of students who had only completed four grades 
and stressed the importance of a complete program of “social upbringing” before any 
skill training began.529   
The complete centralization of the educational systems was not immediate, but in 
spite of the public discussion over its possibility and form, the party leadership had 
already determined it would occur.   An All-Union Party meeting on education was 
planned for April 1930 in Moscow, some ten long years after Hrynko defended (and won 
support) for the Ukrainian system of education at the first meeting in 1920.    Although 
Skrypnyk and the new Russian Commissar of Education, Andrei Bubnov, were scheduled 
to speak at the meeting, their speeches were cancelled because they had already signed 
documents setting the stage for a “unified” system of education.530  When the conference 
met, it unanimously resolved that: “The further existence of different educational systems 
in the union republics cannot now be justified.  The specifics of national culture and local 
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conditions must be addressed in a single system of public education and in a single, plan 
of cultural work for the whole USSR.”531   
The final form of this system would not be decided until later.  The party meeting 
resolved that all schools needed to emphasize a polytechnical approach and ordered 
Ukrainian professional schools and the two highest grades of the Russian nine-year 
school to convert to technicums.  In August 1932 the All-Union Central Committee 
abolished this arrangement and ordered all seven-year schools to convert to ten-year 
polytechnical schools by the 1932-33 academic year.532  Union authorities assumed direct 
control over higher education in the same year.  However, scholars widely consider 1930 
the end of a separate Ukrainian educational system.533 
The beginning of the 1930s was also a time of remarkable confusion for teachers 
trying to sort out what Narkomos expected of them methodologically.   The 1929-30 
curriculum fundamentally altered the focus of schools.  In Russia, an activist pedagogue 
named V. N. Shulgin had been criticizing schools for their lack of revolutionary zeal.  
During the midst of the cultural revolution, he became a leading administrator of the 
Russian Narkompros and used his position to exhort teachers to pursue socially useful 
“projects” with their students, linking activities to factories or collective farms.534  As 
Gail Lapidus has written, the party’s attempts to mobilize students for work during the 
Five-Year Plan had already disrupted the work of educational institutions.   When 
                                                 
531 Bondar, 53. 
532 Iasnyts’kyi, 162. 
533 Krylov, 78; Bondar, 54; Sukhomlyns’ka, ed., Narys istorii ukrains’koho shkilnytstvo, 173. 
534 Fitzpatrick, Education and Social Mobility in the Soviet Union, 139-157.   
  
291 
Shulgin began to speak of the imminent “withering away” of the school, he was in fact 
offering an “optimistic rationalization of educational chaos.”535   
There has been remarkably little written on Shulgin’s influence outside of Russia.  
The Ukrainian Commissariat of Education responded to this pressure from its Russian 
counterpart by reworking its previous demands for kraieznavstvo production-oriented 
exercises.  On one level, this approach built upon the 1920s experience.  Mylovydov, a 
contributor to the pedagogical journal Radianska osvita, noted that the 1929-30 
curriculum was similar to the old program in its directives to draw general lessons from 
local study.536  Educational authorities continued to use progressive language.  Skrypnyk 
stressed that a student needed to acquire “knowledge on his own initiative with his labor 
and wisdom.”537  Skrypnyk also stressed that the Ukrainian Narkomos would not permit 
the use of child labor by collective farms or factories for labor’s sake.538    He maintained 
that Ukrainian teachers must always prioritize the pedagogical value of any activity. 
However, there was heightened militancy to this brand of methodology that 
overroad all other concerns.  Mylovydov argued that the 1929-30 program placed a new 
emphasis on direct observation.  According to the program, “the school organizes around 
itself all of society, participates, and gives direction to the life of the raion.”539  The 
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program included a whole section of explanatory notes on how to accomplish this task.  
Skrypnyk argued this sort of activity would train students for leadership:   
Social upbringing, in my opinion, is ideological production, particular to the 
phase of socialist reconstruction of our country, which has as its task the re-
upbringing and upbringing of millions of adults and young generations of 
laboring humanity to remake and make them capable of the execution of great 
historical tasks, to have them become a proletarian class before us.540   
 
The project method was indoctrination through application.  Now, students’ activities 
were linked to concrete tasks:  industrialization, collectivization and class struggle.  
Although complexes were nominally retained, these themes alone guided instruction.   
More research needs to be done on the actual impact of the “project” method at 
the level of the classroom in Ukraine.   Nevertheless, 1929-30 academic year marked a 
critical juncture in educational policy.  It was at this time that practices that Shulgin had 
long advocated came to fruition.  By 1931 Shulgin’s favor among the party leadership 
was already waning.  The commissariats of education did not, however, advocate a return 
to 1920s progressivism, but rather opted for traditional, subject-oriented methodology, 
designed to provide students with a set body of knowledge.   Although the cultural 
revolution did not anticipate this turn, Lapidus argues that, in the Russian case 
By facilitating the short-term economic needs, and by injecting direct, if crude, 
political criteria into the evaluation of the educational theory and practice, the 
cultural revolution destroyed the limited autonomy that [the Russian] Narkompros 
had achieved, and its vision of an education that joined social needs to individual 
development.541 
 
Similarly, in Ukraine, the Communist Party in the person of Commissar of Education 
Mykola Skrypnyk would exercise strict control over the field of education.  Gone was the 
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complex system’s focus on the civic instruction through the development of child’s 
interests and talents.    
A survey of pedagogical literature in Ukraine demonstrates this important shift in 
educational policy during the early 1930s.  The teachers’ newspaper Narodnii uchytel 
ceased publication in 1930, having lasted only five years as an advocate of both the 
complex system and Ukrainization. The largely theoretical journal Shliakh osvita was 
replaced in 1931 by Komunistychna osvita, which placed a class understanding of the 
school’s mission at the fore.  The journal Radianska osvita merged one year later with a 
new competing journal, Za politekhnychnu osvitu, as Politekhnichna shkola.  These were 
years of immense flux and editorial boards were struggling to adapt to changed 
environment.  But already by 1930 it was clear that the progressive pedagogy, advocated 
by non-party theorists and administrators, had ended. 
The SVU show trial helped lend a sense of urgency the task of educational reform 
and the gradual subordination of the Ukrainian system gave authorities powerful tools to 
control curriculum in the classroom.  Skrypnyk explained that Narkomos’s chief 
responsibility now lay in the coordination of methodology, not administrative operations.  
The existence of “counterrevolutionary ideological saboteurs” in education required new 
attention.542  At first, authorities claimed imprisoned SVU members like Durdukivskyi 
had tried to force a return to “formal” instruction in the schools.543  They were not only 
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trying to implant a nationalist orientation in their students, they were also undermining 
Soviet pedagogy.   
By 1932 the pedagogical press claimed that Ukrainian nationalists had used the 
complex system to impair education.  One critic, Pomohaiba, accused SVU member 
Ivanytsia of intentionally equating the complex method with Marxism in order to confuse 
teachers.544  He found numerous counterrevolutionary passages that appeared in the 
textbooks and pedagogical writings of Ivanytsia and Doha (both arrested as members of 
SVU).  He did not describe specific “nationalist” tracts, but rather the failure of SVU 
members to acknowledge class struggle and the role of the party.  One article edited by 
Doha, Durdukivskyi, and Ivanytsia allegedly excluded the “primary role of the teacher.”  
Of course, progressive pedagogy dictated that the teacher’s role was as a facilitator and 
Ivanytsia was a leading proponent of exercises favoring child self-activity.   In a 1932 
report to Robos, Skrypnyk labeled “all philosophical, idealistic, and theoretical founders 
of the complex system” enemies.545  The SVU then became a convenient excuse to end 
such excessive theorizing in pedagogy as well as teacher and student independence in the 
schools.   
Ukrainian proposals for the standardization of a Soviet educational system during 
the debates of the late 1920s imagined an extension of the heart of the Soviet Ukrainian 
pedagogy: the creation of a new socialist citizen, familiar with all aspects of labor, 
equipped to learn more, but not locked permanently into any one profession.   
                                                 
544 V. Pomahaiba, "Posylyty vohon' po fashysts'kii pedahohitsi SVU," Politekhnichna osvita, no. 3 (1932): 
8. 
545 Viddil narodn'oi osvity Kyivs'koi mis'krady, 32. 
  
295 
Centralization, as imposed from above, ultimately meant an end to this progressive zeal.  
In response to the demands of the party, Narkomos came to stress the importance of 
discipline in the schools, textbooks, and a traditional hierarchy of institutions.  
Acquisition of basic knowledge and an emphasis on educational advancement superceded 
any notion of pedagogical experimentation.  Ukrainization at the primary school level 
continued, but remained troubled.  The homogenization of education offered reasonable 
grounds for this retreat.  It demonstrated that power lay in the center and privileged the 
transportability of education.  Professional advancement would require mastery of the 
language of the center:  Russian.  This reality did not mean the end of Ukrainian 
schooling, but the beginning of its limitation. 
From the perspective of educational policy then, 1930 was a critical year.  The 
SVU show trial in the spring of 1930 also changed nationalities policy irrevocably.  Most 
importantly, it removed or scared Ukrainization’s most committed administrators and 
suppliers of the “raw material” needed for success. The period following 1930 was a time 
of an apparently significant expansion of Ukrainian-language schooling.  Bohdan 
Krawchenko labels it the “high point,” noting that by 1932, 87% of general education 
schools had Ukrainian as their language of instruction and 85% of children enrolled in 
schools were of Ukrainian nationality.546  However, as reports of the 1930 perevirky have 
made clear, much more research needs to be done on the quality of Ukrainian-language 
instruction and the level of preparation of teachers during this time.  Given the chaos 
provoked by Shulgin’s “project method” and the party’s abrupt turn against it, teachers 
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were much more concerned with sorting out what teaching method was now permissible 
than improving their Ukrainian.  They would have had few sources to which to turn.  As 
Krawchenko concedes, a 1931 review of books published between 1928 and 1930 
revealed “major ideological errors” and the editorial staffs of were purged.547  In one of 
its last editions in November 1930, the Narodnii uchytel editorial board called for the 
severe punishment of the manager of its own publishing house for allowing the 
publication of a “rightist” brochure.548 
What was fundamentally different about the period following 1930 was the 
Ukrainization campaign’s mechanistic nature.  The archival record for Narkomos in the 
years that followed appears to contain no comprehensive files about Ukrainization at the 
primary school level.  Of pre-eminent concern for the party during this period were 
VKP(b) TsK decrees of July and August 1930 ordering universal enrollment of school 
age children.549   The Ukrainian Commissariat’s claim that 98.2% of children aged 8-10 
were enrolled during the 1930-31 academic year compared to 75.2% during 1929-30 
seems highly inflated and while Presidium of the VUTsVK claimed great success in a 
September 1931 report, it also acknowledged not all local authorities had met their 
targets.550  Regardless, even if the official figures are somewhat accurate, not enough 
schools had been built and teachers trained in the intervening time to serve the new 
students.   Students placed in newly “Ukrainized” schools were doubtless subject to a 
poor quality education.   Government statistics may have reflected high Ukrainization, 
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but this meant little more than schools had been designated as such on paper and 
increased numbers of ethnic Ukrainian students were enrolled in overcrowded schools.  
The 1932-33 famine created further chaos in rural Ukrainian schools, a tragedy that is 
worthy of separate, rigorous study.  The characterization of 1930-33 as the golden age of 
Ukrainian schooling does not appear apt. 
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Conclusion 
Recent events have underscored the symbolic power of language and education 
demonstrated by the experience of Soviet Ukraine in the 1920s.  In the November 2004 
Ukrainian presidential elections, incumbent prime minister Viktor Yanukovych attempted 
to muster support for his campaign by claiming that a victory by his opponent, Viktor 
Yushchenko, would lead to a weakening of the linguistic rights of Ukraine’s Russian-
speaking community, including parental choice of a child’s language of instruction.  He 
promised to hold a national referendum on granting the Russian language official status.  
The Yanukovych campaign’s claims of “discrimination” against Russian-speakers 
provided the framework for the prime minister’s political platform and shaped media 
coverage of the election.  The international press regularly spoke of the possible division 
of Ukraine between language communities, repeating the warnings of the Yanukovych 
camp.  After the Central Election Commission declared Yanukovych the official victor of 
the November poll, Yushchenko supporters took to the streets, claiming widespread vote-
rigging by Yanukovych’s followers.  The Ukrainian Supreme Court intervened and 
forced a second runoff in which Yushchenko emerged as the ultimate victor. 
Other issues besides language played a critical role in determining voter choice, 
but the intersection between language and education was salient enough for Yushchenko 
to include a pledge to respect the right of parents to educate their children in the 
“language of their parents” in his inauguration speech.  Furthermore, parties allied with 
Yanukovych’s defeated camp have continued to point to “shortages” of Russian schools 
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in some of Ukraine’s major cities, including Kyiv.  Language remains an important 
rhetorical device for political mobilization and debate because of its emotive potential. 
In the 1920s the Ukrainian republican and party leadership asked educators and 
intellectuals to use language as a tool for the radical transformation of society.  This study 
has sought to unpack what this process meant and demonstrate at the level of the 
classroom the union between educational and nationalities policy.  It thus seeks to go 
beyond a discussion of language transfer by decree which previous scholarship has 
addressed.  The KP(b)U entrusted the Commissariat of Education (Narkomos) to apply 
an innovative, progressive pedagogy towards the creation of a new generation of Soviet 
citizens.  Russian educators shared this approach, but their Ukrainian counterparts gave it 
greater attention because of the distinct professional orientation of the Ukrainian 
educational system.   Narkomos aimed to do away with traditional subject divisions and 
teacher pedantry by integrating lessons into thematic groupings or complexes firmly 
oriented towards instructing students in the value of labor and the role of production.  
Students would gain a “labor mentality” by acculturation and more rapidly take their 
place in the rebuilding of an economy recovering from the civil war. 
Narkomos maintained that instruction in the Ukrainian language was absolutely 
necessary for teachers to achieve this goal.   It judged Ukrainian to be the native language 
for all ethnic Ukrainian children and educators stressed the primary role of language in 
the new methodology.  The commissariat also sought to rationalize education by 
recommending that teachers develop an awareness of production through the study of the 
familiar, or “regional studies” (kraieznavstvo).  The curriculum provided for the gradual 
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broadening of this study to an investigation of a region’s tie to all of Ukraine.  The 
Ukrainian language and Ukrainian studies were both at the core of a curriculum that 
allowed teachers and students considerable freedom to innovate.  Narkomos’s hope was 
that children would gain the outlook, self-confidence, and decision-making skills 
necessary to undertake their public duties as young adults. 
However, most teachers were ill-prepared for the dual demands of a progressive 
pedagogy and Ukrainization.   They were poorly paid, generally had a low level of 
education, and little training in how to teach in Ukrainian or design a curriculum on the 
basis of the complex system touted by Narkomos guides.  Schools, on the whole, 
remained in a state of disrepair and teachers lacked paper, basic school supplies, and most 
importantly, Ukrainian-language textbooks or pedagogical guides.  Narkomos had 
pursued a decentralized process for both Ukrainization and curricular planning, leaving 
the tasks of school reform to local educational sections.  The general lack of state and 
community financial support for education meant that these sections could offer teachers 
few opportunities for retraining.  Some returned to a formalistic approach in the 
classroom or abandoned methodology altogether.  
 Importantly, evaluations of teachers’ language knowledge revealed that teachers 
had also not made much qualitative progress in transferring to Ukrainian language 
knowledge.  Narkomos correlated resistance to linguistic and pedagogical reform and 
viewed instances of both as anti-Soviet behavior.  Although local educational sections 
occasionally acted to discipline or dismiss problematic teachers, they also made 
allowances for delay.  There were few incentives for real change.  Ultimately, this study 
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has argued, the success of Ukrainization must be judged at this level.  An increase in 
Ukrainian-language schooling did not translate into a rapid transformation of the 
classroom’s language environment. 
In spite of the problems associated with Ukrainization, this dissertation maintains 
that the shift to Ukrainian-language schooling was a fundamental aspect of the party’s 
program for galvanizing republic-wide support for its economic programs and assuring 
urban authority over the village.  If industrial laborers and the party were to administer 
the countryside, they would have to master its language -- Ukrainian.  The Ukrainization 
campaign meant little without Ukrainization of the proletariat.  Nevertheless, protests 
regarding the “forced” Ukrainization of some laborers (and their children) occasioned the 
intervention of the party.   Commissar of Education Shumskyi continued to insist on the 
need for Ukrainization of the proletariat, but the KP(b)U Politburo and Stalin rejected any 
semblance of coercion.   However, after Shumskyi’s ouster in 1926, Narkomos did not 
(and could not) abandon the Ukrainization of the republic’s industrial laborers, but settled 
on a more indirect formula.  Ukrainization of the proletariat would occur gradually 
through children.  Although the KP(b)U absolutely forbade the involuntary schooling of 
ethnic Russian children in Ukrainian, it gave Narkomos the freedom to continue to 
Ukrainize children of Russified Ukrainians.  In effect, Russified Ukrainian parents had to 
resist a strong Narkomos campaign of persuasion and disprove the identification of 
Ukrainian as the native language of their children.  Narkomos’s final objective was the 
creation of a Ukrainian-speaking, labor-oriented cadre that would alter the linguistic 
environment of the cities. 
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The paradox of both the program for Ukrainization and the new Soviet school was 
that the Communist Party leadership required absolute political control and yet had little 
day-to-day management over the classroom and the political costs of its activity.  
Although the shortcomings of Ukrainization among teachers were widespread, there was 
a group of educators committed to the policy and its improvement.  The person of 
Ukrainizer and pedagogical innovator was often one and the same.  The KP(b)U relied on 
these individuals greatly for Ukrainization’s general success.  Consequently, the 
importance of the field of education, often characterized as a “soft line” concern, should 
not be minimized.  In some areas, educators were creating alternative centers of authority 
to Narkomos.  The KP(b)U monitored the activity of these figures and grew increasingly 
worried about their potential power.  Non-party educators subscribed to a broad 
understanding of Ukrainian culture’s place in the building of socialism and worked to 
strengthen this role.  They hoped that Ukrainization’s ultimate agenda would be shaped 
by their efforts.  They put great faith in the ability of education to define behavior, a faith 
that the party leadership ultimately shared and feared. 
This study has argued that the SVU show trial irrevocably damaged future efforts 
for Ukrainization and suggested that the oft-cited achievements of 1930-33 must be 
questioned. The SVU show trial was aimed directly at Ukrainizing and progressive 
educators.  The KP(b)U, guided by Moscow, put forty-five members of the intelligentsia 
on trial, not just because it had little confidence in them, but because it was worried about 
the real consequences of their work (despite the actual deficiencies of a Ukrainian-
language education in 1929-30).  The signal that the party intended for teachers was that 
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they must place Ukrainization under the party’s leadership and wed it to the public 
campaigns of the Five-Year Plan.  The message teachers understood was that it was best 
not to burden themselves unnecessarily with the goals of campaign.  Although Narkomos 
achieved full Ukrainization formally, examinations of teacher knowledge continued to 
reveal a weak grasp of the Ukrainian language and Ukrainian studies topics.  Few were 
leading the charge for a policy that the republican leaders continued to tout. 
Furthermore, the party’s move to rein in Ukrainization corresponded with a 
protracted move to assume management over classroom methodology.  By 1930 it was 
clear that the complex method had not realized Narkomos’s academic goals and had 
created too much opportunity for variant interpretations of curriculum.  Soviet authorities 
politicized the school and linked student activism to the explicit goals of the First Five-
Year Plan: collectivization and industrialization.  The move to conform the Ukrainian 
educational system to all-Union norms foreshadowed the regimentation of the 
educational system generally.  The SVU trial ultimately offered an excuse for a full-scale 
rejection of the complex system.  Several SVU defendants had been prominent sponsors 
of progressive pedagogy.  Now the complex system as a whole was tainted by association 
and the pedagogical press blamed Ukrainian nationalists for confusion in the schools.   
In 1933-34, when the party finally declared “local nationalism” the chief danger, 
Soviet authorities purged the Narkomos apparatus almost entirely of its existing staff and 
dismissed thousands of Ukrainian teachers.551  By the late 1930s, the number of 
Ukrainian schools dropped in major urban centers and Soviet authorities began a gradual 
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campaign for the re-Russification of higher education.  Both these processes would 
accelerate after the war.  In fact, the die had been cast earlier.  The SVU show trial had 
already fundamentally undermined the potential of Ukrainian-language instruction.  It 
was at this point that the restriction and subordination of Ukrainian-language instruction 
began and it never recovered the dynamism it had enjoyed prior to 1930. 
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